**Endnotes**

**for *One Brief Miracle: The Diplomat, the Zealot, and the Wild Blundering Siege***

(abridged e-book edition of a full hardback edition originally published in 2002 as *Cursed Is the Peacemaker)*

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**Note on declassified government documents**

I cite hundreds of cables and other documents declassified by the State Department, National Security Council, FBI, and other agencies. Each is cited here by city of origin, number, and date/time. Most cables cited use military time, with a 24-hour clock, so 21 means 9 p.m. *Z* stands for “Zulu,” shorthand for Greenwich Mean Time. Example: 062147Z Jul 82 means July 6, 1982, at 9:47 p.m. GMT.

I have donated the documents to the National Security Archive at The George Washington University. Ask for the “John Boykin Collection / Middle East Peace Negotiations.”

**Note on interviews**

In each case, I give the last name of the interviewee and date of the interview. I have donated recordings of most of my interviews to The Foreign Affairs Oral History Program of the Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training in Alexandria, Virginia.

**Chapter 1: The Bellowing Diplomat**

Phil had profile: Grove 6-12-94.

Medal of Freedom ceremony: Bider 4-26-93 --and 5-23-93; Marjorie Habib 9-28-93 and 7-18-93; Phyllis Habib 7-7-97; “Reagan Presents A Medal to Habib,” *Washington Post,* 9-8-82; “Phil Habib Wins Presidential Medal of Freedom,” *State,* October 1982. Habib’s friend and one-time boss Walter Orebaugh received the Medal of Freedom in 1946 (“A Hero’s Words,” *Naples [Florida] Daily News,* date illegible, probably May 14, 1972), but Habib was the first career diplomat ever to receive the re-named *Presidential* Medal of Freedom (Carol Jose email to author 1-2-02).

What kind: Habib interview with Tueni

Hardest-working: Habib interview with Tueni

Strategy, bullshit detector: Ashley 3-27-93

Military thinking: Habib interview with Tueni; O’Donohue 3-20-93, 3-28-93, 4-7-94, and 4-12-94

Colloquial, what he thought: Krezcko 10-6-93; Howell 10-11-93

Exact opposite: Haig 5-11-94

Smart: Thomas Dunlop letter to author 5-7-93

Professor: Habib interview with Mulcahy; Kissinger eulogy at Habib’s memorial service, June 10, 1992, in “Philip Habib: A Remembrance,” *Foreign Service Journal,* July 1992; Kissinger remarks at Habib’s swearing-in as undersecretary 7-1-76. Habib and Kissinger each told the story of their first encounter many times, and told it somewhat differently each time. This account is a compilation.

Mr. Vietnam: Bundy 5-29-93

Turning points: Isaacson & Thomas, p. 699

Tet: Habib interview with Mulcahy; Shepard 9-13-93; Oberdorfer, p. ix, x, 2-3; Brinkley, p. 256; Rusk, p. 475-76; Cronkite, p. 254. Habib said, “The Tet offensive was being played up as the great disaster, even though it was not militarily a disaster [for the US and South Vietnam]. Psychologically it was a disaster.”

Loop: Rosenthal 3-24-93

Trip to Saigon: Kim 9-21-93; Weyand 6-26-94; Katzenbach 5-30-93. It wasn’t that he thought the two leaders of South Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky, were especially bad people. “I don’t bad mouth Ky or Thieu,” Habib later said. He recognized that they were ineffective, but said Thieu “wasn’t totally corrupt,” was intelligent, hardworking, astute, and not as bad as the media portrayed him. He also said he considered Ky better than his image: “tops, fine, a very courageous guy.” Both were “victims of circumstances beyond their control” (“Peace Envoy’s Postscript,” Habib as told to Larry Engelmann, *Vietnam* magazine, April 1993).

Artificially prop: Ashley 3-27-93; Rosenthal 3-24-93; Weyand 6-26-01

Wise Men: Brinkley, p. 255-57; Isaacson & Thomas, p. 686-87. Wise Man Dean Acheson greatly respected plain-spoken, down-to-earth people (James Chace on Charlie Rose 11-12-98), so he took instantly to Habib. In Joseph Alsop’s words, Acheson considered him one of “the wisest young men in town . . . a rare bird who spoke from factual certainty about situations not glib cocktail party whim” (Douglas Brinkley letter to the author 3-22-94). Brinkley adds that “Acheson thought Habib was the model of State Department thoroughness and competence.” The group included Acheson, former undersecretaries of state Averell Harriman and George Ball, former national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, former ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, World War II hero General Omar Bradley, Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, negotiator of the Korean War settlement Arthur Dean, former treasury secretary Douglas Dillon, and former deputy secretary of defense Cyrus Vance. Habib already knew several of the Wise Men. Besides having served under Lodge in Saigon and having briefed Acheson one-on-one just recently, he had worked under Dillon and Ball in 1962 (Habib interviews with Tueni and Mulcahy), gotten to know Harriman when the latter came to Korea in 1964 (Harriman Papers, box 573; Habib interview with Tueni), and had dealings with Vance during Vance’s time as secretary of the Army (Vance 2-14-95; Habib interview with Mulcahy). McGeorge Bundy was the brother of Habib’s boss, Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy. Acheson was William Bundy’s father-in-law. The other two briefers were CIA analyst George Carver and Major Gen. William DePuy.

Wise men misc.: Brinkley, p. 254-62; Clifford, p. 507-19; Isaacson & Thomas, p. 676-706; Oberdorfer, p. 308-323; Karnow *Vietnam,* p. 561-66; Johnson, p. 416-24; Habib interview with Mulcahy; “LBJ Claims Lead Role in De-escalating War,” *The Washington Post,* 2-7-70; Thomas Johnson notes “Continuation of Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisers in the Cabinet Room (Summary),” March 26, 1968, 3:15 p.m., LBJ Library; Bundy 6-13-93 and 1-29-94; Zorthian oral history, LBJ Library, 4-24-81, II, 19

Briefing: Habib memo “Observations on the Situation in Viet-Nam,” 2-26-68, par. 30 (LBJ Library 72D207, Box 7611); Isaacson & Thomas, p. 693. There is no record available of what Habib actually said in his briefing. Fifteen years later he said, “I don’t remember what I said to them. I remember I spoke from my heart. Usually I had an outline on yellow paper, but I never kept any papers, so I don’t know what the hell I said” (Habib interview with Mulcahy). In contrast to Habib’s briefing, Carver outlined a promising, optimistic picture. Habib interrupted him several times. “That’s not true,” he would say, and question Carver sharply (Katzenbach 5-30-93).

Dumbfounded: Karnow, *Vietnam,* p. 562.

Extremely candid: Ball 8-11-93

Clifford’s questions: Clifford, p. 513-14; Holbrooke 4-1-93; William Bundy 6-13-93

Wise Men with LBJ: Isaacson & Thomas, p. 702, also p. 700; Oberdorfer, p. 311. Some in the group dissented. Several of the Wise Men had been growing disenchanted with the war since their prior meeting but, like Acheson prior to his private sessions, had had little solid information on which to base their unease. As the group gathered March 25, Vance sensed “a feeling among the Wise Men that there hadn’t been enough of a facing of the facts and telling them as they were” (Vance 2-14-95).

Poisoned: Isaacson & Thomas, p. 695; “The Fight for the President’s Mind,” by Townsend Hoopes, *The Atlantic Monthly,* January 1969. In late February, Secretary of State Rusk had said that suggestions of a bombing halt were “almost obscene” (Abramson, p. 656). After hearing from the Wise Men, LBJ demanded that Habib, Carver, and DePuy give him the same briefings that had so moved the Wise Men. Habib was scheduled to give a speech about the war in Dayton, Ohio; canceling the speech at the last minute could be interpreted as the administration having something to hide. Clifford’s account (p. 518) says “Habib deliberately went ahead with a previously scheduled speech in Dayton, Ohio, thus avoiding the meeting with the President.” Isaacson & Thomas (p. 703) suggest that presidential adviser Walt Rostow made the decision to “let him go, figuring he had done enough damage.” In fact, the decision to let him go to Dayton was LBJ’s, who wrote on an action memo about bringing in Habib, “Don’t need him” (Rostow Action Memorandum “4:00 p.m. briefing,” 3-27-68, NSF Vietnam country file 7E(4)a 2/68 - 4/68, Public Relations Activities, Box 100, LBJ Library handwriting file). Carver and DePuy did give LBJ an encore, after which he shook his head and said, “I don’t know why they’ve [the Wise Men] drawn that conclusion” (Isaacson & Thomas, p. 703).

Here is Habib’s account: “I’m sitting in my office, and a phone call comes from Walt Rostow: ‘The president wants to see you. He heard about the briefing, and he wants to be briefed.’ I said, ‘Walt, I’m just walking out the door. I’m leaving for Dayton, Ohio, making a speech to 1,000 students on the Vietnam war, explaining the policy and all that. But of course, if you insist, I’ll cancel it and I’ll be over there.’ He said, ‘Well, just a minute and I’ll call you back.’ Five minutes later he calls back and says, ‘You go ahead and make the speech’” (Habib interview with Mulcahy).

Profound effect: Vance 2-14-95. Karnow *(Vietnam,* p. 562) writes that their advice “had swayed [LBJ] profoundly.” Katzenbach 5-30-93 adds that Habib’s remarks unquestionably had a major impact “because this respected professional with a reputation for integrity was now so skeptical” about the war effort. “The Wise Men were surprised to hear that things were not going as well as they had suspected.”

In his memoirs, Johnson (p. 416) said he felt that the Wise Men had heard “a fairly gloomy assessment” from the briefers, but suspected that the briefings had been based on “outdated information. In any case, I decided that the briefings had been much less important in shaping the views of these outside advisers than was the general mood of depression and frustration that had swept over so many people as a result of the Tet offensive.” That was not the feeling of the Wise Men themselves. While many of them had been growing skeptical of the war effort already, they made it clear that the briefings had been very influential. One of them, Arthur Dean, said “Maybe I am just speaking for myself, but I think all of us here very reluctantly came to the judgment that we’ve got to [start looking for a way to disengage] and we only came to it after we listened to the briefing last night” (in Thomas Johnson’s collection of excerpts from 3-26-68 meeting, 3-27-68, 3:15 p.m., Diary Backup 3/26/68, Box 93, LBJ Library). Douglas Dillon too said, “The briefing last night led me to conclude we cannot achieve a military victory” (Thomas Johnson notes “Continuation of Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisers in the Cabinet Room [Summary],” March 26, 1968, 3:15 p.m., LBJ Library).

LBJ’s speech: Clifford, p. 484, 519; Oberdorfer, p. 317-23. Habib and his boss Bill Bundy were among the many people who had a hand in the rewriting of LBJ’s March 31 speech (Habib interview with Mulcahy). LBJ did authorize one last troop increase—of 13,500, a fraction of the 206,000 he had been considering sending prior to the Wise Men’s meeting. It was the last major US troop increment ever authorized. LBJ had talked to Rusk in 1967 about withdrawing from the presidential campaign because of health (Rusk, p. 483). LBJ had announced six months earlier his “San Antonio formula,” an offer to stop bombing if Hanoi would start productive discussions (Karnow *Vietnam,* p. 683), but nothing had come of it.

Johnson wrote in his memoirs that he had been mulling over the possibility of not running for re-election ever since his January 1965 inauguration. In his speech, he wrote, “I went forward with the decisions that had taken shape in my mind years, months, and days earlier. I repeat: No President, at least not this President, makes a decision until he publicly announces that decision and acts upon it. When did I make the decisions that I announced on the evening of March 31, 1968? The answer is: 9:01 p.m. on March 31, 1968” (Johnson, p. 419, 424-25).

Involvement peaked: “The Fight for the President’s Mind,” by Townsend Hoopes, *The Atlantic Monthly,* January 1969; “LBJ Claims Lead Role in De-escalating War,” *The Washington Post,* 2-7-70; Brinkley, p. 262

Paris Peace Talks: Holbrooke, p. 82-83; Katzenbach 5-30-93; Whitehouse 9-6-93; Rosenthal 3-24-93; Abramson, p. 666-67; William Bundy manuscript, ch. 5; Weyand 6-26-94; R. Miller 3-30-93. Rosenthal adds that the only concession the North made was that South Vietnamese president Thieu could stay in office.

Kim Dae Jung: O’Donohue 4-7-94 and 3-28-93; Kim Dae Jung letter to Habib 8-20-83; Dan Oberdorfer interviewed on NPR’s “All Things Considered,” 12-19-97; “Cloak-and-dagger games: Saving the life of a leader,” *Time,* 3-2-98; “Angry Koreans Elect Longtime Dissident,” *The New York Times,* 12-19-97; “Wild Plot,” *Time,* 8-20-73; “Bizarre Homecoming,” *Time,* 8-27-73; “Kidnapping Debate in Japan” and “Slip-up by Clerical Worker Releases Confidential Files,” *Washington Post,* 6-6-79; Boettcher, p. 225-27; Buss, p. 132. The Japanese also pressured Park not to have Kim killed. The role of the airplane is unclear: Kim himself is the only person on the boat who has talked about what happened, and he was of course not privy to how the boat received the message. He knows only that, right after the plane appeared, he was taken away from the brink. Japan took his kidnapping as a grave violation of its sovereignty. Three months after the kidnapping, the prime minister of South Korea apologized to the Japanese for the kidnapping. He blamed it on a former Korean official and suspected agent of South Korea’s CIA whom he insisted had acted as a private citizen (“Honorable Settlement,” *Time,* 11-12-73).

Point man for Asia: His title was assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs Nick Veliotes, who served at that level, says, “Any career officer who becomes assistant secretary should . . . conclude this is the last assignment” (Veliotes ADST oral history).

Kissinger and Habib: “Remarks at the Swearing In of Philip C. Habib,” 7-1-76; Kissinger 5-16-94; Wisner 6-12-94. Kissinger would later describe Habib as “one of my heroes” (Kissinger letter to Marjorie Habib 5-27-92). He said “Phil was my conscience even if he brutalized me from time to time. I might not do what he said, but I wouldn’t make a move without finding out what he thought.” Kissinger and Eagleburger eulogies at Habib’s memorial service, June 10, 1992, in “Philip Habib: A Remembrance,” *Foreign Service Journal,* July 1992; Leslie Gelb column, “The Ultimate Pro,” *The New York Times,* 5-29-92. Habib would later describe Kissinger as “the only authentic genius ever worked with” (Habib interview with the author 12-20-83).

You’re still wrong: Eagleburger eulogy at Habib’s memorial service, June 10, 1992, in “Philip Habib: A Remembrance,” *Foreign Service Journal,* July 1992; R. Miller 2-19-94

Eighteen-hour days: Marjorie Habib 2-27-93

Heart attack 1977: Habib interview with Mulcahy; AFSA *Journal* April 1978; Cheitlin report 3-29-78; Marjorie Habib 6-5-97; T. Miller 2-28-93 and email 1-23-02; Saunders 6-14-93. Saunders’ and Miller’s recollections of that morning differ, but they may not always have been in the room with Habib at the same time; each may thus not have heard what he said to the other. Saunders recalls Habib looking perfectly normal, saying “I think I’m having a heart problem,” and asking him to call an ambulance. What Habib said to Miller is quoted here since it is so similar to what he said to Thomas Dunlop in Saigon in 1969 under comparable circumstances.

Retire or die: Marjorie Habib 10-28-01

Second massive heart attack: Habib interview with Mulcahy; Marjorie Habib 2-27-93, 3-5-93, 3-13-93, and 9-24-95; Green 7-9-93; Marjorie Habib letter to Wyn Hall 3-3-72; Sullivan 4-21-94. “All my family die young,” Habib once said. His sister too would later die of a heart attack. His other brother, Fred, died young of brain cancer. He had had some chest pains in Paris, but these were worse. Before he went to Korea, State’s Office of Medical Services had examined him and cleared him not “for full Foreign Service duty,” but only “for Foreign Service duty at a post with adequate medical facilities” (Medical Clearance form 10-1-71).

Can’t imagine: “Habib the Peacemaker,” *Newsweek,* 8-30-82. The article bowdlerizes his profanity as “F——.”

Small assignments: Habib interview with Mulcahy; Vance 2-14-95

Heart during retirement: Habib interview with Mulcahy; Hill 7-19-95 and 3-27-93; Cheitlin report “Followup—September 11, 1978, RE: Mr. Philip Habib”; University of California, San Francisco, “Record of Operation,” by Daniel Ullyot, MD, 8-25-78; Cheitlin 3-26-93

**Chapter 2: The War That Got Away**

Let’s face it: Habib interview with Mulcahy

They went back: Haig 5-11-94; Kim 9-21-93; “Gen. Haig Arrives Here To Brief Park on Viet,” *Korea Times,* 1-21-73

Avert it: The US’ top priority in the Middle East at the time was to ensure that the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli treaty be implemented on schedule by the end of April 1982. That treaty called for the Israelis to give back the Sinai Peninsula, which they had captured from Egypt in the 1967 war. The deadline was now a year away, and none of the preliminary steps had been taken that might convince the Israelis to go through with their promised withdrawal. So State’s policy priority was to keep Lebanon quiet, “at least keep it quiet long enough so it doesn’t screw up our top priority, which was to make sure that the treaty was actually implemented” (Veliotes 4-20-93; Veliotes ADST oral history).

Agility: Haig 5-11-94

Cardiologist: Cheitlin 3-26-93. Habib assured Haig he was “in tip-top shape.” Haig himself had had a heart bypass operation the previous year and felt fine now, so he readily took Habib’s word for it (Haig 5-11-94).

Historical background on Lebanon, Israel, PLO: Massoulié, p. 22-29, 135-47; “Making Sense of the Middle East,” parts 1 and 2, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1986 and Summer 1986; “Beirut—Up From the Rubble,” *National Geographic,* February 1983; Dunnigan, p. 29-40; Kissinger *Upheaval,* p. 787-89; Friedman, p. 8, 11-18; Gabriel, p. 33-34; Zamir, preface and p. 1-3; Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 19, 31-32; “War or Compromise on Security,” *Washington Post,* 5-14-81; Habib cable from Beirut 08674, 010735Z Dec 81, par. 3; “Beirut: City of Money and Mystery,” *Reader’s Digest,* 11-64; “Sport on the Far Shores of Eden,” *Sports Illustrated,* 3-29-65; Dillon 2-28-02; “Superpowers and Small States: an Overview of American-Lebanese Relations,” by Paul E. Salem, *The Beirut Review,* Spring 1993, www.lcps-lebanon.org/pub/breview/br5/psalembr5pt2.html.

In France’s original conception, the Christians enjoyed a slight majority in the new Lebanon. That slight majority became the basis of power allocations within the government. But as demographics shifted over the decades, Christians became a smaller and smaller minority. Yet no new census was ever conducted, and power allocations were not recalculated to reflect changing realities. Much of the contention within Lebanon can be viewed as attempts by Muslims and Druze to win the proportional share of power that they feel they have been denied. Druze are a sect that splintered off from Islam in the eleventh century. Their religious beliefs are a closely guarded secret, and they do not allow converts. Lebanon became independent of France in 1943. Technically, the Syrian army entered Lebanon under the auspices of the Arab League. Syrian president Hafaz al-Assad said on July 20, 1976, “Historically, Syria and Lebanon are one country and one people” (Israeli, p. 260).

Some years after Pierre Gemayel’s militia attacked the bus full of Palestinians, his son Bashir laughed about it to the American ambassador to Lebanon, saying, “We showed them. We killed everybody who had a Muslim name!” (Dillon 2-28-02).

Bashir, alliance, Zahle: Parker, p. 174-75; Zamir, p. 2-3; Seale, p. 369-70; Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 11-34; Petran, p. 259; Gabriel, p. 60; Sharon, p. 428-29; Lewis in Quandt, p. 230; Randal, p. 231; Cobban, p. 35; Friedman, p. 137-40; Hill 7-17-93. Since Pierre Gemayel and his sons Bashir and Amin were all well-known players in the story, they are generally referred to by only their first names for clarity. Notions of a Jewish-Maronite alliance went back to the nineteenth century, and discussions about an alliance to fight the PLO began in March 1976 (Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 11-13). Bashir’s alliance with Israel was no secret (e.g., Beirut 08673, 010730Z Dec 81, par. 3). Zahle stands by the highway that runs between Beirut and Damascus. Both the Israelis’ downing of the helicopters and the Syrians’ introduction of missiles violated the Red Line Agreement.

The missiles, Soviet-made SAM-6s, were placed 30–50 miles from Israeli territory and had a range of about 5 miles. They thus posed no offensive threat to the people of Israel in the way the PLO’s Katyusha rockets did. The missiles were only a defensive threat to Israeli aircraft flying in that part of Lebanon (Dillon 5-9-94 and 11-16-96; Dillon ADST oral history; Howell 9-6-93). The danger those missiles posed, says Haig 5-11-94, was “with respect to Israeli air superiority” and the need “to keep Israel’s qualitative edge in military terms in place inviolable.”

April 30: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 35; Sharon, p. 429. Whereas conventional ambassadors are accredited to deal with only the single country to which they are assigned, a special envoy is authorized to deal with any countries that are relevant to the issue at hand.

Excuse, cooler, life-line: Lewis ADST oral history

Really intended, informal understanding, Katyushas, ready for truce: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 35-37; Schoenbaum, p. 278; Davis, p. 64; Seale, p. 371; Randal, p. 236-39; Evron, p. 99; Gowers, p. 186; Petran, p. 261-62; Sharon, p. 430-32; Lewis ADST oral history; Lewis 2-17-02; Sehulster 1-5-02

Informal understanding: Habib interview with the author 12-20-83; Parker, p. 181; Lewis ADST oral history; Lewis 2-17-02; Dillon ADST oral history; Beinin 10-30-93

Sharon objected: Sharon, p. 432-33

Long-term arrangements: For example, Amman 08896, 051454Z Dec 81, par. 11, 13

Bargain with the PLO: Draper 4-13-93, 4-25-93, and 2-24-02; Draper ADST oral history; Beinin 10-30-93

Sharon hero, symbol, military achievements: “Ariel Sharon: Feisty Politician Is Not a Natural Diplomat,” *The New York Times,* 10-10-98; “Sharon’s Muscle Evokes Hopes and Some Fears,” *The New York Times,* 10-20-98; Sachar, p. 170

Also earned a reputation: Sachar, p. 170; “Desert Hawk,” *Vanity Fair,* January 2002

Ultra-hawk: Davis, p. 65

Eagleburger: Lewis cable from Tel Aviv 11097, 221519Z Jul 82, par. 2; Eagleburger 7-3-93. Begin objected to these “zoological” references to Sharon by Eagleburger.

Invoked security: Davis, p. 66, based on Ezer Weizman, *The Battle for Peace*, p. 141, 222

Judgment: Lewis ADST oral history

Appalled: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 37-38. The context of the quote is Sharon’s earlier lobbying to be special coordinator of the various security services. Being defense minister would entail even more sensitive powers than coordinator.

Ten times: Davis, p. 65, citing Prof. Nadav Safran

Golda Meir: quoted by Oriana Fallaci in “Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *Washington Post,* 8-29-82

Entrust: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 38

1981 election, take a walk: Lewis ADST oral history. As Lewis tells the story, what turned things around at the last minute was a night club entertainer telling jokes as a warm-up act at a Labor rally, during which he referred to Sephardic Jews as “bums.” Begin seized upon the crack, saying that that’s what Labor thinks of Sephardic Jews. Lewis adds, “Had [that entertainer] not made that crack, Sharon would not have become Defense Minister; Begin would not have been Prime Minister; there would not have been a Lebanon War; there would have been no Sabra and Shatila; and the whole course of the next five or ten years would have been different.”

Mission complete, golf: Dillon 11-16-96; Habib interview with Mulcahy; “Ex-envoy urges change in Latin America policy,” *San Jose Mercury News* 8-30-81

Confidence: Lewis 4-10-94. Early in his mission, *Newsweek* wrote, “If the Arabs and Israelis agree on anything about the Lebanese missile crisis, it is that Philip Habib is a superb diplomat. In Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem and Riyadh—the capitals he visited during two weeks of shuttle diplomacy—the special U.S. envoy won high marks for diligence, discretion and a deft personal touch. ‘His mind is brilliant,’ Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin told a television interviewer last week. ‘I think he is one of the most able diplomats of our time. I am so impressed by him, by his wisdom, by his energy and by his efforts—physical, moral, intellectual.’ After a pause, Begin added: ‘But he did not yet achieve results’” (“Habib Still Plays For Time,” *Newsweek,* 6-1-81).

A few months after the July 24 ceasefire, Begin and Sharon started putting the Americans on notice that, while the deal was fine as far as it went, it did not go nearly far enough. The PLO was still causing trouble in ways unaddressed by the ceasefire, Begin and Sharon said, and if the PLO didn’t stop, the ceasefire would be off and the Israelis would have to take matters into their own hands in Lebanon. The first warning came from Begin to Haig at Anwar Sadat’s funeral in October 1981 (Haig 5-11-94; Cannon, p. 393).

Returned to the region: Haig’s objective in sending Habib back was, Haig wrote, “to defuse Israeli interests in exercising the military option in Lebanon” while advancing the political and security situation (Haig memo to The President, “The Next Habib Mission,”11-11-81; State Department press briefing, 10-13-81, in State 273438, 140016Z Oct 81; State 278253, 192147Z Oct 81). The Egyptians too were anxious to have him come back. The Syrians were not. Just before he arrived in the region, the US signed a military agreement with Israel. On December 2, leaders of Syrian president Assad’s ruling Baath Party led some 300,000 Syrian demonstrators on a march through Damascus, ostensibly to protest a bombing there but chanting “Habib, Habib go away” (“300,000 Syrians protest visit of U.S. envoy Habib to Damascus,” *Los Angeles Times* story in *St. Petersburg Times* 12-3-81). Habib encouraged the Syrians to withdraw their missiles gradually while things were quiet. They replied that they would not do so as long as Begin demanded their withdrawal (Amman 08896, 051454Z Dec 81, par. 11).

On the eve of his arrival, Lebanese security forces said they had uncovered a plot by a group of Libyans in Lebanon to assassinate Habib when he came to Beirut. If there was a plot, exposure and tighter security measures foiled it (Beirut 08799, 041620Z Dec 81; Tel Aviv 18674, 041808Z Dec 81; UPI report of 12-4-81 quoted in Tel Aviv 18675, 041809Z Dec 81).

Draper’s background: Draper ADST oral history; Dillon 2-28-02. Draper had begun his career as a chemist with the Manhattan Project in Los Alamos in 1946-47, but soon realized his calling was international affairs, not science.

Only in force: This is according to an Israeli politician who asked not to be identified by name, but many other sources say the same (for example, Sachar, p. 172)

Hopeless: Sharon, p. 434-35

Formula, shat: Draper 4-25-93. Draper was deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs responsible for the Israel-Lebanon-Syria geographic area. Habib had met with Sharon at least once before, on May 12, 1980, when Sharon was agriculture minister and Habib was in the region to try to mediate disputes between Arabs and Israelis over water rights (“U.S. envoy Habib relaying Yarmuk water ‘bargaining,’” *Jerusalem Post* 5-13-80).

Map, his analysis: Brown cable Tel Aviv 18681, 051155Z Dec 81; Habib interview with Tueni; Draper 4-25-93; Sharon, p. 429, 434-35. Like other Arab states, Lebanon had since 1949 been technically still at war with Israel. Sharon’s point about Lebanon associating with the free world was meant to contrast with Syria’s association with the Soviet Union and thus to resonate with Haig’s Cold Warrior view of the Middle East.

Adhering, violating: Lewis ADST oral history; Habib interview with Tueni; Habib cable Jerusalem 01781, 082022Z Jun 82, par. 7-8

Fast move: Sharon, p. 435

Quite clear, own opinion: Draper 4-25-93; Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 66. Calling this just his own opinion was true, if disingenuous (Lewis 4-10-94): A defense minister’s opinion of what should be done tends to soon become official policy. It is normal for countries to have contingency plans for military operations (Howell 9-6-93), and the Israeli Defense Forces had been developing such a plan for Lebanon since before Sharon became defense minister (“Begin’s Rhetoric and Sharon’s Tactics,” *Foreign Affairs,* Fall 1982, p. 73-74).

Instructed his chief: Brown cable Tel Aviv 18681, 051155Z Dec 81, par. 9

Twentieth century: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 66. This is the earliest published account of what Habib said. Other accounts attribute different words to him, but all accounts are consistent that he expressed astonishment, alarm about the dire consequences of such an ill-advised move, and strong opposition (Brown cable Tel Aviv 18681, 051155Z Dec 81; Draper 4-25-93, 4-13-93, and 12-22-94; Habib interviews with Mulcahy and Tueni; Lewis 4-10-94; Lewis ADST oral history; Teicher, p. 193; Seale, p. 375; Howell 9-6-93; Hill 6-15-93; “Minutes of Sharon-Habib Meeting,” TA241034 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 24 May 82, pp. 1,2, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports, Middle East & Africa,* 1982, 05/28, p. I4; “Sharon Reportedly Outlined Lebanon War Plan in 1981” and “U.S. Backs Lewis Version,” *New York Times,* 5-26-85). Draper (4-25-93) says Sharon “did not think the Syrians would intervene. He thought they would just retreat. He told us he thought the chance of all-out war with Syria was tiny. That was a point where Phil strongly disagreed. But what he said was so staggering that it’s not something you might discuss the pros and cons with because it might suggest that there *are* pros.”

Lewis, denied: “Envoy Says Sharon Outlined Invasion Plan to U.S. in 1981,” *Washington Post,* 5-24-85; “Sharon Reportedly Outlined Lebanon War Plan in 1981” and “U.S. Backs Lewis Version,” *New York Times,* 5-26-85; “Sharon Reacts to Lewis’ Disclosures on Lebanon War,” TA230904 Tel Aviv Yedi’ot Aharonot in Hebrew 23 May 85, pp. 1, 14, and “Sharon Explains Contacts With U.S. on Lebanon, TA240745 Jerusalem Government Press Office in English 23 May 85, both in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports, Middle East & Africa,* 1982, 05/23-24, p. I1. Draper too was amazed: “I mean, telling us their secret plans so openly. Jesus, it was remarkable. Foreign governments don’t tell you in advance what they’re going to do militarily” (Draper 4-25-93). Sharon’s denials focused mostly on whether he had revealed details, not on whether he had revealed the grand sweep of his plan. Habib backed up Lewis’ account *(Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports,* May 23 and 24, 1985), which was consistent with his own account and with Draper’s.

Trap Palestinian: Habib interview with Tueni

Arrogant, disdain, anti-American, oppose anything: Draper 4-25-93 and 12-18-94

Drip method, nuclear: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 65; Lewis in Quandt, p. 230-31; Seale, p. 370; Petran, p. 262. Sharon explicitly told Habib in the meeting that, if something happened, he did not want the US taken by surprise (Brown cable Tel Aviv 18681, 051155Z Dec 81, par. 9).

Become a party: Draper 4-25-93

Alarm, Sinai: Draper 1-13-02; Veliotes 4-20-93; Veliotes ADST oral history. The declassified cable that reports on Habib’s meeting with Sharon (Brown cable Tel Aviv 18681, 051155Z Dec 81) is silent about the most important parts of the meeting. “We sanitized the cable of the most sensitive parts,” says Draper (1-13-02), choosing to report them instead orally by secure phone and in person when they returned to Washington. Haig (5-11-94) later would not remember ever having heard about this meeting from Habib.

Feeble: Schiff, “The Green Light,” *Foreign Policy,* #50, Spring 1983. Schiff writes that “the American nay was so feeble that the Israelis regarded it merely as a diplomatic maneuver designed to exonerate the United States should the military operation go sour.” *Feeble* is not a word one would expect to hear applied to anything Habib said. His colleagues agree that it was not Habib’s communication that Schiff was referring to. “Phil wasn’t *in* the later meetings where this ‘feeble’ response came out,” says Draper (4-25-93).

Mostly out: Veliotes 5-6-93

Scout out, your business, Chamoun: Sharon, p. 437-43; Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 48-51; also Schiff, “The Green Light,” *Foreign Policy,* #50, Spring 1983; Randal, p. 246-47. Chamoun was also the president who invited American troops into Lebanon in 1957.

Consul general: Veliotes ADST oral history

Bashir told: Dillon ADST oral history

UN: Draper 4-25-93

Journals: Jansen, p. 1

25,000: Jansen, p. 1; Schiff, “The Green Light,” *Foreign Policy,* #50, Spring 1983; Habib interview with Tueni

Chancellor: Schiff, “The Green Light,” *Foreign Policy,* #50, Spring 1983

Pretext: The word *pretext* is often used in the context of Sharon’s lead-up to the invasion (e.g., Veliotes 4-29-93; Yaacobi 2-14-95; Schiff, “The Green Light,” *Foreign Policy,* #50, Spring 1983). As Israeli Foreign Ministry Director General David Kimche puts it, Israel was “on a course for war; it required only some inflammatory act by the PLO to light the fuse” (Kimche, p. 144-45, cited in Parker, p. 176).

Single incident: Habib interview with Dusclaud. Habib said, “Matter of fact, there was practically no evidence of any hostile action from Lebanese territory directly into Israel from that point [July ’81] on. Israelis don’t admit that, but it’s true. We kept track in those days” (Habib interview with Mulcahy). Yaacobi (2-14-95) agrees that the border had been quiet since the ceasefire. On the quiet of the border since the July 24 ceasefire, see also Benziman, p. 268-69, and Bavly and Salpeter, p. 234 (quoted in Davis, p. 3). Habib did agree that the ceasefire applied to attacks on Israel that originated in Lebanon but were carried out across the Jordan-Israel border (Habib cable Jerusalem 01781, 082022Z Jun 82, par. 8). There had been one such instance: A squad of guerrillas went from Lebanon into Jordan and crossed from there into Israel to attempt an attack (Habib interview with Tueni).

I said no: Habib interview with Tueni

Cannot afford, no one agreement: Habib cable Jerusalem 01781, 082022Z Jun 82, par. 7-8; Lewis ADST oral history

With the situation: Sharon, p. 450. Israel by now had withdrawn from the Sinai, as scheduled, in April.

I’d kick: Haig 5-11-94

Feel inclined: The one quoted is Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger (10-7-93), who, it should be noted, is himself extremely critical of Israel. But virtually all State Department people interviewed on the subject offer essentially the same assessment of Haig’s position.

Presidential ambitions: Veliotes ADST oral history

Indians: Haig 5-11-94

Content of Haig-Sharon meeting: Memorandum of Conversation, “The Secretary’s Meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Sharon,” 5-28-82, S/S number 8215555, P900060-0673 and P900060-0674. Substantial portions of the declassified record of the discussion are excised. The memo sometimes uses quotation marks but usually does not. The quotes here are what the document says, which may or may not be the speakers’ actual words. Punctuation altered for clarity.

Loudly: Teicher, p. 195

Did not apply: Sharon, p. 335

Audience, privately: Haig, *Caveat,* p. 335; Haig 5-11-94; Draper 4-25-93

Right to tell: Haig, *Caveat,* p. 335

Conceded the point: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 73; Teicher, p. 195. As Haig put it on another occasion, “How do we think, as Americans, we can be allies with anyone if we tell them they don’t have the right to defend themselves?” (Haig 5-11-94).

Thought he did: Habib interview with Tueni; Shultz 7-25-94

Your opposition: Draper 4-25-93

Bully: E.g., Draper 4-25-93; Lewis 4-10-94; Hill 7-16-94; another State Department official who asked not to be identified by name.

Utterly opposed: Draper 4-25-93; Dillon ADST oral history. See chapter 5, “The Other General,” for Habib’s wording of what he considered an appropriate warning to Begin. A week and a half before Sharon met with Haig, Ambassador Lewis sent State a stark warning about what Sharon needed to hear: “All senior U.S. officials whom he sees in Washington should talk turkey to Sharon about the dangerous situation in Lebanon. To slide over it would be to give him a dangerous signal and reinforce his conviction that whatever Israel ultimately decides it must do about the PLO in Lebanon can be done without long-lasting damage to U.S.-Israeli relations. . . . We are skating on extremely thin ice at this moment with respect to Lebanon. Although there is not a strong majority yet in the Cabinet, much less in the country at large, to support Sharon’s determination to deal the PLO in Lebanon a devastating blow, regardless of the international diplomatic consequences, there is a growing sense of inevitability here that it is only a matter of time. One major successful terrorist act which produces several dead could tip the balance . . . . For this reason, it is extremely important that Sharon hear clearly from top U.S. officials what kind of complications would inevitably result for Israel if a major operation were launched using American supplied weapons. He has a considerable capacity to minimize these complications and to assert to his colleagues that the U.S. reaction will be merely verbal and short-lived. If in fact our reaction would be different, Sharon should know it well in advance, as should Begin. We run grave risks of misleading the Israelis and producing even more complications for both our countries if they believe a major military move into Lebanon would have no direct consequences past U.N. condemnations or other symbolic or verbal sanctions. . . . Don’t allow Sharon to leave Washington with any illusion about the degree to which a major military move into Lebanon would affect the course of U.S.-Israeli relations, if indeed it would have those consequences” (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 07285 May 14, 1982, quoted in State 133828, 172000Z May 82).

Clearly agreed: When interviewed for this book, Haig said (5-11-94), “How do we think, as Americans, we can be allies with anyone if we tell them they don’t have the right to defend themselves? My God! Of course the Israelis had a right to go in and defend themselves. And we had no right to tell them they didn’t if they were attacked from sanctuary, and they were.” The chapter “The Other General” discusses Haig’s agreement with Sharon about other issues, including the applicability of the July 24 ceasefire to attacks against Jews in Europe.

Sharon may or may not have sensed Haig’s excitement with the invasion plans. But Veliotes says he and Draper did when they met with him later that night. A “rather enthusiastic” Haig still had a large map of Lebanon on an easel by his desk. With an air of what Veliotes calls “excitable belligerency,” Haig showed them Sharon’s ambitious plan, including linking Bashir’s Christian militia in the middle of Lebanon with a proxy Christian militia that Israel sponsored in the south. Draper blurted out, “For Christ’s sake, Mr. Secretary, there are a million and a half Muslims between them, and at least a million of them are Shi’a!” Haig seemed surprised. Veliotes said, “If [Israel’s] plan is to do all of this, that means war with Syria, and God knows the carnage. You will have a Middle East policy in tatters.” He and Draper also recommended sending a follow-up message (Veliotes 4-29-93; Veliotes ADST oral history). Shi’a are followers of the smaller of the two main branches of Islam, with adherents concentrated in Iran and Lebanon. This meeting was only a few months after the end of the Teheran hostage crisis, in which militant Shi’a in Iran had held American diplomats hostage for over a year. The Shi’a of Lebanon had so far been not been active in opposing Israel, but an invasion through their ranks would certainly alienate and possibly radicalize them (Dillon 2-27-02).

Went home confident: Habib heard from an Israeli whom he considered very authoritative that Sharon “went away with the idea that he had the green light to go ahead with this campaign” (interview with Tueni).

Job done: Gabriel, p. 14, 82

OK from us: Habib interview with Tueni. Several others also urged Haig to send a follow-up letter. As Haig puts it (5-11-94), “The guys in the bureau’s pants started to get wet. They came rushing in and said, ‘Hey, this guy’s dangerous! You better get another message out to him.’” Though he did send the letter, he brushed off their concerns since they had heard only what was said in the big meeting, not what he considered the real one, the private one.

Letter: Haig letter to Begin 5-28-82, “Dear Mr. Prime Minister,” 8215157. The understated letter urges “complete restraint,” but reiterates “how deeply we understand the very real threat of violence Israel faces. As Minister Sharon said, no one has the right to tell Israel what decision it should take in the defense of its people. We are only expressing our belief that nations facing threats, including the U.S. and Israel, should carefully weigh the consequences of how such challenges are handled.”

Approval: Sharon, p. 451. Schiff writes that “For Sharon’s plan to succeed, however, Israel needed an assurance from the United States that it would not obstruct Israeli moves into Lebanon” (“The Green Light,” *Foreign Policy,* #50, Spring 1983). Howard Teicher, who represented the National Security Council in the meeting, writes (p. 195), “considering the glint in Sharon’s eye and the forceful, overbearing way he clutched his briefing papers and pounded the conference table that day, I believe that Sharon would have found a way to interpret Haig’s comments about the nice weather in Washington as encouragement of an Israeli invasion of Lebanon.”

Disproportionate: Yaacobi 2-14-95

Hunting license: Veliotes 4-29-93. Schiff writes that “the import of Haig’s response for Sharon was that the United States did not oppose a limited military operation provided there was sufficient reason for one. From Sharon’s point of view the American had provided a green light. The halfhearted, feeble warnings subsequently voiced by Haig were irrelevant” (“The Green Light,” *Foreign Policy,* #50, Spring 1983).

Professionalism: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Wildly in love, respected: Veliotes 4-29-93. Veliotes (ADST oral history) adds that Reagan “in his first year and a half in office, was most proud of Phil Habib’s peace missions.”

Habib’s attitude: This source, one of Habib’s colleagues, asked not to be identified by name.

Aimed at the heart: Howell 9-6-93. In fact, they were surface-to-air missiles designed to shoot down jet planes flying overhead. Even if one missed and fell to earth, it lacked the range to land in Israel.

Soviets: Dillon ADST oral history. As the ambassador to Lebanon and thus the diplomat working in the PLO’s home base, Dillon considered such notions ludicrous.

Read few papers, entertained: Draper ADST oral history

Talking points: Lewis ADST oral history; Salem, p. 25

Couldn’t remember: Habib interview with Stuart Eizenstat, 5-13-92, p. 41. Reagan was the best friend Israel ever had in the White House. He had what Dillon (ADST oral history) calls “an emotional pro-Israeli bias. He had a romanticized Hollywood view of brave, little Israel.” Draper (ADST oral history) says he was a genuinely nice man, whose benign, forgiving nature led Israel’s leaders to think they could take the US for granted.

Educate him: Veliotes 4-29-93

Habib earned: Veliotes 4-29-93

That crowd: Veliotes 4-29-93

His turf: Reagan, p. 270

Baker, Bush, Clark: Haig 5-11-94

Do him in, suicidal: Veliotes 4-29-93; Reagan, p. 361; Haig 5-11-94. Haig blamed them for allowing Israel to invade Lebanon, by ignoring his prior warnings. He says he sent a memo to Reagan two months prior to the invasion warning that a war was imminent and suggesting steps to prevent it. But, he says, “that memo never even *got* to the president! It sat on Bill Clark’s desk!” (Haig 5-11-94).

Isolated, stupid: Haig 5-11-94. Haig adds, “Now, I’m sure there were exceptions” to Reagan’s lack of engagement, “like when he went into Grenada.” One writer says, “This chaotic situation [as described by Haig in his resignation letter] in foreign policy affairs during the Reagan Administration reflected the poor leadership of the president, the lack of cohesiveness inside the Administration, and the unsteadiness of purpose in adopting one clear-cut line of foreign policy. Instead, a mixture of policies and personalities clashes [sic] among the decision-makers laid bare the management problem of the Administration” (Korbani, p. 191).

Sanitize: Habib interview with Parker, which is the basis of Parker, p. 181

Broader issues: The US had recently decided to try to breathe fresh life into a series of talks on Palestinian autonomy, with the aim of reaching an outcome within sixty days. This plan was revealed during the Ditchley conference, perhaps by Habib himself in the “candid analysis” he gave the conference (Patrick Seale, “The Search for an Arab-Israeli Settlement,” reporting the conference held at Ditchley Park, 4-6 June 1982; Ditchley Conference Report No. 7/1982, p. 1).

Habib also hoped to establish a contact group (representatives of several interested and influential countries) and eventually an international conference at which the Lebanese factions could work out their differences and thus stabilize Lebanon (Eagleburger cable State 155256, 070141Z Jun 82, p. 3).

Four vacations, Greek islands: Habib interview with Mulcahy; Marjorie Habib 2-27-93; Phyllis Habib 7-7-97. He got a month of leave every year and never took it.

Get after something, have to leave: Habib interviews with Mulcahy and Parker. Though Argov lived, the bullet lodged in his spine and he was badly disabled for life. He was shot by the Abu Nidal terrorist organization, an independent and virulently anti-PLO group. Abu Nidal was in fact under a death sentence by the PLO for having assassinated moderate Palestinians (Dillon ADST oral history; Draper 5-4-93; Yaacobi 2-14-95). Though Begin and his Cabinet knew that the culprit was Abu Nidal, it made no difference to Begin. “They’re all PLO,” he said. “Abu Nidal, Abu Smidal. We have to strike at the PLO” (Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 98).

Israeli response: Gabriel, p. 25, 82; Cannon, p. 200; Gowers, p. 201

Palestinian response: Gabriel, p. 59; Seale, p. 377, 379. The PLO’s response was a colossal blunder, since it gave Israel the final straw it needed to launch its invasion.

**Chapter 3: Playing on Two Ropes**

Lost causes: Barron letter to author 5-4-94. Barron was administrative officer in the Beirut embassy.

Relations: Veliotes 4-29-93

My subordinate: Haig 5-11-94

Haig not invited: Howell 9-6-93; Haig, p.337.

Reagan’s instructions: Habib interviews with Parker and Tueni. Habib would later describe them as “general guidelines.”

Habib meeting with Haig: Haig 5-11-94; Haig, p. 337.

Different instructions: Habib interview with Parker

Motions: Howell 9-6-93. Haig (p. 337) writes that “I asked Habib to go immediately to Begin and urge an immediate end of hostilities before the conflict widened.”

Welcomed: Randal, p. 289; Parker, p. 178; Norton, p. 84; Draper 4-13-93; Howell 9-6-93

Inner circle, others overjoyed: Draper 4-25-93. Draper mentions NSC staff member Howard Teicher specifically as one of these. Haig himself wrote to Reagan on the sixth day of the invasion that the US should “seize the initiative quickly” to capitalize on the occasion (Haig memo to The President, “A Forward U.S. Strategy in Wake of Israel’s Offensive,” 6-12-82).

Having warned: Eagleburger 7-3-93

Considered the invasion: Habib interviews with Parker and Dusclaud

Habib-Begin meeting: Habib cable Jerusalem 01745, 072224Z Jun 82, par. 2. In most of Begin’s other statements, he said 40 kilometers. “In his presentation,” Habib wrote, “Begin stated Israel’s firm commitment not repeat not to remain in Lebanon” (Habib cable Jerusalem 01743, 071925Z June 82, par. 2). A week later Begin was still telling Habib that, once a multinational force took control of a 40-kilometer zone to keep terrorists out, “we will be out of Lebanon completely.” The Israelis considered defining the zone as 43 to48 kilometers, but decided to stick with 40 (Habib cable Jerusalem 01903 of June 13, 1982, repeated in State 163551, 142321Z Jun 82, par. 6).

Artillery range: Habib cable Jerusalem 01745, 072224Z Jun 82, par. 6

Didn’t believe: Habib interview with Parker

More grandiose scheme: Habib cable Jerusalem 01785, 082248Z Jun 82, par. 2 and 3. Habib’s suspicion about an Israeli-Phalange linkup was strengthened the next day when he met with Begin and asked him directly whether Israel’s current military moves were a prelude to such a linkup. Begin was “somewhat coy” and evaded the question, leaving Habib and Amb. Sam Lewis with the “distinct impression” that they were (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 08563, 091533Z Jun 82, par. 8 and 11). Despite his skepticism that the IDF would stop at any 40- or 43-kilometer limit, he set about trying to get a ceasefire anyway (Hopkins, p. 7 and 63, citing a 3-12-92 interview with Habib). Nathaniel Howell, who accompanied Habib for the first week or so of the war, says that in the early days he and Habib really did think they were dealing with Israeli ambitions for a 40-kilometer security zone (Howell 10-23-96).

Few days of quiet: Crocker 4-25-94

Genuinely believed: Kadishai 6-29-95

By tomorrow: Habib cable Jerusalem 01743, 071925Z Jun 82. Begin and Sharon were “supremely overconfident” of the IDF’s ability to root out the PLO within days without triggering a wider conflict with Syria (Lewis in Quandt, p. 242; see also Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 103-6). Sharon told the cabinet the operation should take 12 to 24 hours (Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 105-6).

Sharon told Knesset: Yaacobi 2-14-95. Again on August 4, Begin predicted “a historic period of peace, of 40 years or 50 years” once the PLO left Lebanon (“Israelis push toward guerrilla strongholds,” *St. Petersburg Times* based on *New York Times* and *Washington Post* wire reports, 8-5-82). Four days later he said in a speech, “Because the other Arab countries are completely incapable of attacking the State of Israel, there is reason to expect that we are facing a historic period of peace. It is obviously impossible to set a date. It may well be that ‘The land shall be still for 40 years.’ Perhaps less; perhaps more. But from the facts before us, it is clear that, with the end of the fighting in Lebanon, we have ahead of us many years of establishing peace treaties and peaceful relations with the various Arab countries” (Begin speech “The Wars of No Alternative and Operation Peace for Galilee,” delivered at the National Defense College in Israel 8-8-82, in Laqueur and Rubin, p. 655).

Achieved: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 187

Too massive: Dillon ADST oral history

Terrible terrain: Dillon 5-9-94

Without a fight: Dillon 5-9-94

Any illusions: Lewis 4-10-94

Phyllis: Marjorie Habib 2-27-93; Phyllis Habib 7-7-97; Grove 6-12-94. Despite his instructions, Phyllis did not stay at the hotel the whole time. She spent part of her two weeks at Consul General Grove’s residence.

Dillon and embassy, lie: Dillon ADST oral history. Dillon 5-9-94; “The ‘Beirut Summer,’” by Dundas McCullough, *State,* 12-82, p. 6-7

Intermingled: Habib cable Jerusalem 01745, 072224Z Jun 82, par. 6. Israelis viewed PLO artillery as shooting at Israeli villages from “under Syrian umbrella” (Habib cable Jerusalem 01782, 082059Z Jun 82, par. 6).

Overriding priority: Habib cable Jerusalem 01785, 082248Z Jun 82, par. 2

Escalate: Haig memo to The President, “Lebanon: Critical Moment at Hand,” 6-9-82, 8216678, warning that, unless the Israelis pulled back to within their declared 40-kilometer zone, “there is a strong likelihood of a Syrian-Israeli war”; Draper ADST oral history

Not want a fight: Howell 10-11-93; Howell 9-6-93; Seale, p. 378-79; Begin and Sharon told Habib at their first meeting with him after the invasion that they “wanted to avoid any battle with Syria” (Habib cable Jerusalem 01745, 072224Z Jun 82, par. 6). Israeli Labor Party leaders told Habib June 7 that Israel “had sought to inform the Syrians in every possible way that it desired no clash with Syrian forces” (Habib cable Jerusalem 01782, 082059Z Jun 82, par. 5).

Far more equipment: Seale, p. 379-80

Confronting the Syrians: At their first meeting after the invasion began Sharon told Habib his troops were trying to avoid any battle with Syria, but that “there had been a very dangerous development”: Syria was taking advantage of Israeli caution to move new forces and missiles into Lebanon and had shelled Israeli troops, inflicting casualties and “complicat[ing] the IDF’s mission” (Habib cable Jerusalem 01745, 072224Z Jun 82, par. 6 and 8).

Provoke: Draper ADST oral history

Mobilize: Howell 10-11-93

Cut off: Gabriel, p. 64-66. Sharon, in a meeting with Habib June 7, accused the Syrians of attacking the IDF (Habib cable Jerusalem 01745, 072224Z Jun 82, par. 6 and 8).

Red Line: Cobban, p. 39. The Red Line agreement was an informal division of Lebanon brokered by Henry Kissinger in 1976. Under the agreement, Syria tolerated Israel’s presence in certain areas while Israel tolerated Syria’s presence in other areas (Seale, p. 378). Syrian president Assad now concluded that Syria was Sharon’s real target (Seale, p. 380).

Race: Former Lebanese Prime Minister Sa’ab Salaam would later say “Sharon is winning the race against a political settlement” (Habib cable Beirut 05089, 040531Z Aug 82, par. 9).

War plan: A major strategic premise of Israel is a fast war doctrine, to achieve its objectives before the US intervenes to force a halt to the fighting (Gabriel, p. 14; Yaacobi 2-14-95; Draper 4-13-93).

Bogged down: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 109-160, particularly 137, 159-60

Operating assumption: Haig cable (no number) from Windsor to Habib, 6-9-82; Haig memo to The President, “Lebanon: Critical Moment at Hand,” 6-9-82, 8216678; Lewis cable Tel Aviv 08563, 091533Z Jun 82, par. 4-5; State cable 159059 from NEA to Haig, par. 6; Habib cable Jerusalem 01871, 121152Z Jun 82, par. 3D and E. Other options for a security force in southern Lebanon included involving the Lebanese Armed Forces in it (Haig memo to The President, “A Forward U.S. Strategy in Wake of Israel’s Offensive,” 6-12-82, p. 2). When Habib first pointed out to Begin that the IDF was considerably past 40 kilometers already, Begin said those were just “‘tactical’ positions. Begin stated strongly that it is not an Israeli objective to press military operations with the goal of doing away with the PLO entirely” (Habib cable Jerusalem 01781, 082022Z Jun 82, par. 10; Habib cable Jerusalem 01785, 082248Z Jun 82, par. 6).

Sleep, feisty, glee: Howell 9-6-93. At Habib and Sharon’s first meeting after the invasion, the first words out of Sharon’s mouth were a pointed reminder that he had just recently emphasized in Washington that he didn’t want the US to be caught by surprise (Habib cable Jerusalem 01745, 072224Z Jun 82, par. 6).

No wider war: Gabriel, p. 67, citing *Newsview,* July 20, 1983, p. 19.

Asked Habib to go: Haig memo to The President, “Lebanon: Critical Moment at Hand,” 6-9-82, 8216678; Seale, p. 381. In his memo, Haig told Reagan that “the Syrians are very unlikely to agree” to Begin’s terms as long as Israeli troops kept attacking well beyond Begin’s 40-kilometer zone. Seale and Schiff & Ya’ari (p. 168) both describe this message as an ultimatum, but Draper says, “Phil would never deliver an ultimatum on behalf of the Israelis or anybody else.” In Draper’s view, Habib was simply bringing, in good faith, a reiteration of the Israeli position on the missiles that everyone had known for over a year (Draper 4-25-93). Assad apparently did not view it as any more of an ultimatum than he viewed other messages from Begin (Paganelli 11-2-96). Hopkins, p. 6, and Sharon, p. 465, give differing texts of Begin’s message to Assad.

Sharon claimed that Syria introduced six additional SA-6 missile batteries between June 7 and 9 (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 08505, 090841Z Jun 82, par. 3); Assad told Habib that he had added no new missile batteries in the Bekaa, only shifted existing ones around (Habib cable Damascus 04030, 092111Z Jun 82, par. 1).

Leaks: Hill 7-9-94; Habib cable Damascus 04013, 091207Z Jun 82, par. 3 and 4. Lewis conveyed to Begin Habib’s message that Israeli leaks like this virtually guaranteed Habib’s failure. But Lewis said “this will not be the first or the last time that Israeli leaks complicate your missions. I have long since run out of arguments to forestall them” (Lewis cable to Habib, State 158952, 092310Z Jun 82, par. 3-4).

Night owl: Howell 9-6-93

His disposal: Paganelli 11-2-96

Attack while Habib waits: Seale, p. 381-82; Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 167-68; Gabriel, p. 67, 97. Nathaniel Howell, who was the only person traveling with Habib in the first few days of the war, points out that the missiles were positioned “pretty well far up the Bekaa” nowhere close to the Israeli border. Despite Reagan’s uninformed statement that the missiles were pointed at the heart of Israel, they were defensive missiles. “They couldn’t hit Israel and they couldn’t threaten Israel,” says Howell. “What they did threaten was Israel’s ability to fly at will over the Bekaa Valley. So those missiles were a red herring all along. . . . Among the professionals dealing with this there was some understanding of why the Syrians had moved the missiles in and a feeling that the Israelis had really provoked them to do it” (Howell 9-6-93).

Careful not to strike: Gabriel, p. 92. The only explanation Gabriel offers is that “the political situation changed” on the ninth and “Begin finally authorized” Sharon to launch a preemptive strike (p. 97). Sharon’s version is that, as soon as Habib received the message from Begin on June 8, the US embassy in Damascus forwarded it to Assad. Meanwhile, Assad was introducing new missiles into the Bekaa to supplement the ones he already had there. Begin demanded, through US ambassador Lewis, that Assad remove those new missiles by 5 a.m. the next day, June 8. Assad failed to comply. While the Israeli Cabinet pondered what to do, and while Habib coincidentally was waiting to see Assad, Israeli intelligence notified Sharon that more missiles were on their way to Lebanon. The Cabinet thus decided to take them out (Sharon, p. 465-66).  
 Sharon did tell Begin on the morning of June 9 that the Syrians had moved six additional surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries into Lebanon (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 08505, 090841Z Jun 82, par. 3). But Habib cabled Washington that “Assad told me last night that he had not [repeat] not sent additional SAM batteries into the Bekaa but had rotated units [that were already] there for tactical reasons.” Begin’s request that Habib discuss with Assad the question of “additional SAMs” was “misleading,” Habib said, because the supposedly new units at issue were not in the Bekaa Valley but “located on the border. It is simply not reasonable,” Habib wrote, “to expect the Syrians not to augment their air defense, particularly within their own territory, and use them in certain circumstances under conditions that approximate war. . . . [The Israelis] really wanted to bomb them out and did not even give me a chance to get Assad to move back to June 5 deployment, despite [the] fact that I had been tasked by them to raise the issue” (Habib cable Damascus 04056, 100943Z Jun 82).

Robert Paganelli, the American ambassador in Damascus at the time, also disputes Sharon’s crucial point about his embassy forwarding Begin’s message to Assad on June 8: “No, that’s wrong. Phil carried that message. We never in any of the time that I worked with Phil, when he had a message to deliver, we would *never* preempt that message. Never” (Paganelli 11-2-96).

Begin extremely eager: Sicherman 8-4-98. Lewis cabled Habib in Damascus on June 9 that “Begin has telephoned several times during the day today (Wednesday, June 9) to ask whether I had any word about your movements or meetings. He is obviously extremely eager to know whether anything helpful occurred. When I spoke to him about 3 p.m. local this afternoon, we had just gotten the first word of the firing of the SAM-6 missiles, the Israeli attack on those missiles, and the ensuing air battle” (Lewis cable to Habib, State 158952, 092310Z Jun 82, par. 2-3).

Biggest: Seale, p. 381-82; Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 167; Gabriel, p. 67, 97. Israel shot down twenty-nine Syrian MiGs that afternoon. Schiff & Ya’ari point out that Syria’s loss of pilots was even greater than its loss of equipment.

Knew nothing: Habib cable Damascus 04039, 100047Z, par. 3. Howell also confirms that Habib did not know about the missiles having been hit when he walked into the first meeting with Assad (Howell 10-23-96).

Afternoon: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 169

Listening to the roar: Howell 10-11-93. Paganelli (11-2-96) says the Syrian military bases were far away from town, but Howell distinctly remembers the sounds of the jets.

No hint: Draper 4-25-93; Howell 9-6-93; Sicherman 8-4-98

No worse: Paganelli 11-2-96

Deceived: Paganelli 11-2-96

Ceasefire for 6 a.m.: Eagleburger cable to ambassadors, State 158441, 091807Z Jun 82

Called foreign ministry: Habib cable Damascus 04039, 100047Z Jun 82, par. 3. Howell (10-23-96) and Paganelli (11-2-96) both confirm that Habib did not know about the missiles having been hit when he walked into the first meeting with Assad.

Wild goose chase: Habib cable Damascus 04030, 092111Z Jun 82, par. 1

Turning point: Gabriel, p. 97. Gabriel, who wrote his book with the cooperation of the IDF, says the dogfights were no accident. Rather, “A second part of [Israel’s] strategy was to draw Syrian aircraft into battle and destroy as many as possible in order to establish air superiority over the entire Lebanese battle zone” (p. 97).

Crippled: Gabriel, p. 100. Assad told Habib that he would replace whatever equipment the Israelis destroyed (Habib cable Damascus 04030, 092111Z Jun 82, par. 2).

Humiliate: Habib cable Damascus 04030, 092111Z Jun 82, par. 5; see also Seale, p. 382

False sense of security: Howell 9-6-93

Feint: Seale, p. 381

Feet taken out: Draper 4-25-93

Two ropes: Howell 9-6-93. A newsletter that got hold of Habib’s cables reported that Habib believed he was “set-up” by the Israelis *(Middle East Policy Survey,* June 18, 1982, No. 58, p. 1, “War in Lebanon”). Habib complained about the leak of his cables, but did not dispute the accuracy of the report (Hill 7-9-94).

More tense: Howell 10-23-96; Habib cable Damascus 04039, 100047Z Jun 82, par. 2

Atmosphere: Paganelli 11-2-96

Habib meeting with Assad: Habib cable Damascus 04039, 100047Z Jun 82, par. 6-12. In fact, Habib had “tried strenuously” that very morning to extract from Begin a promise to pull back to 40 kilometers; Begin not only refused, but confided to him that pulling back would contradict the Israeli strategy of keeping a certain amount of pressure on the Syrians to “persuade them” to move the PLO north. Indeed, Begin had emphasized, forcing Syria to move the PLO north was the “only purpose” behind Israel’s operations north of the 40-kilometer line (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 08563, 091533Z Jun 82, par. 2 and 4-7). Begin said the IDF’s strategy was to encircle the Syrians and the PLO much as it had encircled the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Suez Canal in the 1973 war. He pointed out that in 1973 the IDF had not fired on that army, but that keeping it encircled facilitated the subsequent negotiations. Likewise, he said he had ordered the IDF not to attack the Syrians (par. 4 and 6).

One of the two cables Habib was handed during this meeting (Eagleburger cable to Habib and Paganelli, State 158653, 092031Z Jun 82, par. 2) contained talking points for Habib to make to Assad and reinforced the US position “that Israeli forces must be withdrawn from Lebanon.” The other (Draper cable to Habib, State 158702, 092056Z Jun 82) authorized Habib to make clear to Assad that the US did not view the ceasefire as “the end of the game” and to leave Assad with the “clear implication that other steps will follow the ceasefire” (par. 2). Draper was sending this cable in his capacity as deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs; within days he would take over for Howell travelling with Habib.

Not divert: Habib cable Damascus 04056, 100943Z Jun 82, par. 2, 6

Sharon fights on: Sharon, p. 467-68; see also Gabriel, p. 104. It had been three days since Sharon had told the Israeli Cabinet that the IDF had “achieved almost all our objectives!” within the first twenty-four hours (Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 187). Begin’s reply to Reagan’s letter was, in Lewis’ description, “vintage Begin, an extravagantly polite and legalistic way of rejecting the president’s simple proposal and restating Begin’s previous conditions” (Lewis cable Jerusalem 01809, 100509Z Jun 82, par. 5).

Pissed, double-crossed: Draper 4-25-93

Achieved objectives: Sharon, p. 467-68; see also Gabriel, p. 104

Worst fear: Habib cable Jerusalem 01785, 082248Z Jun 82, par. 2, 7

Meat grinder: Habib cable Damascus 04082, 101739Z Jun 82, par. 3. Habib had written two days earlier, “I do not believe the Syrians can in any way accept . . . the virtual loss of their dominant position in Lebanese affairs” as a result of Israeli action. “I believe they might just make a major fight now rather than swallow this humiliation, even at the cost of a military defeat” (Habib cable Jerusalem 01785, 082248Z Jun 82, par. 7).

Habib meeting with Assad: Habib cable 6-11-82. Assad typically had visitors meet first with his foreign minister, then repeat their message to him later. Habib knew that Assad had played the same game with Kissinger and Vance. This practice is one reason Habib had to wait to see him on June 9. Having been burned by that experience, Habib took steps to prevent an encore. He sent word via a Syrian intermediary, “This is ridiculous. I don’t want to go and sit for two hours and tell [Foreign Minister] Khaddam everything I have to say and then have to go repeat it to Assad” (Habib interview with Parker).

Attitude: Draper 12-22-94 and 4-13-93; Draper ADST oral history; Howell 9-6-93

Welcome: Habib cable 6-11-82. The American ambassador in Damascus would say on July 16 that the “Syrians would welcome a Habib visit for . . . any . . . purpose” (Paganelli cable Damascus 05050, 160720Z Jul 82).

Begin would announce: Haig cable Bonn, Secto 08064, 110102Z Jun 82, par. 2

Would have preferred: Habib cable Damascus 04097, 110702Z Jun 82, par. 7

Ceasefire at noon: Cable 111738Z June 82, RUEKJCS/1022. The PLO rejected the ceasefire. Assad’s biographer says that, on the strength of Habib’s words the night before, Assad had already agreed to pull back his own troops and to move the PLO fighters northward (Seale, p. 384). Howell, who was in the meeting with Habib and Assad, says flatly, “He did not agree to pull them back” (Howell 9-6-93).

Assumption: Paganelli 11-2-96

Unilateral ceasefire: An incorrect story has it that the Israelis decided on their ceasefire while Habib was flying from Damascus to Israel and that Habib knew nothing about it until he arrived in Jerusalem (Hopkins, p. 9, quoting his interview with Paganelli 1-11-92). The story cannot be correct because Habib’s cable commenting on “the ceasefire which they intend to declare unilaterally” was sent from Damascus at 9 a.m. local time. Another report is that the Israelis learned of Habib and Assad’s understanding during the night of June 10-11, perhaps by monitoring the less-than-secure line Habib used to report back to Washington. The communication facility at the US embassy in Damascus had broken down, and Habib was forced to fall back on a voice line (Seale, p. 384). When Habib heard of Israel’s unilateral ceasefire, he said he didn’t think Assad would agree to it unless it carried some provision for beginning an Israeli withdrawal—which it of course did not (Habib cable Damascus 04097, 110702Z Jun 82, par. 8). See Sharon, p. 469.

Didn’t mean a thing: Quoted in Seale, p. 385, from Seale’s interview with Habib 7-25-87. Sharon’s explanation in his memoirs (Sharon, p. 470-71) is that the PLO south and west of Beirut kept shooting, so Begin ordered the IDF to strike back at them.

Hell of a fight: Habib interview with Tueni

Clobbered: Habib interview with Parker

Line of defense: Howell 10-23-96; Paganelli 11-2-96

Cleaners: Veliotes 4-29-93

Deceived and betrayed him: Seale, p. 407. The American ambassador in Damascus talked with the Syrian deputy foreign minister June 26 about a report that Assad believed Habib had deceived him in their June 9-10 discussions. He argued that Habib had not misled Assad, but that his discussions had been overtaken by developments on the ground (Paganelli cable Damascus 04565, 261130Z Jun 82).

Breaking a promise: Draper ADST oral history; Draper 4-13-93. Why would Assad blame Habib instead of Sharon? Paganelli, the American ambassador to Syria, says this was a case of Assad shooting the messenger (Paganelli 11-2-96).

Rage: Draper 4-25-93

My word: Quoted by a State Department official who asked not to be identified by name.

Really shouted: Draper 4-25-93

Habib exchange with Begin and Sharon: Habib recounted this exchange several times, with some variations each time. So did Draper and Howell, who were both in the meeting with him. This version is based primarily on Habib’s account in his interview with Parker, with additional material from Draper’s accounts (Draper 12-22-94 and 4-13-93) and Howell’s account (Howell 9-6-93). Habib also told the story in interviews with Hopkins 3-12-92 (Hopkins p. 9-10) and Tueni 6-28-87. Habib repeatedly complained about Begin’s “mind-boggling definition—foreign to any rational definition of a cease-fire” (Habib cable Beirut 04240, 162045Z Jun 82, par. 2). The letter was of course not written by the president himself, but by an official in the State Department. It got the usual approvals, including a “No objection” stamp from the NSC (State 158645 TOSEC 080359, 092024Z).

Habib reported on a June 13 meeting in which he and Begin argued about whether “in place” is intrinsic to the concept of a ceasefire. This may have been the same meeting described in the text, though it may also have been a later one in which they went at it again. In that meeting, Habib told Begin he “found it hard to believe that Israel would deal this way with the appeal of the president. Clearly, the president had proposed a ceasefire in place. Begin repeated that *that would be true* if it had been negotiated into an agreement. As it is, it is a unilateral undertaking” [italics added]. Lewis reminded Begin in this meeting that, when he had first presented Reagan’s message to Begin, he had “made it clear that the cease-fire was in place” (Habib cable Jerusalem 01903 of 6-13-82, repeated in State 163551, 142321Z Jun 82, par. 15-23; Habib cable Beirut 04240, 162045Z Jun 82, par. 2).

The Israelis had continued moving not only on the Syrians, but also on the PLO in the Beirut area. Their rationale there was that their unilateral ceasefire applied only to Syria, not to the PLO (Habib cable Beirut 04240, 162045Z Jun 82, par. 2). In his memoirs, Sharon goes out of his way to emphasize that this ceasefire had been *unilateral,* that Israel declared it because the army “had achieved the war’s objectives in full,” and that, as Begin put it, “Israel wasn’t negotiating with anyone” (Sharon, p. 468-69). It is therefore unclear why, in justifying his troop movements during the ceasefire, he and Begin felt the need to cite Reagan’s message at all.

Begin apparently had no qualms about his and his army’s conduct. The same day, June 11, he told the Cabinet that the operation in Lebanon so far “has been one of the greatest actions, and not only of our nation in its thirty-four years of independence, but throughout the history of our people” (Sharon, p. 474). At about the same time, though, the CIA was calling the invasion “a grave mistake” and saying that Israel had “over estimated the ease with which it could achieve its military objectives.” Israeli losses, the CIA reported, had been “considerable,” “much higher than Israeli media sources have admitted.” There had been “large numbers” of helicopter Medi-Vac flights out of southern Lebanon, and Haifa Hospital was reportedly full (CIA cable 250164, 12 June 82).

Carrying water: Howell 9-6-93

Snookered: A colleague of Habib’s who asked not to be identified by name

Wariness: Hopkins, p. 10, citing his interview with Habib 3-12-92

All ceasefires specified: Draper 12-22-94; Habib interview with Tueni

Moonbeams: Howell 9-6-93

Would not go past: Howell 10-11-93. Sharon’s forces had blown past that point days ago. *The Middle East Journal,* Autumn 1982, vol. 36, no. 4, “Chronology April 16, 1982-July 15, 1982,” p. 566, cites a *New York Times* report that an Israeli Army spokesman said on June 10 that all opposing forces had been cleared from a 25-mile-wide zone (approximately 43 kilometers) north of Israel.

Control of suburbs: Kahan Commission report, p. 7

Surrounded: Beirut had plenty of PLO fighters in it when the invasion began, but their numbers swelled as fighters deployed in the south and east fled into the city to escape the Israeli northward advance. There they could hide out and defy the Israelis, confident that the Israelis would not come into the city to get them (Draper ADST oral history; Dillon ADST oral history). Syrian numbers per Paganelli 11-2-96. Quarter mile per Associated Press story “Habib makes peace in his ancestral land,” in *Clearwater Sun*, 8-21-82.

Looking for general: Sharon, p. 472-83

Tamerlane: Gowers, p. 205. See also Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 196.

Now under siege: Dillon 11-5-96. Beirut had previously come under siege by the Crusaders, by Saladin in the twelfth century, and by the Anglo-Turkish fleet in 1840 (Fisk, p. 278).

Focus shifted: Israeli and Syrian forces did continue to skirmish in various places now and then, but these became peripheral to the main event in Beirut.

No getting around the fact: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 181. The same point is made by Draper ADST oral history and “Ministers: Sharon strung us along,” *The Jerusalem Post,* 6-13-82.

Cornered Palestinians: Habib cable for the President from Beirut 04247, 6-17-82, par. 4

Standard estimation tables: Smith 11-25-96; Smith email to the author 7-12-01; Mead email to the author 7-15-01 confirms Smith’s numbers. Smith adds that “Israel’s air superiority might have lessened the cost, but such an attack would most likely have drawn Syria, Egypt, and others into the fray, which would certainly have changed the equation.” Mead adds that, to the small nation of Israel, 2,000 dead would be the equivalent of 35,000 deaths to America. The casualty tables they refer to are based on military experience stretching all the way back to the Peloponnesian War. The Israelis would no doubt have consulted comparable tables of their own in planning their attack.

Loose cannon: Sharon later said that he had decided in January 1982 that he wanted to avoid entering Beirut because it is the capital. “I solemnly affirm that I never wanted to enter Beirut unless it was absolutely indispensable. And believe me, had I been convinced that we had to enter Beirut, nobody in the world would have stopped me. Democracy or not, I would have entered even if my government didn’t like. I mean, I would have persuaded them. . . . Militarily speaking, we could get in any moment. Just in case it would become necessary, all was arranged to get in” (“Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *The Washington Post,* 8-29-82).

Exterminate: Quoted by a senior Labor party member of the Knesset at the time, who asked not to be quoted by name. That source emphasizes that “exterminate” was Sharon’s word, but notes that Sharon meant to destroy the PLO as an organization, not to kill each person who was a member of the PLO.

Wipe out: According to one of Habib’s colleagues who asked not to be identified

Get the PLO: Habib interview with Parker. Hopkins, p. 12, citing his 3-12-92 interview with Habib, says, “Sharon was hell-bent on getting what he wanted, which was the wholesale destruction of the PLO in Lebanon; he was going to stop at nothing less.” Habib said on June 17, “Sharon knows he has the PLO on the ropes,” Habib said, “but he prefers to have someone else finish them off. I doubt that he would want to risk the Israeli casualties involved in house-to-house fighting. But I cannot rule it out. He may try to use the Phalange for this, but that will be just as bloody” (Habib cable for the President from Beirut 04247, 6-17-82, par. 4). Habib repeatedly insisted that, whatever else might happen, the Israelis must not be allowed to enter West Beirut.

One of Habib’s colleagues, who asked not to be identified by name, says, “Paint the picture we faced at the time: You’re not sure who’s really in control of the Israeli army. Every time you’re told what their position is, they’re actually 10 miles or 20 miles or 50 miles further than you think. You know that the leader of this enterprise, Arik Sharon, has talked about the Palestinians as being like insects and like a disease that has to be cut out. The Israelis seem very, very close to going into Beirut, where you would have *massive* destruction, *massive* casualties—on both sides.” Begin had referred to Palestinian terrorists as “animals on two legs” and Gen. Raful Eitan would later describe West Bank Palestinians as “drugged cockroaches” (*The Times,* 4-15-83, cited in Fisk, p. 399; Sachar, p. 194)—an ironic choice of words, since Anne Frank had written with disgust in her diary of German plans to “cleanse” Utrecht of Jews “as though Jews were cockroaches” (Fisk, p. 399).

Storm into Beirut: Shultz 9-16-93

Major bloodletting: Weinberger 10-7-93

Fight to the last man: Seale, p. 386

Spark an all-out war: In the judgment of the American ambassador to Syria, Robert Paganelli, 11-2-96. That’s what Habib feared most (Tueni 11-15-95): “Once you get into national wars,” he said, “you get into danger of major conflagration. Then you’re talking big stuff” (Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984).

Broader consequences: Draper ADST oral history; Dillon 5-9-94

American-made: Draper 4-13-93; also Draper ADST oral history

Green light: Draper ADST oral history. For example, Arafat said that “the U.S. will pay a high price in the near future for its collaboration with Israel.” Eighteen West Bank labor unions and student organizations denounced “American imperialist collaboration with Israeli policies” in Lebanon, and a Palestinian politician reportedly criticized “American-Israeli conspiracy in the massacre being implemented against the Palestinians in Lebanon” (Palestinian newspapers *Ashaab*  and *Al Fajr,* 6-28-82, summarized and quoted in Grove cable Jerusalem 02057, 281105Z Jun 82, par. 3-4). The pro-Jordanian newspaper *Al Quds* titled one of its lead editorials “The Futility of Habib’s Mission,” in which it concluded that the United States is unfit to play the role of mediator since “American and Israeli aims are identical” (6-28-82, summarized and quoted in Grove cable Jerusalem 02057, 281105Z Jun 82, par. 4). The Soviets also accused the US of, at least, advance knowledge of the invasion and, at worst, complicity in it (Reagan, p. 422).

Quixote, shill: “Israeli attacks into Beirut will make the U.S. appear to have been acting as an accomplice in a pattern of Israeli deception, i.e., declare a ceasefire and then move ahead to take more territory. This can utterly destroy our credibility in future efforts to help meet Israel’s security objectives” (Assistant Secretary of State memo to the Secretary, 6-15-82, 8216710).

Anti-American violence: Hill 6-15-93. Hill hastens to point out that academics frequently predicted upheavals in the Arab world in response to Israeli actions, but that the Arab states have really never cared enough about the Palestinians to react that way.

Fanatics: Draper ADST oral history. Hill says Draper felt even more strongly about this than Habib: “Draper was just really wild about this. He just believed that if the Israelis went into an Arab capital and the US was seen as allowing this to happen, it would be such an affront to Arab pride that God knows what would happen *all over* the Arab world. It could be just upheaval and embassies in flames and everything.” Hill was skeptical about that prospect (Hill 7-19-95). A coalition of Syrian parties appealed to Arab masses on June 19 to hit and destroy American interests in the region *(Journal of Palestine Studies,* Summer/Fall 1982, “Chronology of the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon June-August 1982,” p. 148).

Soviet Union intervening: Draper (2-24-02) says, “We were concerned about a US-Soviet clash. We couldn’t rule out the possibility that the Soviets might come to Syria’s aid.” The Soviets “indicated they might provide air defense help in the event of Israeli attacks on Syrian positions in the Bekaa Valley. The Soviets have suggested that they might become more directly involved in supporting Syrian forces if Israel attacked inside Syria” (Eagleburger cable State 155256, 070141Z Jun 82, p. 3, p. 6).

Draw in the US: Draper ADST oral history. To many, the prospect was very real: The Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 had brought the U.S. and the USSR very close to an all-out confrontation over the Middle East. US ambassador to Syria Paganelli disagreed, considering it unlikely the Soviets would really intervene (Paganelli 11-2-96).

Secretly flown: Seale, p. 383

Brezhnev: Teicher p. 200-202. Teicher says this letter arrived from Brezhnev early in the second week of the war. Haig, p. 339, says it was June 9. As it turned out, Brezhnev’s messages to the US were hollow. In his last months of life, he was too feeble and too distracted by his own crises in Afghanistan and Poland to really want a superpower confrontation (Seale, p. 395). But at the time, his threats had to be taken seriously.

Averting these disasters: As Schiff & Ya’ari (p. 201) put it, the Israelis had “two choices: to let Philip Habib negotiate a withdrawal of the Palestinian forces or to force their way into West Beirut and clean it out themselves.”

**Chapter 4: We Corner Them, You Kill Them**

Murdering: Dillon 11-16-96

Deputy: Prior to the invasion, Nathaniel Howell and Draper had taken turns accompanying Habib in the Middle East. While one was in the region, the other served as Habib’s main contact in the State Department. At the moment the invasion began, Howell happened to be in England with Habib, so he went with him to the region. But he had a new job waiting for him in Washington. So by June 13 or so, Howell had returned to Washington and Draper took his place. Draper would remain with Habib for the remainder of the mission. With Howell no longer in his old job, Charlie Hill became Habib’s main contact in the department. Date of the events described here is per Paganelli cable Damascus 04206, 141618Z Jun 82, par. 2 and 11; and Lewis cable Tel Aviv 141629Z, 141611Z Jun 82, par. 2.

Airport closed: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

We’ll drive: Draper 4-13-93 and 5-4-93. “I couldn’t talk Phil into using a helicopter,” Draper says (4-13-93). Dillon (11-5-96) thinks a direct helicopter flight from Damascus to Beirut would not have been standard procedure anyway, but Habib could have flown around to the port of Junieh just north of Beirut. Col. Charles Smith (11-25-96) points out that the closure of the Beirut airport was the main reason the Marines would later fly Habib in helicopters. Just a few days earlier, while still in Washington, Draper had taken the unusual step of advising Habib in a cable that, if he went from Damascus to Beirut, “take care of your personal safety” (Draper cable to Habib, State 158702, 092056Z Jun 82 [6-9-82], par. 2).

Notoriously bad: Dillon 11-5-96

5,000 feet: Dillon note to author commenting on a draft of this chapter; Paganelli 11-2-96 thought the road went to 10,000 feet.

Bombardment: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Hated helicopters: Bider 4-24-93. Habib’s aversion to helicopters may suggest not only why Habib gave a different explanation, but why he became touchy in giving it:

Interviewer: You mentioned a drive from Damascus to Beirut.

Habib: Yeah, over the mountain.

Interviewer: What was happening?

Habib: The airport was closed!

Interviewer: No, I mean—

Habib: I had to get there! I was in the process of trying to persuade people to stop killing each other, and in order to do that I had to talk to them! And in order to talk to them, I had to get to where they were. And in order to get to where they were, I had to physically move myself from one capital to another (Habib interview with the author, a differently edited version of which appeared in *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984).

Back roads: Draper 4-13-93; Paganelli 11-2-96

Drive to Beirut: Story drawn primarily from Draper 4-13-93. Some details from Draper 9-19-97, Dillon 11-5-96, and Habib interview with Parker. Quotes from Habib are from Habib interview with the author. Draper notes “We had to pay for all kinds of damages later on” for the other cars they smashed along the way. When they finally arrived at Ambassador Robert Dillon’s residence in a suburb of Beirut, Habib and Draper were making edgy jokes about how terrible the roads were and how lucky they were not to have pitched over a cliff (Dillon 11-5-96). But Draper would later say, “I’ll never forget that horrendous ride.” Habib would later say, “That’s just dramatic stuff. Doesn’t count.”

Barely controlled: Weinberger 10-27-93. The press of 1982 often talked about “the 1975-76 civil war” (e.g., “Israelis Say They Have Achieved the ‘Primary Objective’ of Invasion,” *New York Times,* 8-22-82), but the civil war had not really ended (Dillon note to author, 11-29-82). It continued until 1990 (“Crushing Lebanon’s Dream,” *Time,* May 6, 1996).

Capital in flames: Pakradouni, p. 240

Deal cooperatively: His nominal official purpose was to discuss with them how the US could help strengthen the central Lebanese government so it could extend its control over all of Lebanon, to be followed by a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon (Paganelli cable Damascus 04206, 141618Z Jun 82, par. 3).

Coexisting: Habib cable Damascus 04097, 110702 Z Jun 82, par. 5

Alliance of convenience: There was nothing new about this. It had long been American policy to promote reconciliation among the Lebanese factions (Dillon ADST oral history; Veliotes cable 6-11-82, “Possible Habib Travel to Lebanon,” sec. C). But the policy hadn’t accomplished much. What was new was a special envoy on the scene with a rare passion for getting Lebanon’s house in order and a national crisis that he hoped might prompt them to bounce off the bottom of their fortunes and start working their way back up. The US policy goal was to have a revivified central Lebanese government extend its authority over all Lebanese territory (Veliotes cable State 163040, 140045Z Jun 82). Habib, the State Department, and Lebanese officials also hoped—despite the overwhelming odds against it—to bring about a “national unity cabinet” to facilitate national reconciliation. Habib’s argument to the other factional leaders was that, the more they cooperated with Bashir, the less Bashir would be hostage to his Israeli allies. They would then have a better chance of national unity around an independent Lebanese leader (Tueni 11-15-95). He also believed that, if they presented a united front in cooperation with him, the PLO would not be able to play them off one another (Hopkins, p. 18, based on his 10-29-91 interview with Draper).

Six years: *The Jerusalem Post,* “Rival factions meet in Beirut to attempt Lebanese solution,” 6-21-82

Clout, fond: Dillon 11-5-96 and 11-16-96; Crocker 4-28-94

Assassinate: Dillon 11-5-96. Draper 5-4-93 points out that Walid’s home village was surrounded by Israelis and Syrians at the time and suggests that Walid may have been in danger; Dillon 11-5-96 says he was not.

Assurances: Draper 12-22-94

Fetch Walid: Dillon 11-5-96; Crocker 4-29-98. There may have been an additional dimension to Habib’s reasons for wanting Walid at the meeting. Draper (5-4-93) says that when Habib arrived in Beirut June 13, Walid was in a tight spot. He had decided not to fight the advancing Israelis, and his mountain village of Mukhtara was surrounded by Israelis on one side and by Syrians on the other. Claiming neutrality behind Israeli lines could look a lot like collaboration with the Israelis, and that could hurt Walid’s potential as a force for national reconciliation (Crocker 4-28-94 and Dillon 11-5-96). So Habib dispatched Crocker to Walid’s castle with a warm personal letter saying, in effect, “Dear Brother Walid, we need to see you in Beirut—immediately.” Had Walid come on his own, Draper says, he would certainly have been killed (Draper 5-4-93, 12-22-94, and 9-19-97).

Coached, arrogant: Draper 12-22-94 and 9-19-97

Invited: Schiff & Ya’ari, pp. 11-44; Sachar, p. 173. Sharon, of course, did not *need* an invitation from Bashir or anyone else.

Stay around Beirut: Grove cable Jerusalem 01863 of June 11, 1982 (repeated as State 16650, 170133Z Jun 82, par. 5-6)

Accusations, murderous, insult, stomped: Draper 12-22-94 and 9-19-97. Press reports of the meeting said the group discussed issues, adjourned, and agreed to meet again within forty-eight hours. “Committee sources said President Sarkis was relieved that there was no confrontation between” Bashir and Walid. The prime minister was quoted saying, “The mere fact that the meeting was held brings optimism and augers well. It reflects the determination of the Lebanese to save Lebanon, starting by relieving it of Israeli occupation . . .” (“Rival factions meet in Beirut to attempt Lebanese solution,” *The Jerusalem Post,* 6-21-82). Walid would later describe the National Salvation Council as “a committee for burying the dead, its task was to make the Palestinians leave Beirut and not to condemn the Israeli invasion.” He bowed out of it because “I wouldn’t be the one to put the coup de grace on the Palestinians” (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, MEA, January 5, 1983, pp. G6 and G8).

Trundle: Dillon 11-5-96 and 11-16-96; Crocker 4-29-98. It’s unclear exactly when this meeting happened. Most indications are that it was the group’s first meeting when Habib first arrived in Beirut, but Walid did not actually resign from the National Salvation Committee until June 25, so it could conceivably have been as late as that date. (NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8217953, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 1800, June 25, 1982—Late Afternoon Meeting with Sarkis,” 6-25-82). Hopkins, p. 26, gives Habib’s version of the story, that Walid was nearly assassinated after the meeting. In addition to Crocker’s role, Habib said he had Lebanese intelligence chief Jonny Abdu send some of his men along to escort the car. Walid asked for Habib’s help getting home not only out of fear of assassination by Bashir’s thugs, but also because the trip would take him across Phalange lines, Syrian lines, and Israeli lines. Crocker says the assassination attempt on Walid came a few months later. Walid Jumblatt told Habib, apparently on June 29, that Bashir had given him an ultimatum to relinquish his armory and his house at Mukhtara by 4 p.m. that day (Haig cable State 180288, 292004Z Jun 82, par. 5).

The first time the author met Habib, in December 1983, he noticed various strings of worry beads on the coffee tables in Habib’s living room. Habib picked up one string and said, “Yeah, this one was given to me by Walid Jumblatt. He and I disagreed about a lot of things, but I bailed his ass out of some tight corners.”

Sharon and Bashir’s understanding: Sharon’s own way of putting it was that “the main effort in the city should be carried out by Lebanese forces with the IDF playing only a supporting role” (Sharon, p. 487). Also Kahan Commission Report, p. 8; Sachar, p. 184; Khalidi, p. 172. “Lebanese Forces” was another name for Bashir’s militia.

Finish them off: Habib cable Beirut 04247, 171230Z Jun 82, par. 4. He added, “He may try to use the Phalange for this, but that will be just as bloody.”

Do something: Sachar, p. 181

Cajoled and threatened: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 107, 196-201; Seale, p. 286-87

Advice to Bashir: Quote compiled from both Dillon’s and Habib’s accounts (Dillon 11-5-96; Habib interview with Parker, in which Habib draws the connection between his advice and Bashir’s refusal); see also Seale, p. 288-89 and NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8217986, 6-26-82, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, Evening Meeting with Bashir Gemayel, June 26,” par. 8. This advice was right in line with US policy toward Lebanon (Dillon ADST oral history).

Two choices: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 196-201; see also Seale, p. 387

Improvisation: “Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *The Washington Post,* 8-29-82, p. A18

Sharon’s war: This is more or less the theme of Schiff & Ya’ari’s whole book (e.g., p. 301-8). Draper described Israel’s invasion of Lebanon as one of “the most colossal blunders in its history” (Draper ADST oral history).

Can’t really rely: This is Paganelli’s (11-2-96) quote of what Habib had said to him.

Rogue, vastly exceeded: “Court rules in libel case: Sharon misled Begin,” *Jerusalem Post,* 11-5-97; “Sharon deceived Begin on Lebanon, judge rules; throws out libel suit against Ha’aretz,” *Ha’aretz,* 11-5-97. Tel Aviv District Court judge Moshe Talgam ruled November 4, 1997, that Begin knew “that Sharon had not dealt with him honestly, and had taken advantage of his trust . . . . While Sharon received [the Cabinet’s] approval to launch a limited operation ‘Peace for Galilee,’ he estimated and knew that in fact he was embarking on a far greater plan known as Pine Tree. He had tried in the past, and failed, to receive approval for his plan, yet still proceeded to prepare for its implementation. The green light given by the prime minister and the government to commence with Peace for Galilee cannot, therefore, be interpreted as a conscious consent for the Lebanon war” (“Begin knew Sharon deceived him,” *Ha’aretz,* 11-5-97).

That ruling against Sharon came in a libel case he filed against the Israeli newspaper *Ha’aretz* over an article written by Uzi Benziman. In his book about Sharon, Benziman wrote that Sharon, with his war in Lebanon, “proved that one man alone could drag the country into events which would change its future” (Benziman, p. 266).

By the time of the invasion, writes Rabinovich (p. 128), “Sharon had come to dominate, nearly to monopolize, Israel’s defense (and, to a large extent, its foreign) policy.” Lewis writes that “Operation Peace for Galilee looked more and more like Sharon’s personal grand concept for driving the PLO from Lebanese soil” (in Quandt, *Middle East,* p. 238). *Newsweek* wrote that Sharon’s “many critics now accuse him of turning the Lebanese war into a personal crusade against the PLO” (“Who’s in Charge Here?” 8-23-82). Israeli opponents of the war called it “Arik’s war” (Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 216, 251).

Sharon denies everything said here. “This is not my war, Sharon’s war . . . . This is Israel’s war” (“Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *The Washington Post,* 8-29-82). “I never misled Menachem Begin. I never lied to Menachem Begin” (Reuters Information Service story 4-2-96). “Not one single decision during the war was taken without Begin’s knowledge and approval, and in many cases at his own initiative. Moreover, each and every one of these decisions was brought to the cabinet and duly ratified” (“I’ll fight for 20 years—Sharon,” *Jerusalem Post,* 11-5-97).

Reconfigure: This is according to a Labor party member of the Knesset at the time, who asked not to be identified by name, but many other sources say the same. Sharon’s obsession is one of the major themes of Schiff & Ya’ari’s book. Mikdadi, p. 70, quotes Jacobo Timerman saying “This is General Sharon’s personal war, first step towards total expulsion of the Palestinians and the installation of puppet governments in Lebanon and Jordan.” Friedman (p. 131) is one writer who agrees that this was not Sharon’s war. See also, for example, Parker p. 167-69 and 176 on Sharon’s and Begin’s miscalculations.

Creating facts on the ground was Sharon’s specialty (McFarlane, p. 187): For example, when relegated to the hapless job of agriculture minister in an earlier administration, he pushed the policy of expanding Israeli settlements in the occupied territories (Sharon, p. 355-72). Those settlements would become the thorniest issue in later attempts to make peace between the Israelis and Palestinians.

The Israeli defense ministry had sketched out a contingency plan for a major operation in Lebanon well before Sharon arrived as defense minister. Such plans are not unusual in military circles anywhere. But it took Sharon’s vision and persistence to blow the dust off of an academic contingency plan and elaborate it into an urgent mission.

Sharon’s plan: This is according to a Labor party member of the Knesset at the time, who asked not to be identified by name, but many other sources say the same (see, for example, Sachar, p. 172). This Israeli describes Sharon’s vision as his “masterplan”; Lewis describes it as Sharon’s “grandiose scheme” (Lewis unpublished ms., p. 14); Schiff & Ya’ari describe it as Sharon’s “grand design” (p. 44 and 230); Friedman (p. 145) calls it “a strategic design” and “his grand designs”; Ball calls it a “geopolitical scheme” and “spacious” “apocalyptic vision” (p. 27-28); Sachar refers to “this master plan,” “his grand strategy” (p. 172), and “an audacious scheme” (p. 184); an Israeli academic writing in *The Jerusalem Post* (6-27-82) says “Ariel Sharon, after all, has never sought to keep secret his grand strategy” (cited in Jansen, p. 122). Sharon believed, in Friedman’s words (p. 144-45), “that this military strength could, in an almost mechanical fashion, solve a whole knot of complex, deeply rooted political problems.” Also Ball p. 27-28.

Bashir, controlled by Israel: Habib cable Damascus 04082, 101739Z Jun 82, par. 7. Habib said “the Israelis are going to stay in here [Lebanon] and . . . put Bashir in under their guns” (“Transcription of Recorded Radio Conversation between Amb. Habib—Charlie Hill, July 9, 1982—1030 hours,” p. 2). “It’s the Sharon plan all the way,” Habib said. “They’re going to put Bashir in power; meanwhile they are going to control the whole country” (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219693, “Telcon with Habib July 10,” p. 3).

Lebanon would then have, Habib wrote, “something like a quisling government in power” (Habib cable Damascus 04082, 101739Z Jun 82, par. 7). A quisling is a person who betrays his/her own country by aiding an invading enemy, often serving later in a puppet government *(The Random House Dictionary of the English Language,* second ed.). Habib believed such an arrangement “will never be acceptable to the Arab countries in the region and will merely increase the area of confrontation. . . . I believe that any collusion with Israel for the political restructuring that they seem to intend . . . is unacceptable.” He had an indication that Haig might be coming to Israel and that Israeli ideas for restructuring Lebanon politically might be on the agenda. “For the secretary to engage in this kind of discussion with the Israelis at this time, which [a cable the American embassy in Tel Aviv] suggests the Israelis intend, would be unseemly to say the least. If it were to include the dismembering of Lebanon in addition, we would have violated every precept and every statement of policy which has guided our attitude toward Lebanon for many years. The fact that some Lebanese may be willing to play this game should not convince us that it is in our overall interest” (Damascus 04082, par. 7).

Veliotes said July 11, “Everything points to their literally settling in, dictating the next government, bullying, and with guns trying to create what they consider to be the millennium” (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219695, “Telecon between Phil Habib and Charlie Hill, 12:30 p.m., July 11, 1982,” p. 2; punctuation altered for clarity).

West Bank, Gaza, Jordan: Sachar, p. 172; Friedman, p. 144; and a Labor party member of the Knesset at the time, who asked not to be identified by name. Jordan’s King Hussein considered his country Israel’s “next target” (Habib cable London 16170, 261738Z Jul 82, par. 8). Sharon has frequently said that there is an obvious solution to the Palestinian quest for a homeland. For example, “Jordan, I mean Transjordan, is the only solution. . . . Believe me, it’s the perfect solution. . . . Some [Palestinian refugees] could stay where they are, some could transfer themselves to Transjordan. . . . What counts for me is that a Palestine already exists, a Palestinian state already exists, so there is no need to create another one.” (“Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out . . . ,” *Washington Post,* 8-29-82). Habib paraphrased Sharon telling him that, “Palestinians should be given political expression in that part of former Palestine where they already are a majority, namely in Jordan. Why keep the king there, he added rhetorically, and let an entire nation (unnamed) suffer because of one selfish man. I told him to forget it” (Habib cable Beirut 04461, 051600Z Jul 82, par. 8).

Sharon denied having ambitions vis a vis Lebanon beyond expelling the PLO and the Syrians from it. When journalist Oriana Fallaci asked him about ambitions to install Bashir as a puppet to give Israel a “colony de facto” in Lebanon, Sharon replied, “I have never heard such a slander! Such a lie! Such an insult! You are slandering me, you are insulting me!” He also denied his preference for force: “We sincerely prefer a peaceful solution. Why should war be always the way to settle things?” (“Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out…,” *Washington Post,* 8-29-82, p. A19)

Sharon expected: According to an Israeli politician who asked not to be identified by name.

Rid of Begin: “A Defiant No to Reagan,” *Time,* 9-20-82, p. 27. Sharon didn’t mind talking publicly about his ambitions. For example, he told the Paris daily *Le Matin* (7-2-82) that “as prime minister he would give King Hussein 24 hours to leave Amman” (cited in Jansen, p. 122). He was often greeted in oriental neighborhoods of Israel as “Arik, King of Israel” (Sachar, p. 171). IDF soldiers devoted to Sharon called him “king of Israel” and “King Arik” (“Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out…,” *Washington Post,* 8-29-83). Also “For Likud Party, Sharon Is the ‘King of Israel,’” *The New York Times,* 2-7-01. Begin too was sometimes hailed as “King of Israel” (“A Flame Burnt Out,” *The New York Times,* 8-31-83).

Rob him: Hopkins, p. 12. Shultz told Reagan August 12 that the “pattern of Israeli behavior raises questions once again about whether [the Israelis] really want a negotiated settlement—or at least whether Sharon does” (“Talking Points for use with The President,” 10:00 a.m. 8/12/82, 8224185, p. 2).

Intervene: Yaacobi 2-14-95. Gabriel, p. 14, 16. Draper adds that it certainly looked to him and Habib at the time that Sharon was deliberately trying to scuttle any progress they might make (Draper 12-18-94). Sharon’s approach throughout most of the war was, in the words of one American official who asked not to be identified by name, to “stall us, lie to us if necessary, do whatever he had to do until the facts on the ground brought about the inevitable.”

Means of delay: Sharon, p. 485. An American official said toward the end of the war, “Sharon has tried to sabotage Habib all along” (“Who’s in Charge Here?” *Newsweek,* 8-23-82, p. 19).

Against the man: “Mixed reaction in Jerusalem,” *The Jerusalem Post,* 8-8-82

Hated: Marjorie Habib 2-19-95

Cold-bloodedly: Habib interview with Parker

Bowl you over: This official asked not to be identified by name. Sehulster says, “Yes, he would bump into people. His girth is such that it’s kind of hard to walk in a group without it. He’s overwhelmed with himself” (Sehulster 7-12-94).

Arik gets: Newman and Rogan, p. 152

Squire: Lewis ADST oral history

Never to trust: Draper 10-25-98

Biggest liar: Paganelli 11-2-96. These are Paganelli’s words reporting what Habib had said to him.

Worth nothing: Seale, p. 392

Baabda, tanks: Hill 7-9-94; State Department report “Discussions with Israelis on tanks in Baabda,” 890326, 6980; State cable 163040, 140045Z Jun 82, par. 6

Ballistic, prisoner: Howell 10-11-93 and 9-6-93

Significance: This message was given to the State Department through the Israeli ambassador in Washington, reporting a phone conversation he had just had with Begin after Haig told him that, if Israel wanted Begin’s scheduled meetings in the US to go ahead as planned, the tanks around the presidential palace had to go (State Department report “Discussions with Israelis on tanks in Baabda,” 890326, 6980; State cable 163040, 140045Z Jun 82, par. 6).

Already in Ba’abda: Schiff & Ya’ari p. 193, italics added

Sharon on phone: Undated State Department report “Discussions with Israelis on tanks in Baabda,” 890326, 6980, section headed “June 14 (10:34Z)”; State cable 163040, 140045Z Jun 82, par. 11. Israeli Foreign Ministry official David Kimche relayed to Lewis at 5:50 p.m. June 14 Sharon’s word that he would personally attend to the matter of the tanks (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 08846, 141611Z Jun 82, par. 4). At 6:20 Sharon called Lewis directly to assure him that he was “giving orders immediately to have them moved” (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 08880 141731Z Jun 82, par. 2-3). Habib had talked with Sharon about the tanks around lunchtime that day (“Discussions with Israelis on tanks in Baabda,” 890326, 6980, section headed “June 14 (10:34Z)”).

Around Dillon’s residence, cabbage patch: Lewis cable Tel Aviv 08880, 141731Z Jun 82, par. 2-3; undated State Department report “Discussions with Israelis on tanks in Baabda,” 890326, 6980; Haig memo to the President 8217048, 6-17-82; Habib cable Beirut 04247, 171230Z Jun 82, par. 3

Observation post: The Lebanese, of course, refused. Habib was outraged by “this gross insensitivity”: “Sharon had promised us on Tuesday night that he would reduce the IDF presence from around the Baabda area in the vicinity of the palace. It is shocking and almost unbelievable that the Israelis could now make such an approach. Ask the Israelis whether they are trying to destroy the Lebanese government?” (Message from Habib party in State cable 175122, 240945Z Jun 82, par. 3). Israeli soldiers also asked Dillon to use his residence. He too refused (Dillon 11-5-96).

July 5: Habib cable Beirut 04461, 051600Z Jul 82, par. 11. An IDF jeep had been parked right in front of the American ambassador’s residence too. “It’s indecent!” Habib said. “I waved them out of the way” (Hill 7-10-94).

July 8: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 9219393 [*sic,* should be 8219393], 7-9-82, “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib [*sic,* actually Draper], July 8, 1928 [*sic*,should be 1982], at 1430 hours,” p. 1-2. Sharon may have outsmarted himself by positioning tanks around the palace. It helped defeat one of his own purposes in the war: evicting Syrian forces from Beirut. Habib believed that, if President Sarkis asked Assad to get his troops out of Beirut, Assad would do it. But when Sarkis did talk to Assad about it, Assad dismissed the idea, replying that Sarkis “might no longer be considered a free agent [to make that request], as his country and *even the area of his presidency* were under foreign occupation” by the Israelis. By the same token, though, Paganelli reminded the Syrians that the same could be said of PLO and Syrian military presence in Lebanon (Habib 7-2-82 cable Beirut 4415, quoted in State 184218, 021729Z Jul 82, par. 15; italics added; this quote is Habib’s paraphrase of Sarkis’ account of the discussion, not necessarily Assad’s words; Paganelli cable Damascus 04934, 101438Z Jul 82, par. 16-17).

Begin weeps: Draper 9-19-97

How many Arabs: Draper 4-13-93

Lost sleep: Draper 4-25-93

Agony: Draper 4-25-93 and 9-19-97

Fancy himself: This is according to Sam Lewis (4-10-94), who as US ambassador to Israel for eight years knew Begin better than did any other American. He adds that, prior to Begin’s re-election in 1981, Begin was “somewhat in awe of generals,” but with his re-election “Begin now felt confident of his military judgments as well as his political mastery. Unfortunately . . . [he also] largely put aside doubts, moderate advice, and much sense of proportion” (Lewis in Quandt, *Middle East*, p. 232).

Man of dreams: This Israeli politician asked not to be identified by name. This politician points out that, even after thirty years as a member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, Begin would ask questions that revealed a remarkable degree of detached unrealism. “I was every time again and again shocked by his questions,” says this politician. Schiff & Ya’ari describe Begin as “naive about military matters” (p. 112). David Ben Gurion described Begin as “a romantic fool, essentially a windbag full of rhetoric and metaphors” (quoted in “Begin’s Rhetoric and Sharon’s Tactics,” *Foreign Affairs,* Fall 1982, p. 68). Lewis points out that, even when Begin assigned himself the additional job of defense minister during his first term as prime minister, he spent only one day a week at the Defense Ministry and relied heavily on a very able military secretary (Lewis 4-10-94).

Friedman sees Begin’s fascination with military strength in psychological terms: “He lived for the chance to correct the indignities that he and his forefathers had suffered for centuries. Begin loved the idea of Jewish power, Jewish generals, Jewish tanks, Jewish pride. They were his pornography. He needed a war to satisfy his deep longing for dignity and to cure all his traumas about Jewish impotence. . . . What made Begin even more dangerous was that his fantasies about power were combined with a self-perception of being a victim. Someone who sees himself as a victim will almost never morally evaluate himself or put limits on his own actions. Why should he? He is the victim” (Friedman, p. 143-44).

No longer first class: Maj. Gen. Uri Simhoni, in Strober & Strober, p. 206

Military background: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 38-39, 113; Jansen, p. 12

Forbidden, sole source: Lewis 4-10-94

Sold Begin: According to a leading Israeli politician who asked not to be identified by name

Strung along: “Ministers: Sharon strung us along,” *Jerusalem Post,* 6-13-82, cited in Jansen, p. 12. On June 15, 1982, Lewis described “Sharon’s technique” as “following his own timetable and leading his colleagues along subsequently to endorse it” (Lewis 6-15-82 cable quoted in Haig cable 051526, 170048Z Jun 82, par. 4).

Eleventh hour: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 115. Sharon took the same approach with the Cabinet, getting them to approve one move at a time (Jansen, p. 12).

Vote: Yaacobi 2-14-95. The closest thing to a Knesset vote on the war was a no-confidence vote on Begin during the war. He survived.

Discussion of objectives: “Ministers: Sharon strung us along,” *Jerusalem Post,* 6-13-82, cited in Jansen, p. 12. Though this particular article appeared early in the war, the same lack of discussion of objectives prevailed throughout the war.

Pit bulls: Bider 4-24-93

Hold my own: According to one of Habib’s colleagues, who asked not to be identified by name.

Alley fighter: Lewis unpublished manuscript about Habib, April 22, 1985

Almost every time: Lewis 4-10-94

Blamed: Habib reported that “Sharon said that the July [1981] cease fire, in which, as he put it, the killing of Jews elsewhere in the world was not considered a ceasefire violation, had become intolerable to the point that it had contributed to the recent Israeli action” (Habib cable Jerusalem 01745, par. 6, 072224Z Jun 82). Sharon wrote in his memoirs that “the reality of why we were involved in this war [was] the years of horrific terrorism from Lebanon, the attempted destruction of the Israeli north, the massive PLO buildup of Katyusha rockets and artillery, [and] the utter failure of the American negotiators,” i.e., Philip Habib (Sharon, p. 482).

Enemy: Lewis cable Tel Aviv 11097, 221519Z Jul 82, par. 3

Heart: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 220-21; Hill undated letter to author received 6-13-97

Do the opposite: Hill 6-15-93

Ridiculed, lecturing, give response to Begin: Lewis 4-10-94; Howell 9-6-93

Crap: Lewis 4-10-94

Nasty to Morrie: Lewis 4-10-94

Falling asleep, guts: Draper 12-18-94. Draper took Sharon’s words to indicate he wanted him dead. He adds, “I think he disliked Phil too, but he really had a real dislike for me. I never knew why. I think he thought I was a typical WASP and was anti-Semitic into the bargain and anti-Israeli.”

**Chapter 5: The Other General**

Every step: Veliotes 5-6-93

Fascination: Draper ADST oral history. Veliotes says Haig had “a romantic view” of the IDF that “sort of mesmerized” him (Veliotes 4-29-93).

Bombing in Vietnam: Haig 5-11-94

Soviets: Haig 5-11-94. Draper says Haig rejected the prevailing State Department view that the Palestinian issue was the hub of the Middle East; the real problem, as Haig saw it, was Soviet efforts to expand into the region (Draper ADST oral history).

Oversimplification, strategic consensus: According to a colleague of Habib’s who asked not to be identified by name; “Transcript of Radio Conversation Between Lawrence Eagleburger, Ambassador Habib, and Charles Hill, July 18, 1444-1516 EDT,” 8220873, p. 18. Habib would later say, “There is no place for the USSR in a peace process in the Near East because, unlike us, the Soviets are not sincerely in favor of peace.” But neither did he see much advantage or relevance to Haig’s idea of a stragegic cooperation. “I have never believed in the interest of this idea, and I don’t think that anyone in the Near East has any interest in it whatsoever. This proposal is a mistake. It has prevented [people] from considering the [really] important problem: that of peace between Israel and the Arab states. At the time, I gave my honest opinion to General Haig, by reminding him that the real question consists in resolving the inter-regional conflicts” (Habib interview with Michel Dusclaud, translated by Susan Bree, p. 9 of translation). Habib also said, “Al is too caught up with strategic consensus,” Haig’s concept for regional opposition to the Soviets (Hill 7-16-94). While Syria was certainly a client of the Soviets, Veliotes (ADST oral history) says, “You’ve got to make some pretty insane conceptual leaps to consider Assad a Communist or an agent of the Soviet Union—he was his own son of a bitch. That was tough enough.” The strategic consensus outlook, he says, led to proposals of “legitimized idiocy.”

Habib’s view of US-Israel relations: According to a colleague of Habib’s who asked not to be identified by name. Haig’s perception of Habib’s views: “Phil never liked the Israelis. I mean, you gotta know that. He had an Arabist view, but not as bad as some of the guys over in the State Department” (Haig 5-11-94). Habib’s closer colleagues scoff at that assessment.

Couldn’t afford: Haig 5-11-94

Habib watch assaults: Habib interview with Parker 5-9-90

Haig on Israeli bombing: Haig 5-11-94. Haig believed that most of the destruction in Beirut came from car bombs and other terrorism from the prior seven years of civil war, not from Israeli attacks in 1982. An official in the Near Eastern Affairs bureau who asked not to be identified by name says that, while earlier car bombs and terrorism certainly did account for some of the damage, Haig is “just totally full of shit about that. I was there in September 1982. You’ve got buildings flattened, buildings with major pock marks in them—those aren’t from car bombs. That’s artillery. That’s aerial bombs.”

Border quiet: Habib interview with Tueni, p. 48. Habib notes “there was only one suspicious day when they had come out of Lebanon, gone around through Jordan, come across the river, and were caught.” On the quiet of the border since Habib’s 1981 ceasefire, Sam Lewis, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, writes that “along the border, the cease-fire held in large measure for the next eleven months” (in Quandt, *Middle East,* p. 237). See also Benziman, p. 268-69, and Bavly & Salpeter, p. 234 (quoted in Davis, p. 3).

Border active: Haig 5-11-94. The point is not who was right and who was wrong, but that they disagreed.

Habib on 1981 deal: Though Habib rejected the idea that the 1981 arrangement applied to any attack on Jews anywhere in the world, he did speak of “my formulation that it also applied to attacks mounted through third countries” (Habib cable Jerusalem 01781, 6-8-82, par. 8).

Haig on 1981 deal: Haig 5-11-94

Top priority: Hill 7-9-94

Lawyering us: Hill 7-9-94

Committed to stopping: Eagleburger 7-3-93

Press on: Haig memo to The President, “A Forward U.S. Strategy in Wake of Israel’s Offensive,” 6-12-82. Veliotes says, “Haig’s basic orientation was the Israelis should finish the job on the PLO and Beirut; Phil’s strong belief was the PLO should be evacuated and we should seek to address the Palestinian problem through the peace process. And Haig disagreed with that” (5-6-93).

Exactly the opposite: Hill 6-15-93. Hill was director of the Office for Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs. With Draper, who was deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, in the region with Habib, Hill filled in as acting deputy assistant secretary during the summer of 1982.

Military instincts: Hill 3-27-93; Eagleburger 7-3-93. Once they had the PLO by the throat, Haig reasoned, that would be the time to stop, because they would then have maximum leverage for a negotiated settlement (Hill 3-27-93).

Bay of Pigs: Hill 7-6-95. The reference is to a US-backed operation in April 1961 in which 1,500 CIA-trained Cuban exiles invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow its leader, Fidel Castro. Haig apparently felt that the US had failed to follow through in supporting the invaders so they could win. Like Sharon, Haig considered this invasion the prime opportunity to get rid of the PLO once and for all; stopping the war prematurely would only ensure that the PLO problem would fester and flare up again a year or two later (Haig 5-11-94).

Should not intervene: Eagleburger holds out for a more subtle view, that Haig was prepared to let Habib do what he could do as long as that didn’t mean getting too tough on the Israelis. Haig would have been happy for Habib to find a way to stop the fighting without forcing the Israelis back out of Lebanon. That matter of how tough to be with the Israelis was, in Eagleburger’s view, where Haig and Habib diverged (Eagleburger 7-3-93).

Imaginary line: Hill 7-19-95. Even as Habib was trying to persuade the Israelis to withdraw at least to the 40-kilometer zone that they had initially declared (Habib cable Jerusalem 01871, 121152Z Jun 82, par. 3B), Haig was writing to Reagan that “We must not, however, be compulsive about pressing Israel to move back to any line as it is even conceivable that the Lebanese government may want the Israeli presence in advanced positions—at least for a short time—as leverage for Syrian withdrawal” (Haig memo to the President, “A Forward U.S. Strategy in Wake of Israel’s Offensive,” 6-12-82, p. 2). In the same memo (p. 1), Haig warns against “the development of heavy pressure to press only for Israeli withdrawal, a situation which would threaten to isolate us with Israel and to create a policy vacuum to be exploited by the radical Arabs and the Soviets.” Haig wanted instead to capitalize on the invasion to accomplish various policy objectives in the region.

Renegade, nuts: Hill 3-27-93; Haig memo to The President, “A Forward U.S. Strategy in Wake of Israel’s Offensive,” 6-12-82, p. 2. Hill adds that “Haig wanted the Israelis to drive so far north that the PLO and Syria would have to negotiate. If the IDF were stopped halfway, world opinion would just turn toward forcing them out with no quid pro quo” by the PLO or Syrians (note from Hill on manuscript of this chapter).

You’re wrong: “Being Patient Brings Habib Final Victory,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82. Punctuation altered for clarity.

Begin visit to Washington: Veliotes, Association for Diplomatic Studies oral history, p. 204-5. By this time, says Veliotes, Haig “clearly was supportive of their finishing the PLO in Lebanon” (Veliotes 4-29-93). Haig said that if he were president he would tell the Israelis to go ahead (Hill 7-6-95). In later years, Haig would say the US had made a big mistake by not letting the Israelis finish off the PLO, according to a State Department official who asked not to be identified by name.

Privately, instructions: Sharon, p. 487

Subtlety, take Lebanon, mirrors: Haig 5-11-94

Haig on simultaneous withdrawal: Haig (5-11-94) says, “We had one set of objectives, and that was to get a successful three-party agreement to withdraw.”

Too tall an order, linkage: Paganelli cable Damascus 04206, 141618Z Jun 82, par. 5-6. The Syrians’ rationale was that their presence and the Israelis’ presence in Lebanon must not be equated because Syrian troops had been invited in as peacekeepers by the Lebanese government and sent in by the Arab League, whereas the Israelis had entered Lebanon as aggressors (par. 5, 10). Syrian troops had long since ceased serving any bona fide peacekeeping role, but they stuck with their argument. A year later their position was unchanged.

As Habib saw it, simultaneous three-way withdrawal was impossible because, regardless of what the Palestinians thought of it, the Israelis and the Syrians would never buy it. He saw zero chance that the Israelis would withdraw until after the PLO was gone, and zero chance that the Syrians would withdraw until after the Israelis were gone. The Syrians insisted that they had entered Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese government and the Arab League and that their presence there was thus legitimate. The Israelis, by contrast, had invaded. For Syria to agree to leave Lebanon in the context of a simultaneous Israeli withdrawal would, Syria believed, be to put its presence and Israel’s presence on an equal footing. Such an agreement would repudiate the legitimacy of Syria’s own presence there and, in effect, capitulate to Israel. Habib felt the Syrians would never agree to that humiliation in order to spare themselves another humiliation. The Israelis (and Habib and the rest of Washington) felt that whatever legitimacy may have attached to the Syrian’s original entry into Lebanon in 1976 had long since passed and that they had now become an occupying army. Though Habib agreed with that position, he considered it academic, since he saw no chance that Syria would ever acknowledge it, much less withdraw on Israeli or American terms. This Syrian view remained a central issue after the siege (see chapter 15, Baking Stones).

Habib felt that simultaneous withdrawal of all three foreign forces “was a huge cake, and you had to eat it bite by bite” (Smith 6-21-94). The first bite was to defuse the most volatile situation by getting the PLO and the three Syrian brigades out of the city of Beirut peacefully. The second bite would be to get the rest of the Syrian forces and the Israelis out of Lebanon altogether. The third bite would be to enable the Lebanese army to take control of Beirut and then expand their control to the rest of the country (Smith 6-14-94). Sharon reports Habib telling him that, because of Syria’s security interests in Lebanon, “The withdrawal of external forces cannot be symmetric” (Sharon p. 478).

On July 10, Israeli general Avraham Tamir confirmed to Habib Israel’s intention “that Israeli forces would not withdraw one inch and there would be no disengagement anywhere until all Syrian and PLO elements had left Lebanon.” Habib deferred arguing about it at the time but told Tamir that that notion was “unrealistic” and that “if he thought that all foreign forces were going to leave before the Israelis move one inch from their present position, he would soon discover otherwise” (Habib cable Beirut 04561, 101755Z Jul 82).

Gunpowder: Howell 10-11-93

Hostility: Weinberger 10-7-93

Megalomaniac: Lewis 4-10-94

MEPS article: “War in Lebanon,” *Middle East Policy Survey,* June 18, 1982, No. 58, p. 1

Quotes my cables: Hill 7-9-94

Somebody could die: Sicherman 8-4-98

Conversation with Eagleburger: Hill 7-9-94. Hill (7-12-95) explains how *MEPS* probably got the information: Some officials would tell reporters what they had been reading in the cables, often for no purpose except to show off that they were important inside people in the know. The editor of *MEPS* declined to tell the author who leaked the cables or even to confirm that the cables were leaked. But Sicherman (8-4-98), who was Haig’s special assistant, speculates that the material might have been leaked by an enemy of Haig’s. Making it seem like a leak by Haig would make Haig look bad.

Suffer together: Haig cable to Habib, State 170177, 192358Z Jun 82, par. 2-4

Brilliant job: Hill 7-6-95

Dark side: Hill 7-9-94. He said this to Reagan a week earlier, June 15.

Openly decided: Veliotes 4-29-93 and 5-6-93. Weinberger hints at the same thing: “Phil gave very good, wise briefings, and the president was impressed with him and benefited greatly from his briefings. There were times when probably some of the State Department masters of Habib were not happy that he spoke so frankly. I think there probably were attempts made to keep him out of direct contact with the president” (Weinberger 10-7-93).

Declared war: Veliotes, ADST oral history, p. 203. Grunwald, p. 533-34, says, “Apart from any policy differences [with the White House], Haig was near paranoid about attacks on his authority. Behind his forced composure, one could sense the steam rising. He repeatedly complained that ‘guerrillas’ in the White House were out to get him.”

Serving Begin: Hill 7-9-94

Wanted instructions: Habib cable Jerusalem 01871, 6-12-82, par. 2 and 3

Obey: Hill 3-27-93; Grove 6-4-94

Variously: Habib wrote that Israeli actions made it “increasingly impossible to salvage anything out of my instructions and the basic goals contained therein” (Habib cable Beirut 04200, 6-15-82, par. 4).

Choose: Hopkins, p. 40, based on his 3-12-92 interview with Habib. As Lewis says, “He followed the president’s guidance” (Lewis 4-10-94).

Ultimately: “Concluding Remarks” by Habib in Staar, p. 283-84

Nightmare: Haig 5-11-94

Set up: Howell 9-96-93

Undermined: Gowers, p. 210

Five minutes: Haig 5-11-94. Haig adds, “But Phil never would double-cross his secretary of state. That’s not in Phil’s makeup.”

Little guidance: Hill 6-15-93

Go forward: Hill 6-15-93

Messenger boys: Draper 12-18-94. That is not to say he did not transmit Israeli demands to other parties at all. He did. But he tended to bring them up as though they were his own ideas or otherwise make them more palatable. He said, “I do not present conditions as Israeli demands for the sake of necessary ambiguity” (Veliotes memo to the Secretary, 8217557, 6-23-82, Report From Habib/Draper for your 0930 Secure Telcon with Habib).

Maximum concessions: Haig cable Bonn, Secto 08064, 110102Z Jun 82, par. 3

Stand by idly: Habib cable Damascus 04097, 110702Z Jun 82, par. 2 and 8. Reagan asked Habib whether this might be a propitious time, while Syria was bloodied, to strike a deal on the Golan Heights, which had been a bone of contention ever since Israel had captured them from Syria in the 1967 war. “There is no way we can use this war now to make movement in that direction,” Habib wrote, “despite the lessons the Syrians have learned. The Syrians will not negotiate with the Israelis while the Israelis are in Lebanon. They may not negotiate afterward either, but there are other ways and other days to deal with that problem” (Habib cable for the President from Beirut 04247, 6-17-82, par. 4).

Same answer: State Dept. transcript of Habib tacsat call, “Secure Voice Conversation of June 25, 1982, 0550,” 8217642, p. 6

Best you can: Draper ADST oral history

Conjure: Grove 6-12-94

Reasonable objective: Habib cable Damascus 04097, 110702Z Jun 82, par. 5

Vacuum: Lewis 4-10-94

Wrote own instructions: Grove 6-12-94; Lewis 4-10-94. One mark of an outstanding diplomat, says Hill, is the ability to “answer your own question,” i.e., to propose a solution to the problem you are reporting. Habib always did, and his proposal was usually approved. In that sense, Habib wrote his own instructions (Hill 3-27-93).

Accepted Phil’s views: Draper 4-13-93. As Hopkins puts it, “whatever Habib did, essentially, became US policy” (Hopkins, p. 3).

Rarely overruled: Hill 3-27-93. Habib had “almost a carte blanche” from the president, says Lewis, yet he continually kept Washington informed of what he was doing and what he planned to do next and gave them time to disagree if they wanted to. They rarely did (Lewis 4-10-94).

Local scenery: “Radio Telecon Eagleburger/Habib, 1545 June 29, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218313, 6-29-82, “Department Response to Lebanese Questions Concerning the 9 Points”

Never disregard: This source, a State Department official involved in giving Habib his instructions, asked not to be identified by name.

Clarified: Hill 6-15-93

Dumb: Grove 6-12-94

Rant: This source, a State Department official involved in giving Habib his instructions, asked not to be identified by name.

Meet with Sharon: “Radio Telecon Draper/Hill, 0130 June 28, 1982,” NEA Hill memo to Bremer, 8218166, 6-29-82

Bulldozing tactics: “Message from Habib 0500 June 29: Day’s Activities, June 29,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218168, 6-29-82

Details, crazy: This official in the Near Eastern Affairs bureau asked not to be identified by name. Habib’s ploy with written instructions was, according to this source, “a classic technique.”

Guy on the ground: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Just smile: Hill 6-15-93

Immensely creative: Grove 6-12-94

Anything that interfered: Grove 6-4-94

Rebuilding: So did the Israelis (Grove cable Jerusalem 01863 of 6-11-82, repeated as State 16650, 170133Z Jun 82, for example). The difference was that Habib wanted a Lebanese central government strong enough to stand on its own two feet in the community of nations. Begin and Sharon wanted a Lebanese government strong enough to run the country but weak enough to be controlled by Israel.

Driven largely by Habib (Sicherman 8-4-98), America’s policy goals in this crisis were to strengthen the Lebanese government, dramatically reduce Syrian presence in Lebanon, end the Palestinian state-within-a-state, end the southern Lebanon enclave of Maj. Haddad (an ally of the Israelis who controlled parts of southern Lebanon on their behalf), strengthen peacekeeping operations in southern Lebanon, and eliminate the Green Line barrier separating East Beirut from West Beirut (Habib cable Beirut 04233, 161325Z Jun 82; Haig cable to Habib, State 166582, 170207Z Jun 82).

Habib later said his four goals were to get external forces out of Lebanon, establish Lebanese sovereignty, strengthen the Lebanese government, and ensure that Lebanon would no longer be used as a base for hostile action against Israel (Habib interview with Mulcahy tape 2). These goals, along with the goal of reconciling Lebanese factions, were US policy. They were not merely Habib’s own idiosyncratic goals (Draper 12-18-94; Dillon ADST oral history), but the policy was “driven very much by Phil,” says Haig’s special assistant (Sicherman 8-4-98). US policy was to try to “help the central government in Lebanon to consolidate its control and thereby diminish the threat” to Israel from Lebanon-based Palestinian terrorism (cable STATE 155256 TOSEC 080198, for the Secretary from Eagleburger, June 7, 1982, p. 2-3).

It certainly is not normally an American diplomat’s job to bolster a foreign government. But this was no normal situation. For one thing, the Lebanese have long looked to outsiders to solve their problems for them (Dillon ADST oral history). Second, the anarchy in Lebanon had repercussions throughout the region and, by allowing the PLO and Syrian troops to occupy Israel’s northern neighbor, threatened America’s ally Israel. Habib and the Israelis both recognized the need for a viable Lebanese government and the probability that the next president of Lebanon would be Bashir Gemayel. The difference was Begin and Sharon wanted to install Bashir as a puppet who would sign a peace treaty with them, while Habib wanted Bashir to be independent so he could unite Lebanon in a pluralistic nation. Third, since Habib was of Lebanese descent himself, the Lebanese considered him almost one of their own and looked up to him more than to most foreigners.

Sovereign control: This was important to Habib for several reasons. First, it was right. Lebanon’s suffering would not end until a strong central government prevailed over the anarchy that had ravaged the country for seven years. Second, it was US policy. Third, Israel’s security required a stable, sovereign Lebanon next door that could and would prevent terrorists on its soil from attacking Israel. Habib’s approach put him on a collision course with the Israelis on this political front as well as on the military front, since Begin and Sharon’s objective was to install a puppet to control Lebanon on their behalf. Habib was determined that Lebanon regain its full sovereignty as an independent nation. In this effort, Habib had a staunch ally in Morris Draper, who as head of State’s Lebanon affairs office had long repeated American insistence on Lebanon’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity (Hill note to the author 4-8-98 commenting on a draft of this chapter).

94 Quixotic, tide turn: Habib’s ego was certainly also a factor: Who better than he to make it happen? He had a sense that this was his moment, that this mission was what he had been born to and what his whole life had prepared him for. He believed firmly that any problem created by human beings can be solved by human beings. And he loved solving problems—the thornier, the better.

94 Structure: Draper 5-4-93

94 Coached: An important part of Habib’s negotiations in Beirut around June 23-25 consisted of coaching the National Salvation Council and Lebanese officials on how to assert governmental authority over Palestinians and everyone else residing in Lebanon. The reason was that an agreement specifying the future role of Palestinians in Lebanon would be an intrinsic part of the terms under which the PLO would leave Lebanon and the Israelis would end their invasion.

Habib knew perfectly well that the Lebanese government had “no clout with Arafat” (NEA Hill memo to Bremer 8217615, 6-23-82 “Radio Telecon Secretary Haig/Ambassador Habib—0950, June 23, 1982,” p. 2). Nonetheless, he urged them to start behaving as if they did. He insisted that the Lebanese decide for themselves answers to basic questions about the government’s relations with Palestinians once this invasion was over, and then tell the PLO what the new terms were going to be. “I stressed that while the PLO could ‘propose’, the Lebanese government should ‘demand’. It was their country and their sovereignty which we were talking about.” The basic questions he wanted them to decide included such issues as whether Palestinians would be permitted to remain in Lebanon as peaceful, law-abiding citizens subject to government authority. Would Palestinians be allowed to maintain a military force not subject to the government’s authority? What would be the nature of a PLO (as opposed to general Palestinian) presence in Lebanon, if any?

Habib pushed the Lebanese to answer each question in the direction of asserting Lebanese government sovereignty over all people on Lebanese soil. The National Salvation Council was then supposed to meet with the PLO to work out an agreement about such matters, all within the context of an agreement that the PLO leaders would leave Lebanon, Palestinian fighters would disarm, and the Lebanese Armed Forces would take control of West Beirut (Veliotes memo to the Secretary, 8217557, 6-23-82, “Report From Habib/Draper for your 0930 Secure Telcon with Habib”; Hill memo to Bremer 8217614, 6-23-82, “Radio Telecon Draper/Hill—0800, June 23”; “Response to Phil Habib, 1000 June 24,” attachment to NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8217677, 6-24-82, “Response to Phil Habib”).

Believed in: Sicherman 8-4-98

Consensus: Habib 6-15-82 cable Beirut 4214 repeated in State 166572, 170133Z Jun 82, par. 2E

Proposal: Hill 7-9-94; Veliotes cable to Habib, State 166587, 170239Z Jun 82, par. 2

Enormity: On July 10, Israeli Gen. Avraham Tamir told Habib what the IDF intended, “and I tell you, it’s exactly what we feared all along,” Habib said. “. . . It’s the Sharon plan all the way. You know, they’re going to put Bashir in power; meanwhile they are going to control the whole country” (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219693, “Telcon with Habib July 10, 1982 - 1058,” p. 2-3; punctuation altered for clarity). Bashir’s brother Amin Gemayel would later use the term “Israel’s . . . puppet” himself (Habib cable Beirut 06791, 030900Z Oct 82, par. 2).

Satrapy: Hill 7-9-94. A satrapy is a state controlled by a foreign ruler.

Chevy Chase Circle: Habib cable Beirut 04200, 6-15-82. He said that, on his way back from lunch in Beirut the same day, he had driven through a convoy of Israeli trucks “moving into the heart of Beirut” (Hill 7-9-94).

Sneaking forward: Sharon, p. 475-76

Incomprehensible, reworded: Habib 6-17-82 cable Beirut 4255 quoted in State 167752 TOSEC 090014, 172116Z Jun 82, par. 3, 6

Spelling an end: Hill 7-9-94

Destroying it: Hill 7-9-94

June 22 proposal, frantic, breakthrough day: Hill 7-9-94; Frank, p. 8-9; Brown 6-21-82 cable Tel Aviv 09329, repeated in State 173001, 222242Z Jun 82, par. 3. Dillon had evacuated dependents of embassy personnel on June 6 and 7.

Sharon on his way: Veliotes memo 8217487 to the Secretary, 6-22-82

Meeting with Sharon: Radio Telecon from Habib 2130, 6-22-82; Veliotes memo to the Secretary 8217487, 6-22-82; Hill 7-9-94; Tanter, p. 138-39

Bush, Weinberger, why budge: Habib 6-18-82 cable to Murphy from Beirut 4267 repeated in State 169293 TOSEC 090039, 181749Z Jun 82, par. 4; Teicher, p. 206; Haig, p. 343; Hill 7-9-94. Some accounts mention only Weinberger, not Bush, talking with the Saudis; others mention only Bush. Habib sent word to the PLO “that there was nothing in the vice president’s talks in Saudi Arabia that should give the PLO hope that there is another way out except through the offer” that he and the Lebanese government were making (Habib cable 4267, par. 4).

Habib muttered that it might take 48 hours just to persuade Arafat to agree to the 48 hours (Hill 7-9-94). Lewis (oral history, summer 1982 portion, p. 6) mentions only Weinberger and says, “In retrospect, if we in fact conveyed the wrong signal, either intentionally or inadvertently, that may have been one of the major causes for Beirut’s great damage and suffering. Had the PLO not thought that we would come to their rescue at the last second, they might well have fled Beirut shortly after the Israeli invasion, thereby sparing Beirut and its inhabitants from a few weeks of hell.”

The PLO came to believe “that Israel was incapable of storming Beirut, or unwilling to suffer the casualties involved, or otherwise prevented from doing so by domestic or external restraints.” On June 20 Arafat proclaimed that “no one will accept to lay down his arms. . . . I am here and I am staying here” (Khalidi, p. 86). Even Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who was quite sympathetic to the PLO, said “Arafat is trying to gain time, hoping for a miracle in the Arab world, but I don’t believe it will happen” (Mikdadi, p. 51).

Joke: Mikdadi, p. 57-58

Winds: Bill Brown, the number two official in the US embassy in Tel Aviv, wrote on June 21 that “The PLO, however, is probably on the edge of on the one hand moving toward greater immediate flexibility, while on the other becoming crazed with fear, deciding that there is no other way out and resorting to suicidal military measures” (Brown 6-21-82 cable Tel Aviv 09329, repeated in State 173001, 222242Z Jun 82, par. 3).

Competing, stock: Veliotes 4-29-93

Work things out: Draper 4-13-93; Haig, p. 310-11, 342

Mustn’t happen again: Haig, p. 311; Cannon, p. 201-2. Haig emphasizes that Reagan gave no indication that he disagreed with the content of the instructions to Habib.

Accused Clark, Reagan decided: Cannon, p. 204

Cheering: Howell 9-6-93. Veliotes reportedly ran down the hall of the State Department saying, “Don’t anyone dare cheer. Keep at work” (Charles Stuart Kennedy in Viets oral history, p. 33).

Champagne: Viets oral history, p. 33

Dancing: The report was in Randal, p. 251. “No, no, no. That’s bullshit,” says Draper (12-18-94).

Days numbered: Habib interview with Parker, p. 5

Guessed Shultz, more balanced: Dillon 11-5-96. “Relieved” is the word Draper and Lewis use to describe Habib’s reaction (Draper 12-18-94 and Lewis 4-10-94). One of Habib’s colleagues, who asked not to be identified by name, distinctly recalls being surprised and put off by “the vehemence of Phil’s remarks” about how happy he was that Haig was leaving. But Dillon, in whose home Habib was when he got the news, says that, unlike the others in the residence, Habib did not pause to criticize Haig. “I think this was part of his idea of being professional,” he says. “The rest of us would make very critical remarks, but Phil never did that. From his point of view, he thought of the rest of us as kids: ‘That’s the way kids act, but I, Phil Habib, don’t act like that.’”

Sick few days: Letter from Veliotes in Cairo to Habib, April 4, 1983. Haig took refuge at the Greenbriar resort in West Virginia (Cannon, p. 397) mostly as a means of escaping the press.

Begged: Haig 5-11-94

Master of ceremonies: Eagleburger 7-3-93. State’s number two person, Walter Stoessel, officially became acting secretary, but had little to contribute.

Complicating Habib’s problems: Lewis 4-10-94; Hill 7-9-94; Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 206

Threats: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Authority to penetrate: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 206. The Cabinet declined *(Journal of Palestine Studies,* Summer/Fall 1982, “Chronology of the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon June-August 1982,” p. 145).

Habib’s recommendation: NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8217987, 6-27-82, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0430 a.m., June 27, 1982.” Italics are not in the State Department’s transcription of Habib’s tacsat dictation but are added according to the recollection of Charlie Hill (who took the call from Habib) of what Habib emphasized in his dictation (Hill 7-9-94). The same day, the Grand Mufti (the Sunni Muslim spiritual leader of Lebanon) phoned Habib and explained that “Islamic thought in Lebanon holds the United States accountable for what has already happened.” Two days earlier the Grand Mufti had told Habib that continued Israeli attacks on Lebanon would transform Muslim opinion in that country, which was basically favorable to the United States, into hostility against the US (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer 8218010, 6-27-82, “Radio Message from Amb. Habib, 6/27/82, 11:30 a.m.: Appeal from Grand Mufti”). There was precedent that Habib hoped to draw on. When Israel had invaded Lebanon in the 1978 Operation Litani, President Carter decisively stepped in and threatened to cut off aid to Israel unless they left Lebanon. The threat worked, though Israel left a residual military presence north of their border (Veliotes ADST oral history, p. 199).

Will not withdraw: Hill 7-9-94. In addition to shooting, the Israelis were dropping leaflets on the city as part of a psychological warfare campaign telling people to leave town (Bavly, p. 102). It was working: People were leaving the city in droves. Habib thought “A degree of panic now in Beirut is good. But this must not lead to action.”

Take orders, I accept: Hill 7-9-94; also Shultz, p. 14. Reagan by this point had bought Haig’s argument that it was premature to make threats. On June 25, Haig was convinced that he had assurances from Israel not to enter West Beirut. But, just to make sure, Haig did tell the Israeli ambassador that morning that if they did go in, the US would cut off all military and economic assistance—precisely the threat he wouldn’t hear of from Habib the same day. At the same time, Haig encouraged Israel to play a bluffing game to frighten the PLO into making the necessary concessions. The IDF did shelling, then declared a ceasefire, then followed up with radio broadcasts—all of which, Haig believed, were part of a bluff. Haig said, “If we can get the PLO finished, it will all be worth it.” But nobody told Habib any of this. Convinced that the IDF’s moves were real preparations for a brutal assault, Habib demanded that Reagan phone Begin immediately to say that the U.S. would apply strict sanctions if the IDF went into West Beirut. There was no time for a letter; it had to be by phone. He insisted that State pass his demand on to the White House (Hill 7-9-94).

Shinola, declined: Shultz, p. 14; Haig, p. 350-51; Haig 5-11-94

**Chapter 6: Fight the Fire Anyway**

Tough, driven: Randal, *Tragedy*, p. 232-33

Impossible: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Never doubted: Hill 6-15-93 and 3-27-93; Habib interview with Parker 5-9-90, p. 25; Grove 6-12-94; also according to a Near Eastern Affairs bureau official who asked not to be identified by name. Many of his colleagues agreed that Habib was the only one who could succeed (for example, Grove 6-12-94; Hill 7-19-95). Some disagreed (Crocker 4-25-94; Eagleburger 7-3-93).

Authority derives: “Oakley’s Gambit,” *Time,* 10-18-93

Most players: Habib interview with the author 12-20-83; also Draper ADST oral history and Grove 6-12-94

Knew their ambitions: Grove 6-12-94

Care greatly: According to a colleague who asked not to be identified by name

Legend, best: Lewis unpublished ms., p. 3; Doug Waller 6-30-98; Grove 6-12-94

Unique crisis: Dillon 5-9-94

Totally unconventional: Tueni 11-15-95

Knack: Dean 5-12-94

Resiliency: According to a State Department colleague who asked not to be identified by name

Clout: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Trying to solve: Hill 7-12-95

Lie for country: Habib interview with Kreisler, page 2 of 6. His own view was that “the best diplomat is the one who most accurately and honestly presents the policies of his government” (from an undated draft of Habib’s speech to the South Korean National Defense College in one of his personal scrapbooks about his time as ambassador to South Korea 1971-74).

No flies: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Lost the whole show: Grove 6-4-94 and Grove letter to author 6-8-97. There is a certain difference of opinion about the extent to which Habib toned down his ways when dealing with foreign counterparts. Some say simply that he was the same no matter who he was talking with. Others say he toned down the profanity and theatrics with foreigners. Dillon (11-5-96) is critical that Habib was not nearly as tough with the Israelis as he was with Americans.

Foolishness: Grove 6-12-94

Didn’t hesitate: Sometimes that was genuine, sometimes it was a ploy. A US Marine lieutenant colonel, who knows something about such matters, says that even when intimidation was just a tactic, “he was *good* at it. He was a forceful man. Very forceful” (Smith 6-14-94).

Toe-to-toe: This diplomat asked not to be identified by name

Eyeballs, hands: Bider 5-23-93. For example, after a particularly exasperating tacsat call to the State Department, Habib slammed down the receiver, turned to a Lebanese official who happened to be nearby, and said, “This is Washington for you. The guys there only believe what they read in the telex. Who the hell invented the written word? Was it you, the Phoenicians?” (Salem, p. 37).

Challenge or ridicule: Veliotes 5-6-93. Veliotes adds that, while Habib didn’t hesitate to ridicule your point of view, he would never ridicule you as a person. Dillon points out, “Phil was quite capable of letting you believe what you wanted to believe. He wouldn’t lie, but he wouldn’t correct you. This is not unusual among diplomats” (Dillon 11-16-96).

Defend your opinion: Bider 5-23-93

Overwhelm them: Kreczko 5-11-94

Always appear in control: Crocker 4-28-94

Heart problem: Sicherman 7-4-98

Don’t waste your time: Tueni 11-15-95

Negotiation without compromise: “Peace Envoy’s Postscript,” Habib as told to Larry Engelmann, *Vietnam*  magazine, April 1993; “Habib habits: Facts, humor, pressure, honesty,” *The Spokesman-Review/Seattle Chronicle,* April 25, 1987, report on a speech by Habib at the University of Idaho; also Habib’s speech “Diplomacy and the Search for Peace in the Middle East,” p. 6-7

That’s a joke: Kreczko 5-11-94

Blame: Habib testimony to US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Briefing on Central American Peace Initiative,” June 16, 1987, p. 26

Hour ago: Bider 4-26-93

Little point of agreement: Tueni 11-15-95

No particular method: Hopkins, p. 36, citing Sam Lewis

Scorn: Habib interview with Parker 5-9-90, p. 24

Leave your books: Tueni 11-15-95

Definition of success: Cyrus Vance 2-14-94

Least bad solution: Dean 5-12-94

Two kinds of conflicts: Dusclaud 4-19-95, citing a speech by Habib at the University of Bordeaux in November 1991

Not always necessary: Habib interview with Dusclaud

Habib’s rule, moral story: Grove 6-4-94 and letter to author 6-8-97; also Dillon 11-5-96. Habib made this point often, usually with a self-satisfied chuckle. Dillon is critical of Habib about this view: “That’s partly right, but it’s not always right. It seemed to me that he was too quick to take the soldiers seriously. I could never quite engender the same respect for men with guns—including our own—that Phil seemed to have.”

Show more anger: Bider 4-24-93; Howell 9-6-93

Tell genuine anger: Bider 4-26-93; Lee 10-2-94; Tueni 11-15-95; Hill 7-12-95

Every Habib sentence: Hill 7-7-98

Master of tirade: Hill writing in “Philip Habib: A Remembrance,” *Foreign Service Journal,* July 1992, p. 12

Shitty way to deal: According to a diplomat who asked not to be identified by name

Yelling from other room: Crocker 4-25-94

Histrionics: Draper 12-18-94

Uncontrollable way: Shultz 7-25-94

Use theatrics: This source asked not to be identified by name.

Being impossible, bully me: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Threats: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Anger no act: Lee 10-2-94; Crocker 4-25-94; Hill 6-15-93

Anger tended to be: Howell 9-6-93; Bider 5-23-93 and 4-26-93

Classic definition: Barron letter to author 5-4-94; quote is from Caskie Stinnett, in *Simpson’s Contemporary Quotations,* p. 216 (Humor and Wit)

Rare gift: Hill note to author on manuscript of chapter 12

Syrian announcement: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219690, 7-10-82, “Telecon with Habib July 10, 1982 0700,” p. 3-4; punctuation altered for clarity, characteristic profanity added to bowdlerized transcript

Beat up on: Sehulster 6-23-94; and an official who asked not to be identified by name

Morrie Goddammit: Crocker 4-25-94. Crocker adds, “It was a Mutt & Jeff routine.” In fact, according to a diplomat who asked not to be identified by name, their radio call signs were Dagwood (Draper) and Mr. Bumstead (Habib). In the comic strip “Blondie,” Dagwood was forever being yelled at and kicked in the pants by his boss, Mr. Bumstead.

Shooting off mouth, magazine: Hill 7-12-95; Hopkins, p. 29

Screaming moral outrage: Hill 3-27-93

Cared too much: Shultz 7-25-94

He was Lebanese: Haig 5-11-94

Extraordinarily emotional: Lewis 4-10-94

I must say, cucumber: “Radio communication between Habib and Veliotes, July 7/82, a.m.,” 8218994, p. 5. Punctuation altered from State Department transcript for clarity. A few days earlier Habib sent a cable arguing that Israeli military moves were counterproductive and that he considered Israeli cutoffs of water and power “unbelievable in the 20th century, inhumane, and unnecessary in the present circumstances.” He concluded by saying, “In making these points, I assure readers of this message that I am not ‘panicking.’ However I am frustrated by my inability to see Wazzan [due to Israeli fighting] about the results of his crucial meeting last night with the PLO” (Habib 7-4-82 cable Beirut 4439, quoted in State 186503, 061812Z Jul 82, par 5-7).

Overly committed: Veliotes 5-6-93

Pissed as shit: State Department official who asked not to be identified by name

Weren’t exposed: Sehulster 6-23-94. Another Marine who worked with Habib in Beirut, Col. Robert Johnston, in fact, viewed him as “a pretty damn composed individual. He knew what he wanted, and at the drop of a hat he could give you a shopping list. He could cuss at the Israelis, and he did that quite often, but basically he had a calm demeanor. You never felt like he in any way had lost his control of the situation” (Johnston 12-4-96).

The tough guys: Hill 7-19-95, 7-9-94. Dillon comments that, “the tough guys in the Department—the ones who would say ‘if you want to make an omelet, you gotta break some eggs,’ or ‘let the peasants die to achieve our noble goals’—were by and large people who had no real experience with violence or combat. One thing I admired about Phil was that this tough-talking guy from Brooklyn wasn’t like that. It really pained him to see the suffering” (Dillon 12-31-97).

Eagleburger: Hill 7-19-95. The description of Eagleburger as “one of the tough guys” is Hill’s. Hill says Eagleburger was being “a smartass” in his remark about Sedan and the Somme. “Ardennes” refers to the Battle of the Bulge, a bloody battle in December 1944 as the World War II Allies were retaking Europe. “Saint-Lô” refers to a July 1944 Allied assault in which 2,500 planes dropped some 4,000 tons of bombs on a fourteen-square mile area around the northern French town of Saint-Lô. This key part of Gen. Omar Bradley’s Operation Cobra, seven weeks after D-Day, helped clear the way for an Allied advance toward Paris. Sedan was the site of the climactic battle of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, in which the French were routed and Emperor Napoleon III was captured. The Battle of the Somme, France, was one of the bloodiest battles in history, claiming over a million lives in 1916.

Study in personal contrasts: Crocker 4-25-94

Posturing, parties might buy: Habib interview with the author, in *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Firefighter: Hill 7-12-95

Keep on trying: Lee 10-2-94

Always hope: Bider 4-26-93

We can’t do this: Barrett 5-9-94

I never saw: Crocker 4-25-94. Crocker also says Habib sometimes seemed nervous, but Pascoe says “Worried, yes; nervous, no” (Pascoe 6-4-94).

Beliefs sustained: Crocker 4-25-94

Get to work: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Common ground: Crocker 4-25-94

Logical line: Habib interview with Dusclaud

Being retired: Dean 5-12-94

Dueling brains: Bider 4-24-93

Loved challenges: Bider 5-23-93

He did it to right: Dean 5-12-94

Jazzy: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Loved the drama: Daniel O’Donohue writing in “Philip Habib: A Remembrance,” *Foreign Service Journal,* July 1992, p. 13

Hardest negotiations: Quoted by Hill 7-12-95

Roundabout diplomacy: The State Department did two slightly different transcripts of this tacsat call; the quote uses elements of both (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219690, 7-10-82, “Telecon with Habib July 10, 1982 0700,” p. 4; NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219694, “Telecon between Phil Habib and Charlie Hill, Saturday, July 10 11:00 a.m.”)

Some special envoys: Parker, p. 209, quotes David Newsom’s intriguing discussion of this phenomenon, from *Middle East Journal,* Summer 1981.

Taking the ambassador: Habib interview with Parker 5-9-90, p. 25

Before I’d go: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Involve the local ambassador: Hopkins, p. 39-43; Habib interview with the author, in *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984. The ambassadors in the region consistently commend Habib for this practice while criticizing his successors for arrogantly failing to do so (Hopkins, p. 39-45; Paganelli 11-2-96; Dillon 5-9-94). Hill adds that Habib’s practice of involving the local ambassador and staff rooted his negotiations in the local process of diplomacy (Hill note on manuscript of chapter “Life in the Pressure Cooker”).

Cooks, maids: Gaucher 5-15-94

Jonny Abdu: Sehulster 6-23-94; Crocker 4-25-94; Gaucher 5-15-94

Numbing torrent: Lee 10-2-94; Bider 5-23-93

I don’t carry: Kreczko 10-6-93. Kreczko was not with Habib in the summer of 1982, but in the fall and winter of 1982-83.

Painting themselves blue: “Middle East ripe for new peace talks, says former presidential envoy Habib,” *Campus Report* (a publication of Stanford University), February 20, 1985

My parents’ home: “An old pro wins a new peace,” *Washington Post* story in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-21-82; “The Habib Diplomatic Style: Unorthodox but Effective,” *Latin America Daily Post,* 8-26-82

Red-white-and-blue: Bider 4-26-93

FSOs are trained: Howell 10-11-93. By the time Habib got to the Middle East, State had dropped that practice. Besides, he was retired. Ironically, recent presidents have increased the frequency of sending political appointees to the homelands of their forebears (according to a source who asked not to be identified by name).

Cozy up: Howell 9-6-93 and 10-11-93

My first cousin: Dean 5-12-94. This was in fact true—except that his father’s real name was Jamous. John Gunther Dean was ambassador to Lebanon when Habib began his 1981 mission.

Uncle: Bavley, p. 104

One conversation: Crocker 4-25-94

Massive attempt: Dillon ADST oral history

Folk hero: Hill 7-17-93. *Effendi* is an Arabic term of respect, comparable to *sir* in English.

Bill: Grove letter to author 6-8-97, speaking specifically of a waiter in the Philadelphia restaurant in Jerusalem.

Not God, swept: Dillon 11-16-96 and 5-9-94. Ghassan Tueni, the Lebanese ambassador to the UN, said, “To us in the little old country, Philip Habib was yet another prophet, but one who was physically bringing back peace from the America of which his people dreamt for generations past. . . . He was our giant” (eulogy at Habib’s memorial service, June 10, 1992, Washington).

Suddenly realized: Hill letter to the author received 6-13-97

Inaccessible: Dillon 11-16-96

One of the boys: Tueni 11-15-95. Among the Lebanese, it was crucial to view the interlocutor as being of their same universe, competent, and a representative of a party with clout (Crocker 4-28-94).

Role of mentor: Hill 7-17-93; Lewis 4-10-94

Bashir, advice: Seale, p. 388

Avuncular: Tueni 11-15-95

Could they really trust: Lewis 4-10-94

Arab leaders: Hill 7-17-93

Rug merchant: Paganelli 11-2-96

Sympathetic, mistaken: Draper 4-13-93

Sister disparaged: Marjorie Habib 4-19-95

Phil never liked: Haig 5-11-94

Much more sympathetic: Lewis 4-10-94. Habib believed that “Although the right to [Palestinian] self-determination as a concept is undeniable, the exercise of self-determination through an independent Palestinian state is not practical at this time.” He also accepted as a given America’s “unshakable commitment to the existence and security of the State of Israel” (Habib speech “Diplomacy and the Search for Peace in the Middle East,” April 29, 1985). He privately acknowledged to Assad Syria’s legitimate security interests in Lebanon (Hopkins, p. 63).

Pro-Arab: Eagleburger 7-3-93. Eagleburger readily describes himself as strongly pro-Israel. Haig (5-11-94) considered Habib an “Arabist.” Hill (7-19-95) argues that there is no way Habib could be considered an Arabist, since he spent most of his career as a Far East expert.

Any American: Kreczko 5-11-94

Clearly understood: This source asked not to be identified by name.

Internationally disliked: Davis, p. 68, based on Bavly and Salpeter, p. 75. The American public, like Habib, remained committed to Israel generally while becoming increasingly critical of Begin *(International Herald Tribune,* 7-22-82; cited in Jansen, p. 84).

Begin’s excesses: Randal, *Tragedy,* p. 286. Goldwater, a US senator from Arizona, was a leading conservative and the Republican candidate for president in 1964.

A lot of right: Hill 6-15-93

Pox: This source asked not to be identified by name.

Balanced view: Eagleburger 7-3-93. But, he adds, they “would view him as being pro-Arab on occasion.”

Self-righteous: Dillon ADST oral history

Enemy: Eagleburger 7-3-93

Product of Brooklyn: Such as Barrett 5-9-94; Crocker 4-25-94; Kreczko 5-11-94

Stereotypical: Pascoe 6-4-94; Draper ADST oral history; Haig 5-11-94; Marjorie Habib 2-27-93; Tueni 11-15-95; Dillon 11-5-96

Shrug: Lee 10-2-94. *Malesh* is an Arabic word roughly translated “What the hell. Never mind. It doesn’t matter” (Lee and “Saving the Children,” *The Stanford Magazine,* Winter 1987, p. 62).

Lebanese food: For example, Dillon 5-9-94; Crocker 4-25-94; Lee 10-2-94

Bazaar: Draper ADST oral history

Shrewd bargaining sense: Grove 6-4-94

Price of a rug: Dean 5-12-94

Jewish haberdasher: Tueni 11-15-95

Only diplomat: Hill 3-27-93. Hill adds that he felt that other Americans—who want to get to the point and get every item clearly understood and nailed down—could never understand how things got done in the Middle East.

Middle Eastern feel: Draper ADST oral history

Kissed: Draper 4-13-93; Green 7-10-93

Touch: Crocker 4-28-94

Brother, food: Draper 4-13-93

In Jerusalem, in Beirut: Gaucher 5-15-94

Whipped cream: Eagleburger 7-3-93

Thirty-five subparagraphs: Hill 3-27-93

He could recall: Bider 4-24-93

Lawyer’s discussion: Lewis 8-11-82 cable Tel Aviv 12220, quoted in State 226747, 130526Z Aug 82, par. 1, 7

Courtly, dour: Veliotes 5-6-93. Begin was also extremely tenacious. Lewis, who knew Begin better than any other American diplomat, describes one letter from Begin to Reagan as “vintage Begin, an extravagantly polite and legalistic way of rejecting the president’s simple proposal and restating Begin’s previous conditions” (Lewis cable Jerusalem 01809, 6-10-82, par. 5).

Dare to tease: Draper ADST oral history; “Habib habits: Facts, humor, pressure, honesty,” *The Spokesman-Review/Seattle Chronicle,* April 25, 1987, report on a speech by Habib at the University of Idaho

Poker: Habib in informal talk to Jewish Community Federation at Silverado, January 21 or 22, 1984; Marjorie Habib 2-27-93. He was much more relaxed with Lebanese officials and Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry David Kimche (Kreczko 10-6-93; Veliotes 5-6-93).

Arabs tended: Hill 6-15-93. As Howell points out, there is not a clean division between Israeli and Arab negotiating styles. The Egyptians, for example, could be every bit as punctilious as the Israelis. And Assad was more explicit than other Arabs. He was relaxed, congenial, and joking until he realized he’d been had on June 11. Howell also points out the drawbacks to both the legalistic and the lax styles: “Arabs sometimes reach agreements that aren’t agreements. It sounds good and everybody leaves happy, but they haven’t achieved anything. The Israelis, on the other hand, at least when they’re in that kind of legalistic mode, never get to an agreement because you can never clear up all the little nit-picks” (Howell 9-6-93).

Talk around: Habib interview with Parker 5-9-90, p. 22

Traditional Middle Eastern way, if you tried: Hill 6-15-93

Shrug shoulders: Hill 3-27-93. This may help explain why Assad mistakenly thought he had an understanding with Habib over a ceasefire on June 11, discussed in chapter 4.

Take the eyebrow: Howell 9-6-93

Always insisted: Crocker 4-25-94. This was to avoid confusion or deliberate distortion. Habib and Draper sent their messages to the PLO in a form they called “non-papers”: written in the third person to maintain a certain distance and typed on plain white paper to avoid looking like official US policy statements (Hopkins, p. 20). Crocker says Habib’s messages to Arafat were often neatly typed in English; Arafat’s messages to him would come back handwritten in Arabic.

Yank him back: “A Sterling Achievement,” *Time,* 8-30-82, p. 26

Sum up: Howell 9-6-93

Diplomat’s job: Dillon 11-16-96

Just outstanding: Shultz 7-25-94

Slightly exaggerating: Dillon 5-9-94

Tell Reagan: Barrett 5-9-94

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Every right: Hill 7-12-95

In my opinion: Hopkins, p. 35, based on his interview with Veliotes 2-7-92

No one way: Habib interview with the author 12-20-83, p. 20 (not included in *Stanford Magazine* edited version)

Own interest: According to a diplomat who asked not to be identified by name

Bashir: Seale, p. 388-89. Seale says, “Bashir often came to Habib for advice, developing a dependence on the older, wiser man whom he sometimes addressed as *Ammo* (uncle).” For another example, in trying to persuade Sharon to stop bombing Beirut, Habib would point out how the press was portraying the destruction and misery he was causing. “What the hell is the world seeing you for, Arik?” (Draper 4-13-93)

Re-equipping: Habib 7-24-92 cable Jidda 5532, quoted in State 206640 TOSEC 110050, 250019Z Jul 82, par. 6B (punctuation altered for clarity)

Essentially the same: Grove 6-4-94; Kreczko 10-6-93; Veliotes 5-6-93

Ladies: Lee 10-2-94

Bunch of crap, joke: Kreczko 10-6-93

Rarely raised: Lewis 4-10-94

Wicked, firm: Marjorie Habib 3-26-94; Veliotes 5-6-93; Draper 4-13-93

High commissioner: Lewis 4-10-94

Curse: Draper 4-13-93

Baton: Barron letter to author 5-4-94

Naked lady dance: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Interesting person: Shultz 7-25-94

Enjoy being around: Kreczko 10-6-93. Despite their substantive differences, many Israelis liked Habib and enjoyed his sense of humor (Bavly and Salpeter, p. 104).

Say or do next: Mead 6-5-94

Serendipitously, 1980 assignment: Grove 6-12-94 and 6-4-94

**Chapter 7: The Plan**

Call spirits: Act III, scene I, 52. Associated with this context by *The New York Times.*

No precedent: Habib cable Beirut 05901, 011245Z Sep 82, par. 4; Shultz 9-16-93; Hill 7-17-93

Somehow extract: Hopkins, p. 15-17, citing his 3-12-92 interview with Habib. It wasn’t just the PLO that Habib needed to get out: A top-flight unit of 3,500 Syrians and a Palestinian faction under Syrian command were also trapped in West Beirut (Draper 5-4-93).

Buffer force: Habib cable Jerusalem 01903 of June 13, 1982, repeated in State 163551, 142321Z Jun 82, par. 4, 6, 7. Begin told Habib he would be “delighted” if such a buffer force could be established so Israeli troops could get home “in weeks.” Once the ostensibly modest invasion turned into a massive siege of Beirut, the idea of a multinational buffer force in southern Lebanon became irrelevant.

Own evacuation: USMC 2, Tel Aviv Is 08807, 13 June 1982; Cable RUEKJCS/8807, 132226Z Jun 82. Habib had been all for it, since that would spare the civilians of Beirut needless suffering. But Sharon and Menachem Begin at first forbade evacuation since, in their minds, evacuation was escape. They had not come this far to let the PLO now slip through their fingers, regroup, and roar back with a vengeance a year later. Sharon and Begin soon changed their minds, however. Driving the PLO out of Lebanon to somewhere else, they decided, would be OK after all (Radio Telecon from Habib 2130, June 22, 1982).

Interested in listening: Habib cable to Secstate also for action, 6-28-82, “Meeting with President Sarkis, et al, June 28, 1982,” p. 4

Deal with stupidity: Hill 7-9-94

Afraid to propose: Transcript “Recorded radio conversation between Mr. Eagleburger and Amb. Habib, July 7/82, 0900 hours” 8219191, p. 3-4; Hill 7-12-95. As Draper told the Syrian foreign minister July 10, the basis of US policy in Lebanon was not what the Israelis wanted, but “what would ensure a stable and secure Lebanon and prevent future Israeli military actions against Lebanon” (Paganelli cable Damascus 04934, 101438Z Jul 82, par. 12).

128-29 PLO could “propose”: Veliotes memo to the Secretary, 8217557, 6-23-82, Report From Habib/Draper for your 0930 Secure Telcon with Habib, p. 1-2. At first the PLO thought this was as ridiculous as everyone else did. They couldn’t be bothered to take the Lebanese government seriously enough to talk to them, much less take orders from them. As Sharon tightened the noose around West Beirut, though, that quickly changed.

Habib insisted that this be a deal between the PLO and the government of Lebanon. After the first week of the invasion, he spent most of his time in Beirut, meeting with the Lebanese president, prime minister, foreign minister, and other top officials, talking over possible scenarios and terms under which the PLO might leave.

A major reason Lebanese sovereignty was so important (and precarious) was that the modern state of Lebanon had been carved out of the traditional land of Syria. The Syrians had never fully accepted that division, and Assad still regarded Lebanon as part of greater Syria. He enjoyed pointing out to Habib that Habib’s father, who had emigrated from “Lebanon” to America around 1900, would have carried a Syrian passport. That was true. In registering for college in 1938, Habib had listed his ethnic background as “Syrian-American.”

A package: For example, “Radio Communication between C. Hill - Habib, 7/6/82, 0715” 8218995, 7-6-82, p. 3; also Habib cable Beirut 04461, 7-5-82, par. 4; Habib cable Beirut 4415, quoted in State 184218, 021729Z Jul 82, par 10. He told Washington the same thing. After receiving “a crashingly dumb idea” from the State Department, Draper called to say “it would be helpful if Washington did less creative thinking about ideas which make no sense on the ground in Beirut and spent more time consulting with Beirut and working on [the] agreed upon scenario” (“0350 Draper-Peters secure Telcon,” undated, but hand notations imply 7-5-82).

Wedge: In the early days of the war, before the siege of Beirut set in for the long haul, the idea was that a military force would go into southern Lebanon as a buffer between Israel’s northern border and PLO rockets.

Simply agree with Habib: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984. Habib reported on June 28 that “it is unlikely that the PLO will put anything down in writing, again, for face-saving reasons” (summary of Habib tacsat call “Radio Transmission from Habib—0700 EDT June 28,” 8218031, 6-28-82).

Mammoth operation: Nobody, including the PLO, knew how many PLO fighters were in Beirut. So nobody knew how many would need to be evacuated. Estimates ranged from 3,000 to 10,000. “I don’t know how many we are going to end up with,” Habib said. “We don’t really know. It may be up to 10,000. Remember, some of them are going to have their families. We may run up to 15,000-20,000 people. We ain’t going to take them out in a god damned airplane. We’ll take them out by boat” (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218794, “TelCon Habib and Charles Hill/Adm. Howe, 12:07 p.m., July 3, 1982,” p. 6).

Other powerful fears: Sharon agreed with Habib about this, writing that “the PLO’s incentives to stay were far greater than their incentives to leave” (Sharon, p. 482). In Sharon’s analysis, that meant he had to give them more incentive to leave by sending in more artillery and bombs. In Habib’s analysis, such a “bludgeon approach” was no more likely to work in the future than it had so far (NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8217985, 6-26-82, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, Late Evening Meeting with Sarkis, June 26”).

Budget, Abu: “West Beirut Bids Farewell to P.L.O.,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82

Fat city: Hill 7-12-95

Last ditch: “Radio Transmission from Habib—0700 EDT June 28,” 8218031, 6-28-82; Hill 7-9-94. That was one of Habib’s greatest concerns, and he considered it a very real possibility. At one point he shouted to Washington, “The Palestinians are talking frantically now. They’re really going wild. They’re prepared to go down fighting” (Hill 7-9-94). The PLO’s need to save face is why Habib considered it sabotage to his diplomacy for the Israelis to leak stories to the press: Any time the PLO gave him a concession and the Israelis leaked word to the press, it made the PLO look weak; the PLO would then promptly deny and backpedal on the concession, setting back Habib’s efforts farther than they had been before the concession (Hill 7-10-94).

Rather die: Friedman, p. 147

Khadaffi, Mubarak: Hill 7-16-94

Come get us: This is the analysis of an American diplomat involved in the crisis who asked not to be identified by name. See also Lewis ADST oral history. Draper adds that Habib “had a lot of evidence” that the 3,500 elite Syrian troops trapped in West Beirut “were going to fight to the last man” (Draper 5-4-93), and Assad’s biographer says in so many words that those were indeed their orders (Seale, p. 386).

Never surrender: Hill 7-9-94. Pakradouni writes that “never in [Arafat’s] worst moments of melancholy did he imagine that he would be led to leave Beirut under conditions dictated by Philip Habib” (Pakradouni, p. 255).

Heads above ground: Hill 7-19-95. This fear of being massacred grew larger and larger over time, says an NEA official who asked not to be identified by name. A top official in the US embassy in Tel Aviv wrote on June 21 that “it was crucial that the PLO perceive us to be in a position to influence Israel [to hold fire] so as to overcome PLO paranoic fears, e.g. that should they allow the LAF to deploy, disarm and seek safe conduct they would not be butchered in a subsequent betrayal” (Brown 6-21-82 cable Tel Aviv 09329, repeated in State 173001, 222242Z Jun 82, par. 3).

Trucks, port: Draper 4-13-93

Sink the ships: The source, a State Department official involved with the crisis, asked not to be identified by name. That source said, “they were scared shitless that as soon as they started boarding boats, Israeli planes would come over and sink the boats.” The PLO had good reason to worry that the IDF would sink their ships. Bashir Gemayel himself had warned of that as early as June 26 (Hill 6-26-95).

Women and children: The Phalanges were Bashir Gemayel’s Maronite Christian militia, also known as the Kataeb and the Lebanese Forces. Bashir had invited Sharon to invade Lebanon, and Sharon had coordinated his plans in advance with Bashir and his Phalange commanders. The PLO had good reason to fear for the safety of the Palestinian civilians they would leave behind. Six years earlier the Phalange and its allies had carried out a horrible massacre of Palestinians at the Tel El-Zaatar refugee camp in East Beirut. Since the Israelis had taken over southern Lebanon, the PLO had heard many reports of severe harassment of Palestinians in that region (Cobban in McDermott, p. 215).

Hoping for a miracle: Lewis ADST oral history; Hill 7-19-95 and 7-12-95; Lewis 4-10-94; Mikdadi, p. 51; Khalidi, p. 85-86, 88, 113, 115.

Guerrillas win: Kissinger quoted in Averell Harriman’s Memo of Conversation with Under Secretary Elliot Richardson, Jan 22, 1969, National Archives, Harriman papers

Token force: Habib cable Beirut 04461, 051600Z Jul 82, par. 10; transcript “Recorded radio conversation between Mr. Eagleburger and Amb. Habib, July 7/82, 0900 hours” 8219191, p. 2-3

Political office: Habib cable Beirut 04460, 051345Z Jul 82, par. 9

Consistent, inconsistent: Hill 7-10-94; Begin said that any residual PLO presence would turn back into a full-blown armed presence.

Habib keeps telling: Transcript “Recorded radio conversation between Mr. Eagleburger and Amb. Habib, July 7/82, 0900 hours” 8219191, p. 1. State was at that moment busy drafting a message from Reagan to Begin, so Habib told State to emphasize in it that Habib’s advocacy for a token force and political office “is the position of the United States, goddam it. It is not just me throwing out things [and] negotiating from my head” (p. 5; punctuation altered from the original for clarity). Coincidentally, at about the same time Begin was saying that, the PLO gave up its demand for a token force (transcript “Recorded radio conversation between Mr. Eagleburger and Amb. Habib, July 7/82, 0900 hours” 8219191, p. 2). Instead, they just wanted their fighters outside of Beirut to be able to stay in Lebanon for an agreed-upon time.

Ship to come in: NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8217985, 6-26-82, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, Late Evening Meeting with Sarkis, June 26,” par. 4

Terms in writing: “Radio Transmission from Habib—0700 EDT June 28,” 8218031, 6-28-82, p. 1; Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Greek ships: According to an NEA official who asked not to be identified by name

How else: Habib interview with Parker. The Lebanese government and the Palestinians also insisted on a military buffer because they were afraid of the Israelis (Draper 5-4-93). Haig disagreed with Habib that there was any need for a buffer: “Bullshit. Whether Phil said that or not, whether he was in his dotage or whether he had a good dinner or a bad dinner or an extra Martini, I can’t answer. But let me tell you, there never had to be a buffer. Because they weren’t engaged! There *was* no engagement” (Haig 5-11-94). As early as June 30 there was discussion in Washington about providing US Navy air and sea escorts for the evacuation ships. The Lebanese and PLO both liked the idea (Haig memo to the President, 8218424, 6-30-82, “Lebanon Crisis: Status Report as of Mid-day June 30”; Radio Transmission, Habib to Hill 0800 July 1, 1982, 8218541).

Gucci boots: Mead 6-5-94

Absolutely neutral: Dillon ADST oral history

Any buffer force at all: Draper 5-4-93. This was despite their having themselves proposed, back in the days when Begin was talking about 40 kilometer, a neutral buffer force for southern Lebanon to separate the PLO from the Israeli border (Habib cable Jerusalem 01781, 082059Z Jun 82, par. 6; Habib cable Jerusalem 01782, 082059Z Jun 82, par. 2; Habib cable Jerusalem 01871, 121152Z Jun 82, par. 3D and E; Haig cable [no number] from Windsor to Habib 6-9-82; Habib cable Jerusalem 01903 of 6-13-82, repeated in State 163551, 142321Z Jun 82, par. 4).

Reason to worry: Shultz memo to The President, “West Beirut Situation Looking Better,” 8-6-82, 8223489, p. 2

Screen: Sharon, p. 488-89. The Israelis did not want any military force separating them from the PLO in Beirut because that would mean a relaxation of IDF pressure, and they believed that sustained IDF pressure was the only way to get them to leave. Once the PLO had a protective screen, Israel argued, they would refuse to budge (Shultz memo to The President, “West Beirut Situation Looking Better,” 8-6-82, 8223489, p. 2). Lebanese President Sarkis shared that concern (Hill 7-10-94).

Red Cross: 6-27-82 Israeli Cabinet communiqué reported in Brown cable Tel Aviv 09703, 271402Z Jun 82

It should be the IDF, no way: Johnston 12-4-96

Phalange: The PLO did not trust the Phalange any more than they trusted the Israelis, and neither the PLO nor the Lebanese government believed that the Lebanese Armed Forces had the *capability* to protect them (“Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82, p. 2)

Liaison group: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219392, 7-8-82, “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib, July 8, 1982, at 1230 hours”, p. 2

Last busful: Sharon, p. 491-92; Shultz, p. 63. Sharon clung to this demand for weeks, with Habib batting it down over and over and over (Draper 5-4-93). It would turn out to be one of the plan’s last stumbling blocks.

Trickle in: Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 11D

Habib wanted UN: Habib 6-18-82 cable Beirut 4261, repeated in State 169037 TOSEC 090033, 181403Z Jun 82 [6-18-82], par. 3. If the peacekeepers were a UN force, Habib wanted it to have a strong new mandate with a more sizeable armed force than UNIFIL had (Draper 5-4-93; Habib interview with Tueni; Habib interview with Parker). UNIFIL’s mandate was due to expire August 19, 1982, anyway (Howe and Veliotes memo to The Secretary, 8-9-82, 8223857, p. 3, D+3).

Invented peacekeeping: Hill 7-17-93

Begin absolutely refused: Habib interview with Parker; Habib interview with Tueni; “U.N. Image Of Futility,” *The New York Times,* 8-25-82

Insisted it be called: Habib cable Jerusalem 01903 of June 13, 1982, repeated in State 163551, 142321Z Jun 82, par. 5. American defense intelligence reported that the French also preferred the term “multinational,” because it implied independence for the French unit and highly visible French national identity (DIA cable 200300Z Aug 82, par. 3).

Pathological: Draper 5-4-93. Dillon (ADST oral history) adds that “It’s an article of faith in Israel that the UN is no good.”

Biased: Draper ADST oral history; Hill note to the author received 9-15-98 on manuscript of this chapter; Kadishai 6-19-95. In 1956 UN forces pulled out of the Sinai when Egyptian President Nasser was about to start the 1956 war with Israel. See Stein and Lewis, p. 8, for the evolution of “Israel’s growing conviction that the UN organization was largely hostile to it.”

No diplomatic relations: Yaacobi 2-14-95. Begin had never forgiven the UN for pulling its peacekeeping troops out of the Sinai at Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser’s demand in 1967, a move that helped bring on the 1967 war (Shultz, p. 46). And the UN had gone through “an anti-Israel phase” in the late 1970s, only a few years earlier (Draper ADST oral history).

Hostile: Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 11A

All wanted: Radio Transmission, Habib to Hill 0800 July 1, 1982, 8218541; “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82, p. 2; Draper ADST oral history; Draper 4-13-93; Shultz, p. 45-46

Include Americans: Paganelli cable Damascus 04934, 101438Z Jul 82, par. 4; Lewis interview with Israeli TV show “Moked,” May 22, 1985, transcript p. 8; “Israel Pledges to Keep Cease-fire in Beirut,” *Washington Post* 6-21-82, summarized in State cable 171362, 211630Z Jun 82; Friedman, p. 190

Arafat’s reasons: Draper 4-13-93. Another US official adds that “the PLO felt that, if we weren’t there, all the assurances in the world weren’t worth the paper they were written on.” This official asked not to be identified by name.

Earliest hours: Department of State cable STATE 155256 TOSEC 080198, for the Secretary from Eagleburger, June 7, 1982, p. 1, 5, 7. Though the concept was quite unclear at the time, Eagleburger thought the US might send troops to join the UN force (UNIFIL) already stationed in southern Lebanon, for “a strengthened strategic buffer on Israel’s northern border.” The Israelis scorned UNIFIL for its failure to keep the PLO in line in southern Lebanon, and the Arabs criticized UNIFIL for failing to even slow down the Israeli invasion. The State Department was thus thinking about expanding UNIFIL and its mandate while also “giving much thought to a possible non-UN international force” to replace UNIFIL (Draper memo to the Secretary 6-7-82, X26610, par. 3). The possibility of American troops going into southern Lebanon had come up at an Israeli Cabinet meeting even before the invasion began (Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 106).

If they were replaced: Habib cable Jerusalem 01781, 082059Z Jun 82, par. 6. Begin described this as his government’s preference of three scenarios under which the IDF might withdraw. The Israeli Labor Party preferred an international force, not US forces (Habib cable Jerusalem 01782, 082059Z Jun 82, par. 2 and 9). Haig instructed Habib to remain completely noncommittal about “Begin’s request for U.S. forces, . . . noting only that of course it has been passed to me and to president” (Haig unnumbered cable Windsor to Habib 6-9-82). On June 13, the Israeli Cabinet called for a multinational force, including an American contingent, to control the 40 kilometer buffer zone “so as to allow Israel’s withdrawal” (Habib cable Jerusalem 01903 of June 13, 1982, repeated in State 163551, 142321Z Jun 82, par. 4). On June 15 American reporters were already asking the president’s spokesman about use of US troops in “an occupation army in Lebanon” (transcript of Larry Speakes press conference 6-15-82 in Cross cable State 165239, 160128Z Jun 82, p. 3).

My idea: “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82, p. 3

No other possibility: Draper 4-13-93, 9-19-97. As it turned out, Soviet participation never became an issue.

All agreed, clincher: Stoessel memo to the President, 8218744, 7-2-82, “Habib Mission: An International Force for Beirut.” Habib “very, very reluctantly” resigned himself to the need for Americans (Draper 5-4-93; Draper ADST oral history). American Defense Secretary Weinberger saw no reason to send in US troops. The Defense Department argued that alternate sources of troops—Tunisia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Norway, anybody—should be urgently explored.

Commit US Marines: A Marine landing team was in the Mediterranean all the time anyway (Dillon 5-9-94), so they would be near at hand. A mere 800 of those Marines would come ashore: The rest—including infantry, armor, artillery, and an airborne detachment—would be close at hand as quick backup in case anything went wrong (Sehulster note to author 10-28-98).

Fifty/fifty: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218794, “TelCon Habib and Charles Hill/Adm. Howe, 12:07 p.m., July 3, 1982,” p. 3. The Greeks and Italians volunteered to join too, and in time the Italians became the third contingent (Draper 9-19-97).

Arrogant: Draper 5-4-93

Ease the process: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 9218993, 7-7-82, “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib, July 7, 1982, at 1420 hours,” p. 6

Do our share: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218794, “TelCon Habib and Charles Hill/Adm. Howe, 12:07 p.m., July 3, 1982,” p. 6

UN blessing, begged, recruit: “Transcribed radio conversation between Amb. Habib and C. Hill, July 9/82, 1440 hours,” p. 1-2; Sehulster note to author 10-28-98. Habib told the French ambassador in Lebanon he didn’t want any arrangement that required UN action (transcript, p. 2).

Discreetly shopping: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 9219393 [*sic,* should be 8219393], 7-9-82, “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib [*sic,* actually Draper], July 8, 1928 [*sic*], at 1430 hours,” p. 3. State sounded out US ambassadors in various countries about whether their hosts might be willing to join in, as a contingency in case the French dropped out. Ireland, Belgium, Norway all looked unlikely. Italy seemed the most promising backup.

Sacrilegious, edge us out: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219666, 7-10-82, “Radio Report from Ambassador Habib, 1030 EDT, July 9, 1982,” p. 1-2

Arafat declared: “Radio Communication between C. Hill - Habib, 7/6/82, 0715” 8218995, 7-6-82, p. 2; Hammel, p. 15

Begin responded: “Radio Communication between C. Hill - Habib, 7/6/82, 0715” 8218995, 7-6-82, p. 2. At first, Lewis reported, the Israelis were “unhappy” about having the French in the MNF “but not deeply” (Hill 7-10-94). France did a lot of business with the Arab world and had never been pro-Israeli (Haig 5-11-94). More to the point, France openly supported the PLO, and the Israelis were suspicious of what French presence in the MNF mix might mean (Yaacobi 2-14-95).

Told his intermediary: Adapted from “Radio Communication between C. Hill - Habib, 7/6/82, 0715” 8218995, 7-6-82, p. 2

Backed down: “Jesus, if we hadn’t had the French,” says Draper, “it would have really been a debacle” (Draper 12-18-94). The Israelis had agreed to French participation July 7. Habib said, “They have given their agreement whether they say so or not” (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 9218993, 7-7-82, “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib, July 7, 1982, at 1420 hours,” p. 6).

French first: One of Habib’s Marine liaisons says the French wanted to be afforded the courtesy of being the first to enter because of their historic connection with Lebanon (Smith 6-14-94)

Marines first: A good diplomat, like a good lawyer, can argue either side of an issue. And once Habib had resigned himself to the need for Americans,he advocated a strong American role. One of Habib’s colleagues, who asked not to be identified by name, recalls that Habib “didn’t fully trust the French. He thought they might screw it up with the Israelis, giving them the rationale for going in on the PLO.”

Would not hear of: Draper 12-18-94

Mortifying: Draper 12-22-94. For example, Habib sent word to Shultz that “We will have to work on Israel, the PLO—and DoD—to get agreement to a compromise” about who enters when (NEA Veliotes memo to The Secretary, 8-3-82, 8223048, “Phil Habib’s Views at End of Day August 3”). DoD is the Department of Defense.

Cowards: Draper 5-4-93

Horizon: Sehulster 6-23-94

250,000 men: Barrett 5-9-94

EUCOM: Sehulster note to author 10-28-98. American military brass in Europe had responsibility for the Middle East as well.

Take over, 90,000: Draper 5-4-93. Hill explains why such high numbers of troops were getting proposed in Washington: The Pentagon did not want to be involved at all, so they proposed such a ridiculously enlarged plan and such huge numbers of troops as to guarantee that the White House would reject it. The entire matter could then go away. Hill was in a meeting at which Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs staff “presented a plan to have the US seal the borders of Lebanon with troops ringing the entire country—after Shultz had achieved a lasting ceasefire, of course” (Hill note to the author received 9-15-98 on manuscript of this chapter).

Sarkis: Hill 7-10-94

Optimum number: Barrett 5-9-94

Logistical headaches: Gaucher 5-15-94. This is the same reason the US didn’t want more than three countries contributing forces to the MNF (Howe memo to Eagleburger, “Your August 5 Meeting with the French . . . ,” 8-5-82, 8223374, p. 1).

In the end: Frank, p. 12; Habib interview with Tueni; Frank, p. 162. In early August the French suggested sending 2,000 to 3,000 men as their own contingent. Habib didn’t want more than about 2,000 total (Howe memo to Eagleburger, “Your August 5 Meeting with the French . . . ,” 8-5-82, 8223374, p. 2).

Felt about right: Sehulster 7-12-94

Heavy weapons: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218052, 6-28-82, “Message from Habib—Summary Review of Situation as of Monday Morning, June 28”; Habib cable to Secstate also for action, 6-28-82, “Meeting with President Sarkis, et al, June 28, 1982,” p. 2-3. Radio Transmission, Habib to Hill 0800 July 1, 1982, 8218541, p. 1; “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82, p. 4. What Habib and his colleagues meant by “heavy weapons” was primarily crew-served weapons, i.e., machine guns, mortars, and rockets. Though the Israelis often talked about PLO artillery, Dillon says that no PLO artillery was ever found (Dillon letter to the author 9-11-98).

Not particularly supportive: Weinberger 10-27-93.

Deliberately dragging: Sehulster 6-23-94. In early August, for example, Adm. Jonathan Howe tried to get Pentagon agreement on a simple draft Aide Memoire that Habib needed in order to negotiate a legal underpinning with the Lebanese for deploying American forces in their country. “Phil wanted this on Tuesday,” Howe wrote on a Thursday, “and we have worked it on an urgent basis, but due to Weinberger’s and the Chairman’s personal interest in this, Pentagon clearance has been agonizingly slow” (Howe memo to Eagleburger, “Lebanon Checklist,” 8-5-82, 8223325, p. 2).

Port area: Draper 5-4-93; Shultz, p. 77, 80

Pussies: Sehulster note to author 10-28-98

Totally overwhelm, stand around: Hill 7-17-93. Habib’s top Marine liaison agrees, adding that this attitude represented “a dramatic philosophical change in U.S. military policy and planning” (Sehulster note to author 10-28-98).

Wrong message, nuances: Shultz, p. 77; Shultz 7-25-94

Assurances: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218794, “TelCon Habib and Charles Hill/Adm. Howe, 12:07 p.m., July 3, 1982,” p. 7; “Radio Communication between C. Hill - Habib, 7/6/82, 0715” 8218995, 7-6-82, p. 5-6. Punctuation altered from the State Department’s transcript for clarity. In this discussion, Habib used the term *Kataeb* instead of *Phalange.* The two terms are, for all practical purposes, synonyms; *Phalange* used in the text for consistency. The Phalange also tried to veto the plan for the PLO to leave behind a token force. They eventually cooperated.

Gradually turn over, remain a deterrent: Hill 7-17-93. The sooner the LAF could take over, the better. But Habib had no illusions: The Lebanese Armed Forces was a joke. Their principal activity consisted of collecting their pay. They were terrified to come out of their barracks. How could Habib possibly predict when they would be ready to step up to the plate and take over the MNF’s positions?

Worries, sufficient protection: “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82, p. 4; Hill 7-19-95. The PLO had good reason to fear Bashir’s militia, the Phalange: He avidly hated the Palestinians. Bashir told Habib that, when Lebanon let a small number of PLO into the country, “nobody could take care of them, nobody could go where they were, nobody could order them around, they became an independent little ‘nit’ and then a ‘nit’ grew into a bunch of lice” (“Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82, p. 3-4).

Limited time: “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82, p. 4

Bide their time: Shultz 9-16-93

Reluctantly agreed: There are different accounts of how long Habib wanted them there. He told his Marine liaisons, “You’re going to be in 30 days, but you might be in here longer than that” (Mead 6-5-94). Hill says Habib and his colleagues thought “it would take months at least” (Hill 7-17-93). Draper says “Phil and I didn’t want the Marines to stay a lengthy period—contrary to a lot of the myths. But we felt that, all things considered, they ought to stay about 30 days to take care of the political problems” (Draper 12-18-94). The Marines on the ground didn’t care. Col. Mead, the Marine who would lead them ashore, says, “To us, what the hell, we’re just going to do what we’re told. Marines, we don’t want to be on the goddam ships anyway. We’ll be ashore and it’ll be wonderful” (Mead 6-5-94).

Dump the bastards: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218794, “TelCon Habib and Charles Hill/Adm. Howe, 12:07 p.m., July 3, 1982,” p. 2

Most intractable: Draper 5-4-93

If we don’t: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218794, “TelCon Habib and Charles Hill/Adm. Howe, 12:07 p.m., July 3, 1982,” p. 4

Lack of destinations: Sharon knew quite well about the lack of destinations (Sharon, p. 488), but apparently did not take the logical next step of considering how the PLO could possibly relocate *from* Beirut if they had nowhere to relocate *to.*

Move Palestinians to north: Draper ADST oral history; Draper 4-13-93; Draper 5-4-93

Best candidate: Stoessel memo to the President, 8218744, 7-2-82, “Habib Mission: An International Force for Beirut,” p. 1; Draper ADST oral history; Draper 5-4-93

PLO had proposed: Memorandum for the Record, 8218323, 6-28-82, “Radio Telecon Habib/Hill, 1030 June 28, 1982,” par. 2

Temporary asylum: Habib cable to Cairo, “Egyptian position,” 6-28-82, par. 2. This offer was within the concept of establishing a Palestinian government in exile.

Mubarak’s ticket: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218794, “TelCon Habib and Charles Hill/Adm. Howe, 12:07 p.m., July 3, 1982.” Egypt was an outcast in the Arab world at the time for having signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1978. When a colleague raised various potential problems with sending them to Egypt, Habib brushed him off: “Stop worrying every problem to death. Let the PLO and Egypt sort it out. We don’t care. They should get the PLO to accept a deal that saves their ass” (Hill 7-9-94).

Sympathy, jeopardize: Lewis ADST oral history. Mubarak might be willing to take some fighters, but certainly not let Egypt become the new PLO headquarters (Draper ADST oral history; Draper 5-4-93).

Could not receive Arafat: Sicherman 8-4-98

Initial destination: Stoessel memo to the President, 8220115, 7-13-82, “Habib Mission: Letter to King Fahd,” attached talking points

Game is up: Hill 7-9-94

Diddled: Draper 4-13-93. An Arab League meeting in Saudi Arabia in early July produced nothing but “pap,” Habib said. The Lebanese took its message as, in Habib’s interpretation, “OK, Lebanese, it is all on your shoulders. We won’t help you by saying anything strong but, of course, if you manage to pull it off, we would be happy” (“Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82; punctuation modified here from the State Department’s transcript for clarity). Sermons in West Bank mosques June 25 called on Arab kings and presidents to “bury themselves in the sand” because of their “shameful silence” about the “war of extermination against the Palestinians in Lebanon” *(Ashaab* newspaper 6-28-82, summarized and quoted in Grove cable Jerusalem 02057, 281105Z Jun 82, par. 5D).

Speculated: Hill 7-10-94

The Palestinian cause: “Making Sense of the Middle East,” *The Stanford Magazine,* Summer 1986, p. 23

Saudis and Syrians explained: Shultz, p. 50-51. Taking the PLO was not the only thing Habib needed the Arabs to do. Trapped in Beirut along with the PLO were a couple of thousand elite Syrian troops. The Syrians had been invited into Lebanon as peacekeepers in 1976 by the Lebanese government and blessed by the Arab League. And the Syrians had no intention of leaving—even under Israeli guns—unless that invitation and blessing were formally revoked. They had not been much interested in hearing from Philip Habib since the rolling ceasefire fiasco of June 11. So he needed the Saudis, who had special clout with their Arab brethren, to persuade the Syrians to take their troops out of Beirut when the PLO came out. Lebanese president Sarkis had tried. He told the Syrians he was going to issue an order for them to get out. But Assad replied that, since Sarkis was surrounded by Israeli troops, his orders were not freely given, therefore the Syrians need pay no attention. “Now, that just doesn’t go,” Habib said. “It just isn’t acceptable and the Saudis have to make that clear [to Syria]. I don’t give a shit how much [the US] has to impress that on [the Saudis], . . . that’s their part of the job, being that they have backed away from getting really involved in the Palestinian problem” (“Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82 [punctuation modified here from the State Department’s transcript for clarity]; Habib 7-2-82 cable Beirut 4415, quoted in State 184218, 021729Z Jul 82, par. 15).

Real reason: Draper 4-13-93; Gabriel, p. 31-33

Ruin: Friedman, p. 16; Gabriel, p. 33-34

Helped spark: Korbani, p. 77-78; Salem, p. 60

Afraid to take: Draper 5-4-93

Internal opposition: Hill 7-12-95; Gabriel, p. 33

Mafia: Draper 4-13-93

Great shock: Hill 7-12-95. Dillon points out that the situation was a perfect illustration of the Palestinian problem: They had no place to go (Dillon ADST oral history). Despite all the Arab doors closing in their faces, Habib did not take the refusals at face value. For example, when he and the Lebanese officials heard on July 10 that Syria had decided not to take any PLO fighters, “we sat around and moaned about that a while. I told them I did not accept that [Syria’s] statement was a rejection; that I knew the Syrians. . . . I said, ‘Look, all I read into that announcement is that the Syrians want the PLO to ask them to come. And then Assad will say yes.’” He was sure that “in the end they would accept them and then presumably disperse them around a little bit if they didn’t want them all.” So he told his intermediary to go back to Arafat “and *act as if* we had the Syrians” (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219690, 7-10-82, “Telecon with Habib July 10, 1982 0700,” p. 1-2; punctuation altered for clarity).

He was wrong. He concluded three days later that Syria really did mean no. Syria’s rationale was that accepting thousands of Palestinian fighters would (1) simply transfer the Palestinian problem geographically from one location to another, (2) mean accepting the principle of suspending the Palestinians’ right to resolve their problem, and (3) mean rewarding Israel for its aggression (Paganelli cable Damascus 04934, 101438Z Jul 82, par. 25, 27, 29, 30; Hill 7-10-94).

Carry on: Hill 7-10-94. Oddly enough, the Israelis agreed with the PLO on this point: Begin and Sharon specifically wanted them, Draper said, “in a rejectionist state . . . within easy striking distance of Israeli power,” because they would have “far fewer compunctions” about launching a retaliatory strike against them in a state hostile to Israel than in a moderate state like Egypt. Syria was fine with Begin and Sharon—in fact, they proposed Syria June 27—because they knew Assad would keep the PLO under strict control. Egypt would be OK as long as Mubarak didn’t allow them to set up a government-in-exile there (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218795, 7-4-82, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, July 3, 1982,” p. 1; Habib cable Beirut 04461, 7-5-82, par. 6; text of June 27 Israeli Cabinet communiqué, in Brown cable Tel Aviv 09703, 271402Z Jun 82). But ultimately, the Israelis had surprisingly little to say about where the PLO should and should not go. Begin considered the destinations “somebody else’s problem,” US ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis reported. Begin’s attitude was “Just get out of Lebanon and leave no seed” (Hill 7-10-94).

Motive, declined: Draper ADST oral history; Draper 5-4-93; Draper 4-13-93; Hill 7-16-94; State Department paper “Habib Report from Beirut 0630, June 28,” par. 1. The PLO and Syria had engaged in brutal fighting in 1975-76 as part of the Lebanese civil war (“Agreement on Lebanese peace plan reported near,” *New York Times* article in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-12-82). Perhaps a contributing factor to the PLO’s refusal to go to Syria, at least as of June 28, was that that destination had been proposed by Israel (State Department paper “Radio Transmission from Habib—0700 EDT June 28, 8218031, 6-28-82).

Cannon fodder: Draper 5-4-93

Screw around: Hill 7-16-94

Pessimist: Habib interview with Kreisler

**Chapter 8: The Darkest Days**

Terrible: Habib interview with Mulcahy

PLO had agreed: Habib cable Beirut 4415, quoted in State 184218, 021729Z Jul 82. They agreed in principle to the substance of US terms, conditional on the presence of an international force in Beirut to oversee the evacuation.

Can’t go on: Quote adapted from Habib’s report of what he had said, in “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82, p. 2 and 5

Important night: Hill 7-10-94. Former prime minister Sa’eb Salaam was going with Wazzan to see Arafat.

Next few days: “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82, p. 5; Shultz, p. 46

Firefight: Shultz, p. 46

Hysterical: Shultz, p. 46-47

Only portals: “Israeli tanks rumble into western Beirut,” *Washington Post* article in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-4-82

Took over checkpoints: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218796, 7-4-82, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, July 4, 1982”; Habib cable Beirut 04460, 7-5-82; Hill 7-19-95, 7-10-94. The IDF also took over the road that Wazzan would have to travel to meet with Habib. The road led to the suburb of Baabda, where the presidential palace was, and to the adjacent suburb of Yarze, where Habib was headquartered. Habib held most of his meetings with Lebanese officials at the palace.

Carrying the paper, indignity: Hill 7-19-96; Draper 4-13-93. Beyond the indignity was the physical impossibility of getting from point A to point B and doing meaningful diplomacy with shells exploding outside the door. Wazzan had resigned June 25 in part because Sharon’s attacks had prevented him from negotiating (NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8217953, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 1800, June 25, 1982—Late Afternoon Meeting with Sarkis,” 6-25-82).

Standstill: “Transcript of Habib/Peters Conversation of July 6, 1982, 0531”; “Radio communication between Habib and Veliotes, July 6/82, a.m.,” 8218994. Ironically, the *Financial Times* speculated that the Israeli Cabinet might decide at the next day’s meeting “that it can no longer wait for the diplomats to try to reach a negotiated settlement and may order the army to move into the city to crush the Palestinian guerrillas and destroy their headquarters” (*Financial Times,* July 3, 1982).

Couldn’t negotiate: Transcript “recorded radio conversation between Mr. Eagleburger and Amb. Habib, July 7/82, 0900 hours” 8219191, p. 1 and 3; Habib interview with Tueni. The telephones in Beirut worked most of the time, but they were notoriously unreliable.

Leverage: Draper 12-18-94. It wasn’t just that Wazzan objected to the indignity to himself of passing through an Israeli checkpoint. He stopped working also to protest Israel’s refusal to let any ordinary Lebanese pass through (“Radio communication between Habib and Veliotes, July 6/82, a.m.,” 8218994, p. 4).

Misunderstood, inexperienced: Hill 7-19-95. A few weeks later, US congressman Paul McCloskey made precisely this mistake. After meeting with Arafat, McCloskey announced that he had obtained Arafat’s agreement (on the back of an envelope) to recognize Israel. The PLO promptly denied having agreed to any such thing (Bavly, p. 107-8).

Eyes: Howell 10-11-93

Abandon their strongholds, hours: Gowers, p. 207-8; Cobban in McDermott, p. 213

Meeting with Sharon July 5: Habib cable Beirut 04461, 7-5-82, par. 3-4, 8, 15-16; Habib cable Beirut 04460, 7-5-82. The passage quotes Habib’s account of what he and Sharon said, not necessarily their actual words. Jordan quote adapted from Habib’s account of what Sharon said. This meeting happened on a Monday. Though Habib had still not seen the paper, Wazzan had presumably by now read it to him over the phone. Privately, Habib knew there was a lot of what Draper (12-18-94) calls “play acting” going on: Arafat had agreed to leave, but didn’t say when or to where, which Habib took to mean that “Arafat wants to string things out” (Hill 7-10-94). Indeed, Arafat’s letter was “deliberately vague,” says Khalidi (p. 115). Arafat was hoping to deflate Sharon’s pressure until Habib could come up with destinations—by which time maybe Arafat could get a better deal or worm out of this one altogether (Gowers, p. 208-9).

Despite instructions: Hill 7-10-94

Galerie Samaan: “Transcript of Habib/Peters Conversation of July 6, 1982, 0531”

Technical difficulties: Hill 7-10-94

I don’t know: “Transcript of Habib/Peters Conversation of July 6, 1982, 0531.” Punctuation revised from the State Department’s transcript for clarity.

Begin’s orders, hurry: “Radio Communication between C. Hill - Habib, 7/6/82, 0715” 8218995, 7-6-82, p. 1 and 5; Hill 7-10-94. Italics added and punctuation altered from the State Department’s transcript for clarity. The Israelis repeatedly imposed deadlines on Habib. For example, when the Lebanese government asked in mid-June for a forty-eight-hour ceasefire during which they would negotiate with the PLO, the Israelis treated that as a forty-eight-hour deadline by which time a political settlement had to be reached. The Israeli Cabinet on June 27 “gave the Habib mission a few more days to work out a political solution” but made it clear that time was limited (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 09770, 281704Z Jun 82, par 2).

Two possibilities: Hill 7-10-94

Landing craft: Hill 7-10-94; NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218795, 7-4-82, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib [*sic,* actually Draper], July 3, 1982,” p. 4

Hold our fire: Transcript “Recorded radio conversation between Mr. Eagleburger and Amb. Habib, July 7/82, 0900 hours” 8219191, p. 1

Joke: Hill 7-10-94

We don’t work: Transcript “Recorded radio conversation between Mr. Eagleburger and Amb. Habib, July 7/82, 0900 hours” 8219191, p. 5. Tel Aviv radio reported July 9 that Begin denied setting any deadline for negotiations (Stoessel cable State 190043, 091424Z Jul 82, par 2).

Reagan letter to Begin: Source asked not to be identified by name.

Chastened, already ordered: Per Hill 7-10-94. Reagan’s message carried extra punch because 100,000 Israelis had just turned out in Tel Aviv July 3 to demonstrate against the war. The Israeli public as a whole still supported the war, but in a nation as small and as supportive of its army as Israel, this was a resounding vote of no-confidence in Sharon’s war. The *Financial Times* reported that the majority of protests against the war were coming from soldiers returning from the battlefield (*Financial Times,* July 3, 1982).

Five days, satisfied: Quotes adapted from Habib’s summary of the conversation in NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219392, 7-8-82, “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib, July 8, 1982, at 1230 hours” (Hill 7-10-94). The transcript says “Morris,” doubtless an editorial change by the transcriber, since everyone always called Draper Morrie (according to an NEA official who asked not to be identified by name).

Checkpoint Draper: Draper 12-18-94, 4-13-93, 9-19-97; NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 9219393 [*sic,* should be 8219393], 7-9-82, “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib [*sic,* actually Draper], July 8, 1928 [*sic*], at 1430 hours”; Stoessel cable State 190043, 091424Z Jul 82, par. 1-2. Draper also got Sharon to remove a tank and two big guns from the edge of the presidential palace on the road Wazzan would have to take to the palace to meet with Habib. Lebanese soldiers then lined the road to the palace.

Indispensable: Draper 12-18-94

Strongest reed: NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8217985, 6-26-82, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, Late Evening Meeting with Sarkis, June 26.” During the war, Draper described Wazzan as a “weak interlocutor” (Hill 7-21-94). Hill says Wazzan “never seemed to me to be effective” (Hill 7-12-95).

Straight dope: Draper 12-18-94. Journalists covering the war believed that, had Habib been able to talk to the PLO directly, he “would have been much more persuasive than the Moslem Lebanese intermediaries in making clear to the PLO that there was no alternative but to leave. The Lebanese, and especially Prime Minister Shafik al-Wazzan, were believed to fear the PLO chieftains; they seemed to prefer to water down some of the facts, never fully spelling out the options as clearly as Habib would have presented them. They allowed the leaders of the PLO to harbor their illusions too long” (Bavly & Salpeter, p. 105-6). Sometimes Wazzan apparently overcompensated. For example, on July 28 he met with Arafat and presented Habib’s positions *too* forcefully: Arafat responded that Habib was giving him an “ultimatum” and demanding “unconditional surrender” (Hill 7-16-94).

Had resigned: NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8217953, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 1800, June 25, 1982—Late Afternoon Meeting with Sarkis,” 6-25-82, par. 3

Forget about me: Barrett 5-9-94. This may have been on August 12 (Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 8). Habib couldn’t blame him too much: On July 28 Habib himself considered threatening to stop working unless the Israelis restored electricity (Hill 7-16-94).

In tears, calm him: Draper 12-18-94

Get to work: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Couldn’t fire: Draper 12-18-94. Nor was Habib relieved when Wazzan resigned, since that meant discontinuity.

Adequately forthright: Habib cable Beirut 94744, 200805Z Jul 82 [7-20-82], par. 4. In the copy of this cable declassified and provided to the author by the State Department, Abdu’s name is whited out each time it appears. But there is no question that the person is Abdu. In interviews conducted long before the declassified cable was received, Hill (7-16-94 and 7-12-95) discusses Habib’s dissatisfaction with his intermediaries and identifies Abdu as the one he preferred. Also, everything Habib says about this person in this cable is consistent with other things he had said about Abdu. At the end of July, Habib tried to replace Wazzan as his intermediary to Arafat with Abdu (Hill 7-16-94 and 7-12-95). Rather than simply drop Wazzan, the idea was that Wazzan would then supervise two Lebanese generals who would handle the daily routine technical talks with the PLO. Whereas Wazzan would refuse to negotiate because of Israeli attacks, Hill says, “Abdu, with shells falling all around him, would just go do the job. So he was our kind of guy” (Hill 7-12-95).

Patience thin, Wazzan suggested: Hill 7-10-94. On at least one occasion former Lebanese prime minister Sa’eb Salaam stood at Habib’s side talking on the phone with Arafat (Brown 6-21-82 cable Tel Aviv 09329, repeated in State 173001, 222242Z Jun 82, par. 3).

Bunche: Stein/Lewis, p. 5-6. This approach was dubbed “proximity talks” or the “Rhodes model” for the island where the talks were held.

Habib endorsed: Hill 7-10-94

Maronite fanatics: Draper 5-4-93

Track Habib: Draper 5-4-93. The IDF put tremendous energy into trying to locate and kill Arafat, often bombing buildings moments after he had left.

Proud, sabotaged: Draper ADST oral history

One minute: Hill 7-16-94. Habib did get Washington’s approval in principle to have proximity talks with the PLO. On July 9, Hill told Habib that Acting Secretary of State Walt Stoessel and Undersecretary Larry Eagleburger had discussed the idea of proximity talks and “no one raised any policy objection to this. . . . If you would come back and say that you want to do that, the answer would be ‘sure, go ahead’” (“Transcription of Recorded Radio Conversation between Amb. Habib—Charlie Hill, July 9, 1982—1030 hours,” p. 3). When Habib told Wazzan that he had US permission for proximity talks, the prime minister joked dryly, “You Americans will go into the dining room, the Palestinians will go into the living room, and we Lebanese will go into the outhouse” (Draper ADST oral history, Draper 5-4-93).

Kissinger has confirmed: Kissinger 5-19-94; Dillon ADST oral history; Draper ADST oral history. Here is the pertinent passage from the author’s interview with Kissinger.

Author: “Ambassador Dillon says that, when you first said the United States would not talk to the PLO, you never meant for that to be an ironclad rule, that you meant only that the US would not negotiate with the PLO behind Israel’s back. What is the case?”

Kissinger: “I think Ambassador Dillon was essentially right in saying that.”

Author: “So you did not mean for that to be an ironclad rule.”

Kissinger: “I felt that we would not talk openly with the PLO but we would keep open channels of some kind.”

Ambassador Alfred Atherton also heard Kissinger personally confirm “that the US commitment (to Israel re the PLO) always was meant to reserve the right to have contacts” (“Memorandum of Conversation: Subject: Middle East Developments,” 4-25-83, 8312692, p. 25). Sam Lewis objects that “Henry is rewriting history. He *did* make a commitment in the 1975 Memorandum of Understanding with Israel agreed upon in connection with Sinai II withdrawal not to *negotiate* with the PLO. Period. But he never intended it to preclude *contacts”* (Lewis note on manuscript of this chapter).

Supporters, like hawks: Dillon ADST oral history. Draper (ADST oral history) says, “Kissinger had always left a little wiggle room. Carter sent word that there was to be no room.”

Legislation: Lewis note on manuscript of this chapter

Special authorization: Dean 5-12-94

Plenty of dealings: Draper says, “There is a long history of communications with the PLO for security reasons, primarily in connection with our people in Beirut. We had established a security channel and kept it open” (Draper ADST oral history). Also Hill 7-17-93.

Dean and Dillon contacts: Dillon ADST oral history; Dean 5-12-94; Draper ADST oral history. Dillon adds that he also had indirect ways of communicating with the PLO. It was impossible for anyone in Lebanon *not* to talk to Palestinians, and many of those Palestinians had excellent contacts with the PLO.

Rewarding: Dean 5-12-94

Meloy, hostage, evacuation, damn glad: Dean 5-12-94; Draper ADST oral history; Dillon 10-13-98 note to author; Dillon ADST oral history; Howell 10-11-93. Dillon adds that the PLO provided security for the 1976 evacuation. The Druze also offered protection, which the US also accepted. The chancery was located on the border between a PLO-controlled area and a Druze-controlled area. In 1979 Draper was a deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. The US was, of course, trying to get all of the hostages released from the US embassy in Teheran, but the Iranians agreed to release only the women and the blacks. They kept the white male diplomats hostage for well over a year. Habash’s group represented the extreme leftist wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Howell adds that, when he was stationed in Beirut in the mid-1970s, “the only order that was in West Beirut was provided by Palestine Armed Struggle Command, which is the PLO’s military police.” Even *The* *New York Times* says that “in the chaos of west Beirut, Fatah, the main [branch of the PLO], often proved the most responsible force in operation, protecting, among other things, the American Embassy, and quelling gun battles between groups struggling for territory” (“West Beirut Bids Farewell to P.L.O.,” 8-23-82).

Alternatives: Marjorie Habib

Washington permission: In March 1982 NEA had considered starting direct talks with the PLO if Israel invaded Lebanon (Hill 7-9-94). On June 24 Haig and Assistant Secretary Veliotes discussed threatening Israel, “If you shell Beirut, we will talk to the PLO” (Hill 7-9-94). Eagleburger proposed direct talks as an option July 6 (Hill 7-10-94). The Reagan letter of July 7, quoted in text, threatened direct talks (Hill 7-20-94).

Chose neither: Habib did benefit from the quiet US-PLO cooperation, though. The PLO sent out word that he and Draper were not to be killed (Draper 5-4-93).

Ready access: Draper ADST oral history

Never allowed: Habib interview with Tueni; Mikdadi, p. 64. IDF officers once came to Yarze to call on Dillon; he refused to see them. “I was later told that that was very impolite of me,” Dillon says. “It wasn’t; I was accredited to Lebanon and I didn’t have any business receiving the officers of an invading army. What they clearly expected to do was to use my house as sort of a headquarters, which I of course refused” (Dillon ADST oral history).

Secret meetings with Sharon: Draper 12-18-94, 9-19-97, and 4-13-93; Habib interview with Tueni; Howell 10-11-93

Lob shells, strange: Draper 12-18-94; Hill 7-21-94 and 8-8-95

Unreasonable, scorching: Hill 7-10-94

Out of control, disrupt: Hill 7-10-94

July 11, calm: Hill 7-10-94

Not good enough: Hill 7-10-94

High and dry: Crocker 4-25-94

**Chapter 9: A Concise Formula for Hell**

Modern war: Habib interview with the author

Caves: Smith 6-14-94; Weinberger 10-7-93

Provisions: Draper 9-19-97 and 5-4-93; Hill 6-15-93; Barrett 5-9-94; Jansen, p. 44. “The PLO has enormous stores of food, water, and other required provisions,” Habib told Sharon July 5. “They have generators of their own and could last under the siege. In short, the PLO is not hurting, but others are” (Habib cable Beirut 04461, 051600Z Jul 82, par. 3; Habib cable Beirut 04460, 051345Z Jul 82).

Not cushy: Crocker 4-25-94.

Arafat’s bunker: Smith 6-21-94. Lt. Col. Smith, one of Habib’s Marine liaisons, was given a tour of Arafat’s bunker by the Lebanese Forces after the siege ended.

Urban warfare: Smith 11-25-96

Starve them out: Smith 6-21-94

Unless PLO convinced: Sharon, p. 482

Punishing: Hill 7-10-94; also Habib cable Beirut 04461, 051600Z Jul 82, par. 3; Habib cable Beirut 04460, 051345Z Jul 82.

Israeli troops: Jansen, p. 56-60; Habib reported the water wheel incident to Washington (Hill 7-16-94). At a meeting with Begin July 4, Israeli opposition leader, military hero, and future prime minister Yitzhak Rabin endorsed Sharon’s plan to shut off West Beirut’s water. Though Rabin did not support the war, he hoped that this measure would help end it faster. He later regretted his decision (Gilbert, p. 507).

When Habib would protest: Crocker 4-25-94

Restoring, tightened: Hill 7-16-94

Begin ordered: NEA Veliotes memo to The Secretary, 8-2-82, 8223177; Hill 7-21-94

Assholes: “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82, p. 5. The transcript omits the expletive; Hill (7-7-98) provided it. The State Department had heard, presumably from the Israelis, that the water was under the control of Israel’s ally the Phalange, not the Israelis themselves. Nonsense, said Habib. “Did you hear what I said? I said that anybody who said [the water is controlled by] the Phalange are full of shit. Bashir, himself, has told me he has nothing to do with it. It is completely an Israeli operation, cutting off water and electricity” (“Radio communication between Habib and Veliotes, July 6/82, a.m.,” 8218994, p. 4; the State Department transcript deleted the expletive).

Without water, cholera: Jansen, p. 56-60; Mikdadi, p. 49, 99, 101, 107. UNICEF worried about the potential for plague from rats, typhoid, and cholera (Mackey, p. 179). When Sharon did turn the water back on, it might just run down the street, since so many water pipes had been blown up (Mikdadi, p. 111).

Disease: Hill 7-21-94

Without electricity, fuel, supplies: Mikdadi, p. 106, 89, 51; Jansen, p. 57; Hopkins, p. 46-47

One-day supply: Hill 7-10-94

Same time, fruits, banks: Mikdadi, p. 44, 49, 59; Jansen, p. 114; also Parker, p. 177

Black market, hashish, bribes, meat, price: Draper 12-18-94; Mikdadi, p. 99, 51, 119, 73; Jansen, p. 57-59; Draper 9-19-97 says the IDF allowed smuggling in exchange for money. Mikdadi says 25 pounds equaled about $6.

No less reprehensible: Habib would not have used these words, but the conclusion is inescapable from all the things he did say about the conduct of the war.

Steal milk powder: “Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *The Washington Post,* 8-29-82

Most positive: Habib cable Jerusalem 01903 of June 13, 1982, repeated in State 163551, 142321Z Jun 82, par. 25

Preventing UN agencies: *Sunday Times* of London, 6-20-82, cited in Jansen, p. 35-36. “It is utterly appalling,” the paper wrote, “that the Israeli victors should obstruct these humanitarian non-political operations.” On July 6 Israel’s ally the Phalange helped maintain the blockade of West Beirut by turning back a Red Cross convoy at the port (Stoessel cable State 186129 TOSEC 100100, 060031Z Jul 82, par. 3).

Obstructing deliveries: *The* *Observer,* July 4, cited in Jansen, p. 37

Hospitals, doctors, four trucks: Jansen, p. 37, 52-53; Mikdadi, p. 100; Hill 7-16-94

Unbelievably serious: Hill 7-21-94. Draper suggested having Red Cross convoys bring in the medicines. Habib had said on July 7 that the Israelis at last seemed willing to let medicine and other essential supplies in (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 9218993, 7-7-82, “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib, July 7, 1982, at 1420 hours”); if so, they later changed their minds. On August 11 Sharon made a point of informing Habib that, “as a demonstration of Israel’s flexibility,” the IDF had just allowed the Red Cross to bring food and other supplies into West Beirut, even though “it goes to the terrorists.” Habib was not much impressed with what he considered Sharon’s token magnanimity (Lewis 8-11-82 cable Tel Aviv 12220, quoted in State 226747, 130526Z Aug 82, par. 12).

Collateral damage: “Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *The Washington Post,* 8-29-82; “Begin Is Optimistic All Foreign Units Will Quit Lebanon,” *The New York Times,* 8-29-82. There is little question that the PLO did indeed put guns and ammunition in civilian areas, though Khalidi, p. 133-35, argues that that claim is “a gross canard.”

Comparable civilian sites: Jansen, p. 9; Dillon 5-9-94; Dillon ADST oral history. During an Israeli artillery and tank barrage July 9, Habib said, “A lot of these gun positions are around here [i.e., the American ambassador’s residence in Yarze]. So this big argument that ‘you put your guns up against . . . civilians’: these guns are up against—close—to the Presidential Palace, the Ministry of Defense and us” (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219664, 7-10-82, “Radio Report from Ambassador Habib, 1240 EDT, July 9, 1982,” p. 1; punctuation altered for clarity).

Necessary evil, blowers, generators, food: Draper 4-25-93; Lewis 8-11-82 cable Tel Aviv 12220, quoted in State 226747, 130526Z Aug 82, par. 12; Hill 7-16-94 and 7-21-94

Wasn’t as bad, phony, diesel: Hill 7-16-94

Burgundy’s: “Radio communication between Habib and Veliotes, July 6/82, a.m.,” 8218994, p. 4.

Suffered enough: According to an Israeli official who asked not to be identified by name; also Lewis ADST oral history and Rabinovich, p. 141. At a meeting July 10, Habib wrote, the head of Israeli military intelligence, Yehoshua Segui, “added the gruesome note that the Israeli cutting off of water and electricity may not have affected the PLO directly, but that its impact on the other citizens in Beirut was a very successful form of pressure on the PLO” (Habib cable Beirut 04561, 101755Z Jul 82, par. 8). Habib disputed this point every time it was made.

Only through: Hill 7-16-94

Blow them out: “Radio communication between Habib and Veliotes, July 6/82, a.m.,” 8218994, p. 1-2. Punctuation altered from State Department transcript for clarity.

Common destiny: Khalidi, p. 131-33; Mikdadi, p. 132

Arafat’s head: Kemal Salibi, quoted by Friedman, p. 153

Don’t care: “Radio communication between Habib and Veliotes, July 6/82, a.m.,” 8218994, p. 1-2. Punctuation altered from State Department transcript for clarity.

Time from main task: Shultz 9-16-93; Shultz, p. 56. Shultz summed up the problem to the Israeli ambassador to Washington: “If Israeli actions force Habib to focus on water and power or on repeatedly renegotiating broken cease-fires, then he can’t get to the real negotiations to get the PLO to leave. We face a cycle of self-denying factors” (Shultz, p. 65).

Mayor: Draper 9-19-97; Hill 7-16-94

Diverted: Hill 7-16-94

Syrians: Hopkins, p. 46-47, citing his interview with Paganelli 1-11-92

Discredits, stop working: Hill 7-16-94 and 7-21-94. “Adjustments to IDF lines” was his working euphemism for getting the Israelis to pull back at least a little from Beirut. Even his own State Department was getting bored with his continual harping about the blockade. Hill muttered, “There has to be *some* pressure, for God’s sake” (Hill 7-16-94).

Duels: Dillon (ADST oral history) says, “Occasionally, the newspapers reported rocket and artillery ‘duels.’ Rocket and artillery ‘duels’ consisted of Israeli rounds—a lot of 155 millimeters which are large shells—going into the city and every once in a while some Palestinian popping out of a hole with a hand launcher, firing a rocket.”

4 to 1: Sachar, p. 177. Four to one is conservative: Sharon’s own estimate of the number of PLO in Beirut was 8,000, making it more like ten to one (Lewis 8-11-82 cable Tel Aviv 12220, quoted in State 226747, 130526Z Aug 82, par. 11). An unknown number of additional PLO fighters were still scattered elsewhere around Lebanon. Not all of Sharon’s 80,000 were involved in the siege of Beirut.

Outgunned: Crocker 4-25-94

Small arms, World War One: Gabriel, p. 51; Draper ADST oral history; Smith 6-14-94 and 11-25-96; Mead 6-5-94 and 11-25-96. Habib’s top military adviser, Col. Jim Sehulster, says, “They had a lot of material, but some of it was in really dismal condition. I don’t recall any of the stuff that I saw being modern or very well maintained at all. The question is not so much How much is there? as What it is? They didn’t have a lot of heavy weapons or anti-tank weapons” (Sehulster 7-12-94).

Expertise: Gabriel, p. 50-51. Colonel Mead laughs that the PLO had air-to-ground munitions, even though they lacked aircraft to shoot them from (Mead 11-25-96).

Unused: While the war was still going on, a cache of 25,000 AK-47s was found, still in cases (Hill 7-10-94).

159-60 Revealing locations: This analysis is by a colleague of Habib’s who asked not to be identified by name.

Lanyard: Crocker 4-25-94. He adds that “sitting down in West Beirut was like sitting on the inside of a barrel trying to shoot out. The Israelis did take casualties, of course, but I think that was more luck [on the part of the Palestinians] than real design.”

Indiscriminately: Gaucher 5-15-94. *Indiscriminate* is Habib’s word (Memcon Draper [Habib]/State June 25, 6:59 a.m., 8217804; Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 10). On July 9, for example, Habib said “I think it is inhumane myself because I don’t think they are shooting at any particular target. I just think they are dropping [shells] in. This is the general view of the military people around here who watch this thing by the hour” (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219664, 7-10-82, “Radio Report from Ambassador Habib, 1240 EDT, July 9, 1982,” p. 2; punctuation altered for clarity). The highest ranking military person with Habib, Marine Col. Jim Sehulster, says Israeli fire tended to be “indiscriminate, as far as I’m concerned” (Sehulster 7-12-94). Khalidi, p. 133, attributes the indiscriminate hits to the great expense of pinpoint munitions. Smart bombs were a novelty in 1982 (Hill 7-12-95); most bombs were rather inaccurate, indiscriminate, general-area weapons (Sehulster 11-24-96).

3,000 feet: Hill 7-21-94

Never be persuaded: Crocker 4-25-94

Artillery shells: “In Balance With This Life, This Death,” *Harper’s Magazine,* 11-99, from Anthony Loyd, *My War Gone By, I Miss It So*

Cluster bombs: Draper ADST oral history; Jansen, p. 32-34; Fisk, p. 277-78. An Israeli said “The experts admit this bomb is made by satan. The area of killing of the bomb is very large. No less is its wounding area. Watching it in operation is like watching a rain of terror. Small fatal grenades that create a horrific mushroom of death” (quoted in Jansen, p. 35). The US suspended shipments of cluster bombs to Israel in July (Jansen, p. 86; Lewis ADST oral history).

Phosphorous: White phosphorous rounds were identified by the American defense attaché in Beirut (LWG Welch memo to Bremer, “Message from Habib: Artillery Barrages in Beirut,” 6-25-82, 8217839). Seale, p. 388; Jansen, p. 32.

Hit everything: Fisk, p. 316-17

8,000 rounds: Dillon ADST oral history

Engineering professor: Sami al-Banna, “The Defense of Beirut,” *Arab Studies Quarterly,*  vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring 1983), p. 108, cited in Hopkins, p. 13. Banna expressed his estimate in metric units: several million kilograms of high explosives going into West Beirut, an area of less than 15 square kilometers, during the siege. “Conservatively speaking,” he wrote, “this amounted to . . . 2,500 kg. [of high explosives] per sq. km. per day.” A kilometer is about two-thirds of a mile; a kilogram is about 2.2 pounds. Conversion by Mike Boykin.

Stunned: Viets ADST oral history. Begin had apparently long forgotten his first meeting with Habib after the invasion started, at which Begin had expressed to Habib “concern for not bombing urban areas” (Habib cable Jerusalem 01744, June 7, 1982, par. 7). In their second meeting, Habib asked whether it was necessary to continue bombing Beirut in light of Begin’s claim that the IDF had already achieved its objectives everywhere except in the southern Bekaa. Begin was quite defensive, arguing that he had not bombed Beirut but only the PLO headquarters there. Saying he recognized Begin’s strong objections to civilian casualties, Habib asked him to consider ending air strikes that, whatever their target, inevitably caused heavy civilian casualties (Habib cable Jerusalem 01781, 6-8-82, par. 5).

Dark, lit up: Lee 10-2-94; Mikdadi, p. 91. West Beirut was predominantly Muslim, but not exclusively. Some Christians and many foreigners lived there. The American University of Beirut and the American chancellery (the building that houses the embassy)were both located in West Beirut (Dillon ADST oral history).

Jets, sonic booms: Bavly, p. 102; Fisk, p. 279. The flares may have served as decoys to fool heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles that the PLO might shoot (“In Lebanon, it’s easier to see the losers than the winners,” *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-12-82). As far as Habib was concerned, though, there was no reason for the flares but to intimidate the population (Hill 7-9-94). Along the coast south of Beirut, some buildings were damaged, others totally destroyed. Hardly any were untouched. A former prime minister had machine gun bullet holes through his dining room walls (NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 821819, 6-27-82, “Radio Report from Beirut Political Section, 6/27/82, 12:45 p.m.: Visit to Salim Al-Hoss”).

Coffins: Mikdadi, p. 109.

East Beirut, suburbs: Mikdadi, p. 121; Dillon ADST oral history; Mead 6-5-94

Seven years: Crocker 4-25-94. One ironic benefit of the Lebanese civil war having gone on for seven years before the Israeli invasion was that some number of the people of West Beirut had generators or pumps or wells, which helped the city get through the siege (Crocker 4-25-94; Draper 12-18-94).

We get bombed, Skyhawk, gauge: Mikdadi, p. 95, 114, 125

Intense: Sehulster 7-12-94

More controlled, pain: Mikdadi, p. 73, 122

Leaflets, population: Dillon ADST oral history; Dillon note to the author 10-13-98. Dillon emphasizes that figures such as these are only estimates, since no accurate counts were possible. People had been leaving West Beirut over recent months; during the siege some temporarily left East Beirut too. The French ambassador in Beirut estimated that the non-Palestinian population of West Beirut dropped to 300,000 July 17 from his estimate of 500,000 a week earlier (Habib cable Beirut 04703, 171445Z Jul 82, par. 4A).

Stayed: Habib cable Beirut 04703, 171445Z Jul 82, par. 4A; NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer 8218010, 6-27-82, “Radio Message from Amb. Habib, 6/27/82, 11:30 a.m.: Appeal from Grand Mufti”; NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8218018, 6-27-82, “Radio Message from Habib June 27, 1:10 p.m.: Flight From West Beirut”; Bavly, p. 109; Mikdadi, p. 47, 52, 56-58, 69; Jansen, p. 60-63

Twelve ceasefires: Habib interview with Mulcahy. See also Fisk, p. 228-29. Habib always said twelve ceasefires; press reports in 1982 usually said eleven. “Hell, I had ceasefire after ceasefire,” Habib said. “Beirut was totally raped, being shelled constantly right over my head. And I was spending most of the time in Beirut trying to get the goddam ceasefire, which would last a few hours and then be broken” (Habib interview with Parker, p. 6-8). Habib later said these ceasefires did not hold “because they were improperly agreed upon or violated [without] compunction” (testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, “Briefing on Central American Peace Initiative,” 6-16-87, p. 47-48; the transcript has Habib saying “with compunction”—surely a typographical error or verbal slip, given everything else Habib is known to have said about the Israeli ceasefire violations).

Israeli action: “Radio Communication between C. Hill - Habib, 7/6/82, 0715” 8218995, 7-6-82, p. 1. Punctuation altered from the State Department’s transcript for clarity.

Every time: Dillon 5-9-94. Lewis (ADST oral history) is even more specific: “Sharon became the focus of our frustration and anger because we held him accountable for all the cease fire break-downs, for the shelling of Beirut, the misinformation, the alleged double-dealings, etc.” In any war, the stronger force rarely has as much incentive as the weaker force to maintain ceasefires. They’d rather win their victory and then dictate the terms of surrender (Dillon 5-9-94 and Dillon ADST oral history).

Responded: Stoessel cable, State 228797, 142019Z Aug 82, par. 5. Israel’s policy was, as Begin put it, “If the others break the ceasefire, we shall react with severity” (Transcript “recorded radio conversation between Mr. Eagleburger and Amb. Habib, July 7/82, 0900 hours” 8219191, p. 1).

Crazies: Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 10; Letter to Prime Minister Begin from Secretary Shultz, State 213728, 310424Z Jul 82, par. 4

Now-famous: Habib 7-4-82 cable Beirut 4439, quoted in State 186503, 061812Z Jul 82, par 2-3 (italics added and punctuation altered for clarity). He used as an example the situation he faced on July 6: “I’ve been screaming for three weeks now about the importance of cease-fire *in place.* You want to know why they got into a fire fight the day before yesterday—which set everything back another two days [for a total of] four days?” Because, he said, “Israeli forces crept forward and quite naturally encountered resistance from the Palestinians” (cable Beirut 4439; “Radio Communication between C. Hill - Habib, 7/6/82, 0715” 8218995, 7-6-82, p. 1; italics added and punctuation altered from the State Department’s transcript for clarity).

Hit me first: This State Department official asked not to be identified by name.

At 4:45: Mikdadi, p. 98

Disingenuous, bullet: Jansen, p. 10, citing an article by Hirsh Goodman in *The Jerusalem Post* 6-28-82

Fathom: Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 10

June 21, July 11, July 29: Hill 7-9-94, 7-10-94, 7-16-94. Habib’s top Marine liaison says, “They were killing flies with sledgehammers. Massive retaliation of all types of ordnance for a single rifle shot” (Sehulster 7-12-94).

Hysterical: Shultz, p. 59; Hill 7-21-94; “Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *Washington Post,* 8-29-82

10:30: Lee 10-2-94

His angles: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219664, 7-10-82, “Radio Report from Ambassador Habib, 1240 EDT, July 9, 1982,” p. 1

June 28 ceasefire: Hill 7-16-94. The IDF headquarters at Beirut was at Beit Meri, very close to Habib’s headquarters at Yarze.

Quiet, peaceful: Mikdadi, p. 49-50

Pattern: Hill 7-16-94. This was the view also of a leading Israeli Labor Party politician who asked not to be identified by name. Draper 12-18-94 says it certainly looked to him and Habib at the time that Sharon was deliberately trying to scuttle any progress they might make. A writer observed that “There was one thing that was predictable, however: that whenever it looked as though a solution were near, the planes would return and the gunners would resume their ‘political bombardment’” (Jansen, p. 62; see also p. 45).

By the same token, Habib also said, “When we make progress here, the Arabs backslide on taking” PLO evacuees (Hill 7-21-94). Shultz sent word to Begin that “radical diehard [Palestinian] elements—which are probably communist inspired—are attempting at virtually every moment when progress appears possible to destroy our efforts by violating the ceasefire through attacks against Israeli forces. It is vital that these radical elements be denied their objectives. To play their game by retaliating in a disproportionate fashion that results in a breakdown of the negotiations is to work against our own interests” (Letter to Prime Minister Begin from Secretary Shultz, State 213728, 310424Z Jul 82, par. 4 talking points).

Not pushing: Sharon, p. 482-83

Repeatedly pushed: For example, Habib 7-2-82 cable Beirut 4415, quoted in State 184218, 021729Z Jul 82. The meeting recounted in that cable concludes with Habib telling the Lebanese officials that “we both [have] to go our separate ways and do the serious jobs that [are] at hand and that time [is] pressing. . . . If we don’t hurry, I had better leave,” apparently meaning that otherwise the Israelis would soon destroy the city around him (par. 16-17).

Vitally important: “Radio Telecon Habib/Hill 0745, June 29, 1982,” Memorandum for the Record, 8218324, 6-29-82

June 28, July 2, July 19, July 30, August 9: Hill 7-9-94, 7-10-94, 7-16-94; NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib, July 30, 1082, a.m.,” 8222642, “Radio Conversation between Amb. Habib and Peter Dodd (LWG)”; Habib cable Beirut 05232, 090940Z Aug 82, par. 2; Habib cable Beirut 05240, 091220Z Aug 82, par. 2

Defiant, pound them: Lewis 4-10-94; Lewis ADST oral history; Hill 7-16-94 and 7-16-94; Rabinovich, p. 140-41. Israel’s experience with Sadat was that he often broke deadlocks by giving in to what the Israelis wanted (Draper ADST oral history). “The Israeli lesson was not that Sadat was a great man, but that if you hit the Arabs long and hard enough, they would eventually cave in” (Dillon ADST oral history).

Might as well stay: Stoessel cable, State 228797, 142019Z Aug 82, par. 6. Though the words were spoken in this context by Stoessel, it was Habib’s thinking that Stoessel was reflecting.

Hell-bent: Hopkins, p. 12. Hopkins does not use quote marks around these words, but does attribute them to his interview with Habib 3-12-92.

Some degree of force: Shultz 9-16-93

Motivating: “I recognize the value of ‘Israeli pressure’ on the Palestinians,” Habib wrote (Habib 7-4-82 cable Beirut 4439, quoted in State 186503, 061812Z Jul 82, par. 5)

Such pressure, not opposed: Hill 7-9-94

Erroneously, frankly: “Transcript of Radio Conversation Between Lawrence Eagleburger, Ambassador Habib, and Charles Hill, July 18, 1444-1516 EDT,” 8220873, p. 10. Charlie Hill, who was in the meeting with Shultz and Arens, said the story was “made out of whole cloth” (p. 12). Habib heartily wanted Shultz to say that sort of thing to the Israelis; what he didn’t want was for the PLO to know about it.

Holding out longer: Khalidi, p. 148, cites a calculation that, if the truces during the 1948-49 conflict are factored in, this war was the longest of all Arab-Israeli wars. At seventy days, it approached the durations of the 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars combined. “We taught the Arabs how to fight,” Arafat boasted. “We held off the Israelis longer than any Arab army in history” (“In Lebanon, it’s easier to see the losers than the winners,” *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-12-82). A *New York Times* reporter wrote from Israel, “Actually some military people [here] offer grudging admiration for the fighting ability of the guerrillas in west Beirut” (“West Beirut Siege Is Affecting Israelis’ Self-Image,” 8-23-82).

Atom bomb: Hart, p. 456-57

Increased unwillingness: Khalidi, p. 173

Spotlight: *U.S. News & World Report* (“End of The Road For PLO?” 8-23-82) quoted a longtime observer in Beirut as saying that “The PLO’s stand already is giving birth to exactly what the Israelis did not want—a new upswing in Palestinian nationalism.”

Standstill: Hill 6-15-93

Boom-boom: “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0730 hours, July 2, 1982,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218691, 7-2-82, p. 2

Break off negotiations: Barrett 5-9-94

Spectre of force: According to a State Department official who asked not to be identified by name

Redefine: Hopkins, p. 55

New lease: “Radio communication between Habib and Veliotes, July 6/82, a.m.,” 8218994. Punctuation modified from the State Department’s transcript for clarity. On July 13 he wrote that “the PLO leaders must realize that they cannot operate freely while surrounded by the IDF. Even if Israel does not resort to the military option right away, the PLO leaders probably recognize that the Israelis will be able to continue a long siege of Beirut. . . . The PLO seems to think that Arab pressure on the U.S. may still save them from destruction” (Habib cable Beirut 04611 to SecState, 132115Z Jul 82, par. 3E).

Belief persisted: Khalidi, p. 86. A well-placed Palestinian, Khalidi writes that, after hearing “repeated unfulfilled threats to attack Beirut,” the PLO developed “a clear belief” that Israel was either unwilling or incapable of storming Beirut.

Surrounding the city: Habib 7-4-82 cable Beirut 4439, quoted in State 186503, 061812Z Jul 82, par 5; Hill 6-15-93

This will keep: Habib cable for the President from Beirut 04247, 6-17-82, par. 3

All believed: Haig 5-11-94; Shultz 9-16-93 and 7-25-94; Eagleburger 7-3-93; Draper 12-22-94; Hill 6-15-93, 7-16-94, and 7-10-94. On a 1-to-10 scale, where 1 is stubborn unwillingness to see force used, Eagleburger ranks Habib as a 3 and ranks himself as a 7 or 8.

Dampen the effect: Hill 3-27-93

Threaten to cut off: Hill 3-27-93 and 6-15-93

Litani: Howell 9-6-93; “Mortal Friends,” *Time,* 8-16-82, p. 13

Defensive use: Hill 7-21-94. Sharon has always insisted that “The Lebanon War, like all of Israel’s wars, had been a defensive struggle. Like the Sinai campaign of 1956 and the Six Day War in 1967, it had taken the form of a pre-emptive strike” (Sharon, p. 494).

No US administration: Hill 3-27-93. Shultz says Habib “became quite extreme at one point, I think: that we should threaten to withdraw our military support from Israel, in some fashion. He knew that we wouldn’t, but [thought] we should” (Shultz 7-25-94). One argument in Washington against taking dramatic steps to force the Israelis to stop or to prevent them from entering West Beirut to dig out the PLO, was that doing so might have encouraged the PLO to stall (Hill 7-19-95). Another argument was that, if the Israelis *did* respond to Habib’s calls for less pressure, then it would seem like confirmation of many Arabs’ belief that the US controlled the Israelis, turning them off and on like a faucet. In the longer term, says Eagleburger, “to force them out with their tail between their legs could be very dangerous. The danger is that it would encourage Israel’s enemies to take advantage of that, not to be more reasonable” (Eagleburger 7-3-93).

Finding: Howell 9-6-93

Suspending deliveries: Lewis ADST oral history; Jansen, p. 86, says this was mid-July.

Abundantly clear: Habib cable Jerusalem 01744, June 7, 1982. Begin sent Shultz a message that “sanctions will never change our decisions” (Shultz, p. 68). American sanctions could even help Begin domestically, by making him a martyr and enabling him to change the subject of domestic debate from the war to the cutoff (according to a diplomat who asked not to be identified by name). When Begin became angry with the US, says Lewis, “he would take some action that he knew would make us very angry, to demonstrate to us in unmistakable terms that we weren’t able to push him around.” For example, he might proceed with a few more settlements on the West Bank. In December 1981 the US suspended an agreement that Begin wanted; he reacted by annexing the Golan Heights (Lewis 4-10-94; Lewis ADST oral history). Begin’s view did not change over the course of the war. An Israeli official said on August 6 that sanctions would “have a contrary effect and America will lose all of its leverage. What Israel will do is unpredictable but it could make Beirut look like peanuts” (“Beirut: Fighting—and talks—go on,” *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-7-82).

Facts on the ground: McFarlane, p. 187

Everything he needed: Hill 3-27-93

Come this far: Habib cable Beirut 04640, 141457Z Jul 82, par. 5C

Won’t go along: Hill 7-21-94. Frustration—the need to do something, anything, to show US outrage—was also a reason, according to an NEA official who asked not to be identified by name.

Nazi genocide: “Arafat in Greece in Snub to Arabs,” *The New York Times,* 9-2-82. The Greek prime minister, Andreas Papandreou, was an avid supporter of the PLO.

Survivors: Mikdadi, p. 66

White hats, see you for: Draper 4-13-93

Most humane: “Israelis Seeking to Win Battle of the Headlines,” *The New York Times,* 8-21-82. An Israeli pilot, speaking after the siege, insisted that bombing targets had been precisely selected, through aerial photography or intelligence or both. “There were mistakes, maybe one or two, but . . . we aimed at no civilian targets. We went where the P.L.O. took their guns, and they sat behind the civilians’ backs. . . . We did not do area bombing but rather precision dive bombing” (“Israeli Pilot Tells of Great Effort to Spare Civilians,” *The New York Times,* 8-25-82). For details of the Israeli version, see Gabriel, p. 159-62.

Purity of arms: “West Beirut Siege is Affecting Israelis’ Self-Image,” *The New York Times,* 8-23-82

American public: *International Herald Tribune,* 7-22-82; cited in Jansen, p. 84. A *Newsweek* poll released August 8 found that 60 percent of Americans surveyed disapprove of Israel’s thrust into Lebanon, and that 43 percent favored suspending or cutting military aid to Israel (“Lebanon talks stall over PLO withdrawal process,” *Los Angeles Times* article in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-9-82).

Washington’s sympathy: Lewis ADST oral history. This deterioration began when Begin suddenly decided to annex the Golan Heights in December 1981, says Lewis.

Relations: Yaacobi 2-14-95. Even so, this decline was relative to America’s traditionally exceptionally supportive approach to Israel (Beinin 10-30-93; Viets ADST oral history). American ambassadors in the region, other than Lewis in Tel Aviv, felt Washington was still too pro-Israel (Dillon ADST oral history).

Unity: Habib cable Jerusalem 01745, June 7, 1982, par. 5

National sense: Grove 6-4-94 and 6-12-94

Always agreed: As Gabriel puts it, “The IDF is virtually at the center of Israeli society” (Gabriel, p. 10).

Poll ratings: “Begin’s Popularity is Rising,” *The New York Times,* 8-28-82; *Time,* 8-23-82, p. 31

Academics: “Academics blast ‘unjust war, mass slaughter,’” *The Jerusalem Post,* 6-13-82

20,000: “West Beirut Siege Is Affecting Israelis’ Self-Image,” *The New York Times,* 8-23-82. Hundreds of Israelis demonstrated at the Knesset June 27 to demand Sharon’s resignation and an immediate end to the war (reported in most Israeli newspapers 6-28-82, summarized and quoted in Grove cable Jerusalem 02057, 281105Z Jun 82, par. 5).

July 3: Sachar, p. 193; Bavly, p. 103. Though a majority of Israelis supported the war while it was going on, in later years nine out of ten Israelis would say they had opposed the invasion from the start (Friedman, p. 130). Israelis would overwhelmingly come to view the war as a catastrophe (Beinin 10-30-93).

Disenchantment: The *Financial Times* (July 3, 1982) reported that “the majority of the protests against the war had been coming from soldiers returning from the battlefield who have expressed strong reservations about the scope and aims of the invasion of Lebanon.”

Mindlessly: Sachar, p. 192

Pilots, paratroop: Gabriel, p. 162, 185. Gabriel points out that this would be equivalent to almost 11,000 American soldiers in the Vietnam war openly signing a petition against that war.

Officers: Sachar, p. 193; Bavly, p. 103; Gabriel, p. 185. IDF officers blamed Sharon directly for policies that led to the needless deaths of their colleagues (Fisk, p. 298).

Entebbe, tank soldier: Jansen, p. 124, 126, quoting *Al-Hamishmar,* July 2, 1982

Geva: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 214-16; Sachar, p. 192-94; Davis 103; Gabriel 184-86. Rather than abandon his brigade, Geva offered to remain with them as an ordinary tank officer, but he was fired instead (Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 216). Sharon blamed Geva for boosting the PLO’s morale and thus prolonging the war (Sharon, p. 489; “Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *Washington Post,* 8-29-82).

Abba Eban: Sachar, p. 194, quoting an article in the newspaper *Ma’ariv.*

Seemed to be calling: Crocker 4-25-94, who was political officer in Beirut

**Chapter 10: Suspicions and Lies**

Are there moments: Tueni eulogy at Habib’s memorial service, 6-10-92, Washington. Tueni was Lebanese ambassador to the UN during the siege.

Jordanian: “Habib the Peacemaker,” *Newsweek,* 8-30-82

Voice: Khalidi, p. 107-9,114,132-33,136,138-39,161

Assad: Habib interview with Dusclaud, who is quoting an interview Assad gave to the newspaper *Le Monde.* This was not a new criticism from Assad. On December 1, 1981, his foreign minister told Habib that, by having just signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Israel on military matters, “you have become a direct party in this conflict” (“Habib Returns to Syria and Is Rebuffed on a U.S. Peace Role,” *Los Angeles Times,* 12-2-81).

Representative: “Withdrawal Leaves Many Questions,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82

Mouthpiece: Khalidi, p. 114

Difficult to believe: Paganelli cable Damascus 04216, 151108Z Jun 82, par. 2-3, 5

Arafat’s proposal: Hill 7-10-94. A top PLO official made a point of sending word to Washington and to Habib July 2 that he had no confidence in Habib. Habib sent word back that “my confidence in him is also limited but that I have certain objectives which required the cooperation of many people” (Habib cable Beirut 4415, quoted in State 184218, 021729Z Jul 82, par. 6-7).

Lever: Khalidi, p. 172. Pakradouni, an aide to Bashir Gemayel, mistakenly believed that during the war Habib was “indirectly influencing military operations. Each time that the Palestinians posed conditions that were unacceptable to Washington, Habib suggested to his government that Ariel Sharon be given free rein. For this diplomat also believed in the use of force” (Pakradouni, p. 256).

Could force: Habib cable Beirut 04611, 132115Z Jul 82, par. 3; “Talking Points for use with The President,” 10:00 a.m. 8/12/82, 8224185, p. 2; Hill 7-21-94 and 7-16-94. Even the French and Italians, America’s partners in forming the MNF, had the same belief (Hill 7-21-94). The Arabs were not the only ones to view Habib as part of a charade. *The Wall Street Journal* simplified Habib’s diplomatic effort to a “good cop, bad cop” technique. In the *Journal*’s analysis, Habib was the good cop; the Israeli army was the bad cop. “Mr. Habib is saying, in effect, that if the PLO won’t make a deal now, it will have to reckon with the frightening bad cop in a few days or hours. To be convincing, this approach requires that the good cop *seem to have* enormous difficulty restraining the bad cop from pummeling the suspect” (“U.S. Diplomat in Delicate Negotiations To Determine PLO’s Future in Lebanon,” *Wall Street Journal,* 6-24-82; italics added).

Presiding: These are Draper’s words (Hill 7-16-94). The rampant breakdown in confidence that characterized July 1982 extended also to Habib’s dealings with Lebanese officials. “I am not going to fool around with these people,” he said of the Lebanese July 7, “because I don’t trust any of them” (“Recorded radio conversation between Mr. Eagleburger and Amb. Habib,” July 8/82, 0900 hrs, 8219191, p. 3). The problem in their case wasn’t dishonesty or lack of good intentions. It was timidity and lack of clout (Draper 4-13-93). Time and again Habib leaned on them to rise to the occasion, decide what they wanted, make demands, issue deadlines, assert themselves, start acting like leaders of a sovereign state. But they just couldn’t or wouldn’t. “They are beginning to wonder if they can trust me,” he said, “because I am always so hard [on them] . . . . I keep trying to get them to tell me what they want, but they won’t tell me because they are afraid to ask for anything. Then they would be accused of kicking the PLO out. They can’t afford that” (“Recorded radio conversation between Mr. Eagleburger and Amb. Habib,” July 8/82, 0900 hrs, 8219191, p. 3-4) Their fear was that other Arabs, who gave the Palestinians lip service as long as they resided somewhere else, would criticize them.

Biased: Draper 4-25-93. Lewis 4-10-94 says Habib’s Lebanese background, which had not been a big issue earlier, came to have an effect on Israel’s trust in him. Hill points out that it has long been standard procedure for both Israelis and Palestinians to undermine and attack the negotiator. Even in the late 1990s both the Palestinians and Israelis would occasionally declare that special envoy Dennis Ross no longer had their confidence (Hill 7-19-95 and 10-1-98 note to the author). But the attacks on Habib seemed particularly strong, and this time the stakes were higher than in routine negotiations.

These guys, bullshitted: Hill 7-9-94; “Radio Telecon Draper/Hill, 0130 June 28, 1982,” NEA Hill memo to Bremer, 8218166, 6-29-82; Hill 7-9-94. Habib realized that was a possibility, so he wrote, “In the course of [detailed] discussions, we will be able to determine whether the proposals have a truly valid basis or whether the [government of Lebanon] is being strung along by the PLO (“Message from Habib 0500 June 29: Day’s Activities, June 29,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218168, 6-29-82, p. 1). Habib figured that the Mossad’s source was Bashir Gemayel. His response: “I’m tired of Israeli sniping. The Israelis want to accept what Bashir says rather than what I report. So what?” (Hill 7-9-94).

By July 6: Hill 7-10-94. The specific unacceptable result Sharon was thinking of in this context was letting the PLO leave behind a token force and an office in Lebanon, which Habib had resumed advocating.

Cabinet, falls: Hill 7-10-94

Brilliant: “Habib Still Plays For Time,” *Newsweek,* 6-1-81

Well known: Draper ADST oral history

July 11 ceasefire: Hill 7-10-94

Worst: Shultz, p. 49. The Israelis reportedly announced July 18 that there was nothing to be gained from the Habib mission and suggested he go home (Mikdadi, p. 74).

Characteristic of enemies: Lewis ADST oral history. On August 7 Undersecretary Eagleburger, widely considered very pro-Israel (Eagleburger 7-3-93), said that Washington is “greatly concerned that Israel has some insane paranoia that we’re conspiring to save the PLO. Some people here believe Israel does not want a diplomatic settlement” (Hill 7-21-94).

Palaver, friend, Phil is suspected: Hill 7-16-94; Lewis cable Tel Aviv 11097, 221519Z Jul 82, par. 4-7. Palaver is aimless talk, chitchat. Habib had been in Beirut the whole time since June 14. The text of Habib’s recommendation to Reagan is the chapter “The Other General,” quoting NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8217987, 6-27-82, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0430 a.m., June 27, 1982.” One service Begin mentioned specifically was having just sent Reagan a twenty-page document detailing the PLO’s connections to the USSR and to terrorist groups around the world.

Rarely complained: Hill 6-15-93; Sehulster 7-12-94

Class by themselves: Draper 5-4-93; also Shultz 7-25-94

Face value: Howell 9-6-93

Israel would assure: According to an American diplomat who asked not to be identified by name and who adds that Sharon’s approach throughout most of the war was to “stall us, lie to us if necessary, do whatever he had to do until the facts on the ground brought about the inevitable.”

One of Habib’s colleagues who had been involved in the Israel-Egypt peace treaty talks in 1979 says he found the Israelis then to be tough negotiators, but honest. They might decline to answer a question, but never gave false answers. In 1982, though, “We found that they were *way* over that line,” he says. “They’d tell us things that were just flat untrue, about where they were positioned, what they were doing, what their intentions were. We’d say, ‘The Palestinians say Israelis are active in this area,’ and they’d say, ‘Absolutely not true, never happened’ or ‘We were never anywhere near there.’ And we *knew* that they had been where they were alleged to be. We started making rounds on our own: The defense attaché and in some cases Morrie or I would go out in a car and go out and have a look and, sure enough, they would be *exactly* where they were alleged to be and *exactly* where they insisted they weren’t.” This wasn’t just Sharon, but “the range of guys we were dealing with.” This official asked not to be identified by name.

Lewis, from his vantage point in the US embassy in Tel Aviv, was skeptical that Habib’s reports of IDF locations and movements around Beirut were more accurate than Sharon’s. He believed that Habib was relying on information from the Palestinians and Lebanese, neither of whom were neutral observers (Lewis ADST oral history). Habib did have high confidence in Lebanese intelligence chief Jonny Abdu, but his own location high in the hills overlooking Beirut afforded him a panoramic eyewitness view of much of what was going on (“An old pro wins a new peace,” *Washington Post* story in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-21-82).

Pattern of false: Habib interview with Parker

Disaster: Hill 7-10-94

Capacity, trust: Hill 7-21-94

Biggest liar: Paganelli 11-2-96

Some emphasize: Haig 5-11-94; Hill 6-15-93; Lewis 4-10-94; Lewis in Quandt, *Middle East,* p. 239

Being lied to: Veliotes 4-29-93. The Israeli ambassador in Washington at the time was Moshe Arens.

Flat-out lies: Draper 9-19-97

Steadily lost: Lewis unpublished sample chapter manuscript dated 4-22-85, p. 17

Feeding Begin: Lewis in Quandt, *Middle East,* p. 239

Foreboding, scheme: Habib cable Jerusalem 01785, 082248Z Jun 82, par. 7. Sharon had two plans for operations in Lebanon, one grand and one modest. The Cabinet had only approved the modest one. “Sharon’s grandiose scheme,” Habib wrote, was to put Israeli forces alongside Bashir’s east of Beirut to force Syrian withdrawal from the Beirut area and “redraw the political map of Lebanon once and for all” (par. 3). Habib wrote that he suspected Bashir Gemayel shared Begin’s growing ambitions.

Never confined: Habib cable Beirut 04640, 141457Z Jul 82, par. 4 and 5D. Habib went on to say, “To do this they want to end Palestinian military presence in Lebanon: end the presence of the PLO political and institutional framework in Lebanon; and, set back for as long as possible an integrated Palestinian movement widely recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people” (par. 5D).

Haig (5-11-94) suspects that Sharon just “had it in his craw to get up there [to Beirut] and clean the PLO and Syrians out” and thus exceeded his authority. Indeed, Chief of Staff Rafel Eitan would later say he had never been told to stop at any limit like 40 kilometers (Bavly, p. 165). Veliotes (4-29-93) has no doubt that pushing back the PLO was just a pretext, that Beirut was the objective all along. Lewis (4-10-94) says that he believes Begin’s original assurance that the invasion would only go 40 kilometers was “a lot of double-talk.”

June 13 meeting: Habib cable Jerusalem 01903 of June 13, 1982, repeated in State 163551, 142321Z Jun 82, par. 19

Years later, court: This is according to Ze’ev Begin’s deposition in Sharon’s lawsuit against an Israeli newspaper, reported in “Begin knew Sharon deceived him” and “Sharon deceived Begin on Lebanon, judge rules; throws out libel suit against Ha’aretz,” *Ha’aretz,* 11-5-97.

July 2: Habib 7-2-82 cable Beirut 4415, quoted in State 184218, 021729Z Jul 82, par. 10

These leaks: Hill 7-10-94. In this episode, the Israelis leaked word not only of the PLO’s agreement to leave, but of America’s and France’s commitment of troops to the MNF. Reagan had not yet consulted with Congress, who was on recess for the Fourth of July. Members of Congress were upset that a foreign government knew about his decision before they did, and some tried to invoke the War Powers Act to prevent him from sending troops (Teicher, p. 208).

This can’t string out: Hill 7-10-94. Sources cited in the articles were Reagan’s California White House and the Israelis.

Political capital, only alternative: Lewis cable Tel Aviv 09770, 281704Z Jun 82, par. 7-8. Lewis warned in this cable that “If the diplomatic process does not yield significant results rather soon, we believe he [Begin] would ultimately recommend to the Cabinet to go into West Beirut militarily in some form or other despite the human costs, domestic opposition to such a move and the anticipated very sharp reaction from the United States” (par. 8).

Cruel dilemma: Hill 7-10-94. The Likud was Begin’s political party. Lewis reported on July 14 that even Sharon, “sensitized to his political future, would like to see Habib succeed” (Hill 7-10-94). This was a momentary lapse on Sharon’s part. Hill later wrote that the siege of Beirut “drove each of them [Habib and Sharon] to polar opposites—far beyond the balanced statecraft that each was normally capable of. This brought them into a symbiotic relationship that could have been productive but increasingly became detrimental. Phil needed Arik’s pressure to get the PLO to go. Arik needed Phil to get them out. But Arik put too *much* pressure on, and Phil complained about it instead of using it” (Hill note to author received 11-30-98).

NEA prepared talking points July 18 for Shultz to use with Reagan that said in part that Begin “now seems to realize the quandary Israel is in. If they assault West Beirut, the probable damage to our relationship would cause him serious domestic problems. If they don’t and Habib’s negotiations drag on without success, Begin will pay a heavy domestic price for launching a major operation with heavy Israeli casualties without accomplishing the ultimate objective” (“Talking Points for Use With the President,” 7/18/82, 8220840).

Frustration: “Talking Points for Use With the President,” 7/18/82, 8220840. Only five days later, Habib and Sharon got into yet another shouting match. Sharon told him all about the Cabinet’s resentment of Habib. But he invited Habib to come to Jerusalem and added, “We won’t embarrass you while you’re there” (Hill 7-16-94).

More to their liking: Shultz 9-16-93; Hill 7-12-95. A June 28 cable Sam Lewis is telling in this regard for its glaring omission of any mention of Phil Habib: “There is clear apprehension [in the Israeli Cabinet] over what the U.S. position will be regarding IDF entry into West Beirut in light of Secretary Haig’s sudden resignation. Israelis will scrutinize every word from Washington for hints in this particularly crucial time. Any statement, positive or negative, regarding possible Israeli military action will be analyzed carefully and, with the right combination of events, could tip the balance” (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 09770, 281704Z Jun 82, par 6; punctuation altered for clarity). Habib’s awareness that Israel was listening much more to Washington than to him is the reason he never stopped trying to imbue Washington with his views.

At one point, Sharon even tried to literally go to Washington over Habib’s head. On August 9 he asked for meetings with Shultz and Reagan. “He’s coming to say I’ve been duped,” Habib told State when he heard about Sharon’s request. “He’ll come with intelligence that this is a plot, that the PLO doesn’t intend to leave. The Israelis can’t accept the idea that we won’t permit the military option.” Shultz politely declined to let Sharon do an end run around Habib, and the trip was aborted (Shultz, p. 65-66; Hill 7-21-94).

One of Habib’s colleagues who asked not to be identified by name says, “Phil did tell the Israelis to stop shooting. In fact, he did it so often and with such force that the Israelis (remember, ‘the Israelis’ at this time was Sharon and only him) basically blew him off. What Phil needed was the same message with the same force from Reagan, Haig, and later Shultz.”

Phil could talk: Shultz 9-16-93. The Israeli preference for hearing from Washington may have been stronger in this case, but it was not unique to Habib. For example, during the October 1998 Wye River, Maryland, talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians that the Clinton administration moderated, *The New York Times* quoted an official describing President Clinton’s involvement as “a drug for leaders who have built up a tolerance for lower-ranking officials like the special envoy, Dennis B. Ross, or even [Secretary of State Madeleine] Albright. ‘Why give concessions to Ross when Albright is there?’ the official asked. ‘And why give concessions to Albright when Clinton is there?’” (“Clinton Keeps Up Hope of Success in Mideast Talks,” *The New York Times,* 10-20-98).

Hill says that, while a message from high State Department officials may suffice for some countries and some problems, “when it comes to Israel and the US, that is never sufficient. It must be from the president” (Hill 7-12-95). Lewis adds that “Any [Israeli] government has to be able to demonstrate to the electorate that it can get along with the United States even though at times it may have to be very confrontational. There is a political price to be paid by Prime Ministers who get into public fights with the U.S. Presidents” (Lewis ADST oral history).

Circuitous: Draper 12-18-94; Lewis ADST oral history. Logistics were another reason for this circuitous process. Begin would sometimes argue with a message, sometimes comply. But even the compliance was always short-lived: Begin would agree to a ceasefire conditioned on a stern warning that it must be absolute and mutual, the IDF would advance under cover of the ceasefire, somebody would take a shot at them, Israel would declare that the other side had broken the ceasefire, and the IDF would unleash a round of massive retaliation.

Solve the problem: Hill 7-12-95. Hill points out that “Washington” here refers to the elected and appointed leaders, not the career diplomats, who knew better. American ambassadors in the region were “rewarded if you were able to adduce evidence that the Washington policies were correct” (Dillon ADST oral history). Habib was constantly and loudly saying the policies—insofar as they varied from what he wanted—were wrong.

Insert themselves: Hill 7-12-95; Draper 12-18-94; Holbrooke, p. 301. For one thing, presidents are too busy dealing with every issue under the sun. For another, they rely on experts, such as the regional bureaus in the State Department, to handle foreign crises up to and including writing any statements the president does make on the crisis. Finally, too much involvement by a president dulls the impact of any given intervention. Memorable instances of high-profile personal presidential involvement in a foreign crisis, such as Jimmy Carter’s mediation between Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin at Camp David in 1978 or Bill Clinton’s mediation between Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasir Arafat at Wye Plantation in 1998, are notable precisely because they are so unusual.

Wouldn’t stop: Hill 7-12-95

Anything that keeps: Hill 7-10-94

Bureaucratic sniping: Hill 7-12-95

Pressler, Bechtel: *The Washington Post,* 7-25-82; Associated Press story carried in the *St. Petersburg* (Florida) *Times,* 7-26-82. Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, CIA Director William Casey, and a number of other officials in the Reagan administration also had connections with Bechtel.

Editorial writers: For example, the *St. Petersburg* (Florida) *Times,* 7-28-82

Candidate: George Sheldon, Floridian candidate for Congress, in the *St. Petersburg* (Florida) *Times,* 7-27-82

Understanding with George, $7,500: Habib interview with Mulcahy; AP, 7-26-82; Habib’s 1982 datebooks; Habib’s 1982 tax papers. Habib said, “My job was to be available when they wanted to sit down and talk about things.” Shultz says, “He came and talked about what actually took place and how it took place and what the problems were and what were the peculiarities” of whichever countries they wanted to know about (Shultz 9-16-93).

George Will: *Newsweek* 8-2-82. *Newsweek’*s cover date is nearly a week later than its actual appearance on newsstands.

Joseph Kraft: “Recall Habib?” *San Francisco Chronicle,* 7-28-82

France, broker, advocate, bonus: Khalidi, p. 123-26, 135-47, 153, 163; Hill 7-9-94. France’s partner in this hope was the PLO. Among the reasons France thought it should have a more prominent role was its longstanding relationship with Lebanon. The League of Nations had given France a mandate over the territory now called Lebanon after World War One, and it was the French who in 1920 made Lebanon a state separate from Syria (Dunnigan & Bay, p. 36). Fourteen years later, French president Jacques Chirac became the first head of state to address the Palestinian legislative council, a step *The New York Times* described as “widely viewed as an attempt to increase France’s role in Middle Eastern politics by presenting himself as an active advocate of Arab interests” (“Chirac Gets Warm Welcome On a Visit to the Palestinians,” 10-24-96). Chirac’s step prompted *The New York Times’* columnist A.M. Rosenthal to write that “France watches the U.S. on center stage in the Mideast. That burns Mr. Chirac’s presidential stomach. . . . Lebanon [is] a country for which French bureaucrats never tire of announcing their love” (“The Chirac Caper,” 10-25-96). The Egyptians, the Saudis, and the Jordanians were also pressing for a political bonus (“Transcript of Radio Conversation Between Lawrence Eagleburger, Ambassador Habib, and Charles Hill, July 18, 1444-1516 EDT,” 8220873, p. 7-8).

All the world’s problems: Hill 7-10-94. Habib wouldn’t even let himself get sucked into a discussion with an Israeli general about Israel’s plans for after the evacuation. “You’ve got a completely unreasonable position,” he told the general, “but I’m not going to argue with you now. When the time comes, when we get through these first days, then we’ll have something to say. . . . I have other ideas, but there is no point in discussing them. We’ve got to get these people out, then we’ll talk about the next stage.” Larry Eagleburger did, however, quickly follow up with the Israeli ambassador in Washington (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219693, “Telcon with Habib July 10, 1982 - 1058,” p. 2-3; NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219695, “Telecon between Phil Habib and Charlie Hill, 12:30 p.m., July 11, 1982,” p. 2).

Probably never: Habib cable Beirut 04658, 151445Z Jul 82, par. 4

Resented: Eagleburger 7-3-93

Advising PLO, intoxication, alternative, trap: Khalidi, p. 11-13, 86, 136-38, 143, 145-47. As for a plan for getting the PLO out of Beirut, the French advocated what Habib called the PLO’s “standard line”: The UN would send in a buffer force, the IDF would pull back 5 kilometers, the PLO would reoccupy the camps on the outskirts of town, and the PLO would leave by road. On July 10 the Israelis asked Habib about that plan, and he told them, “That’s the official PLO position, but it is not the position which I am negotiating. . . . [That plan is] irrelevant, that’s no longer under discussion” (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219664, 7-10-82, “Radio Report from Ambassador Habib, 1240 EDT, July 9, 1982,” p. 2; NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219693, “Telcon with Habib July 10, 1982 - 1058,” p. 5).

Limited extent: Khalidi, p. 11-13, 122-26, 135-47; Habib cable Beirut 04561, 101755Z Jul 82, par. 6. Washington too used France to a limited extent.

Sucking up, Liechtenstein: Hill 7-9-94. The matter he was referring to was a French-sponsored resolution in the UN Security Council calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Beirut area. The US vetoed the resolution, saying it failed to call for disarmament of the PLO or for restoration of the authority of the Lebanese government throughout the country (State 181755, 302122Z Jun 82, p. 2-3).

Sceptical: Salem, p. 36. More generally, Khalidi writes of “the stubborn resistance of the U.S. to any scheme which did not give it a central role” (p. 169).

Divided: Evron, p. 148

Mendacious: “Mixed reaction in Jerusalem,” *The Jerusalem Post,* 8-8-82. Begin’s compliment for Habib’s efforts and comment about his prospects were contained in a letter from Begin to Reagan, which he discussed with the Cabinet in this meeting.

Fraud and deception: “Who’s in Charge Here?” *Newsweek,* 8-23-82

Trickery, reneging: “Habib accused of conniving to save bulk of PLO forces,” “Mixed Reaction in Jerusalem,” and “Disconcerting attack,” *Jerusalem Post* 8-8-82. Though these articles identified their source(s) only as “authoritative Israeli circles” and circles “known to be close to the defence minister,” Shultz believed “Sharon has launched a media campaign aimed at discrediting Phil and undercutting his mission” (Shultz memorandum for the president, “Status Report on Lebanon,” 8-9-82, 0223742). *The Washington Post* described the sources as two close advisers to Sharon. It reported that “Sharon has been waging an increasingly open campaign against” Habib’s plan. “Israeli sources say he personally has supervised a campaign of leaks in the Israeli press designed to discredit Habib’s proposals even before they were formally presented to Jerusalem” (“Sharon campaigning against Habib ideas,” *Washington Post* article in *Spokesman Review,* 8-9-82).

Draper says there is no merit whatsoever to the charge that Habib was reneging on an agreement with Begin not to bring any MNF troops into Beirut until after the PLO had left. Deliberately or not, the source(s) were distorting the fact that Habib had given in to Weinberger’s refusal to allow *American* troops to enter Beirut until after the evacuation was well under way. He had never wavered from his plan to have *somebody’s* troops enter at the beginning. Knowing that the PLO would never leave without MNF protection, he had consistently rejected Sharon’s demand that the MNF not enter until after the evacuation was over (Hill 7-21-94).

Gen. Tamir had criticized Habib a week earlier as working for a political outcome favorable to the Palestinians. He was told in reply that in Beirut Habib was criticized as being pro-Israeli (Dillon cable Beirut 05026, 010355Z Aug 82).

Editorial: “Disconcerting attack,” *The Jerusalem Post,* 8-8-82

French had warned: Khalidi, p. 147

Desperate: Hill 7-21-94. Shultz considered Sharon the originator of “a media campaign aimed at discrediting Phil and undercutting his mission” (Shultz memo to The President, 8-9-82, 8223742).

Legendary: Crocker 4-25-94

Obviously, pretext, Algeria, convinced: Hill 7-10-94. See also Rabinovich, p. 141.

Getting nowhere: Hill 7-10-94

Pressure the Arabs: “Transcript of Radio Conversation Between Lawrence Eagleburger, Ambassador Habib, and Charles Hill, July 18, 1444-1516 EDT,” 8220873, p. 9-10; Hill 7-10-94 and 7-16-94. The foreign ministers of Syria and Saudi Arabia were about to meet with officials in Washington to discuss the Arabs’ responsibilities in the crisis. Another option State considered was letting Sharon “tear it up for a while to get the PLO back in line” at the risk of Habib resigning (Hill 7-10-94).

Pressure Israel, protest, wash hands: Hill 7-10-94. As early as June 14 the State Department was considering bringing Habib home “for consultations”—a traditional form of diplomatic protest—but NEA felt it was too early to decide on that (State cable 163040, 6-14-82, par. 3).

Kissinger: “Transcript of Radio Conversation Between Lawrence Eagleburger, Ambassador Habib, and Charles Hill, July 18, 1444-1516 EDT,” 8220873, p. 16-17 (punctuation altered for clarity); Shultz, p. 50. “Well, frankly,” Habib said, “I think the only special peace negotiator I would sort of go for at this point is Henry. If you could persuade him, I think it would be a damn good idea, and you can tell George that I think so. Henry’s the only one with the kind of clout that could deal with the total comprehensive peace package.”

July 6: Hill 7-10-94

July 28: Hill 7-16-94

My staying: “Transcript of Radio Conversation Between Lawrence Eagleburger, Ambassador Habib, and Charles Hill, July 18, 1444-1516 EDT,” 8220873, p. 9-10

Succeed or fail: Hill 7-10-94

**Chapter 11: Life in the Pressure Cooker**

Terrible heart condition: Paganelli 11-2-96

Nobody knew: Habib interview with the author 1-10-84, not included in the edited version that appeared in *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Helicopters in Vietnam: Draper 4-13-93; Conroy 5-27-93; Hill note commenting on manuscript of this chapter 6-97

Top treatment: Letter from George Kerlek Jr. to author, 10-13-94

Huey description: Draper 4-13-93; Bider 4-24-93; Geske 6-5-94; Hill note on the manuscript of this chapter 6-97

Habib on helos, backup, flight surgeon: Letter from George Kerlek Jr. to author, 10-13-94

Eulogy: Francis Meloy and Robert Waring were killed June 16, 1976, along with embassy employee Zohair Moghrabi. Habib delivered his eulogy for them at the National Cathedral June 21, 1976 (Department of State press release No. 313 June 21, 1976).

RPG: Dillon ADST oral history; McCullough, *State,* Dec. 1982, p. 5. Rightly or wrongly, the ambassador at the time, John Gunther Dean, believed the Phalange (a.k.a. the Lebanese Forces) had tried to kill him, and he personally blamed their leader, Bashir Gemayel. Dean was shot at several times (Dillon ADST oral history).

French ambassador: Dillon ADST oral history. The gunmen were part of the PLA, the Palestinian Liberation Army.

Pistol, sniping: Dillon ADST oral history; Dillon 5-9-94; Crocker 4-25-94

Nearly every: Crocker and Dillon in Dammarel, p. 51-52

Ride of your life: Crocker 4-25-94

Booby traps: Gaucher 5-15-94

Nasty: Dillon ADST oral history

Any gang: Lee 10-2-94

Greatest danger: Barrett 5-9-94; Draper 5-4-93

Constant fire: Draper 4-13-93; Associated Press story “Habib makes peace in his ancestral land,” in *Clearwater Sun*, 8-21-82

Convoy: Dillon ADST oral history; Sehulster 7-12-94

Delta Force: Sehulster 7-12-94. Delta Force personnel are assigned to protect US politicians abroad when in quasi-combat situations, where conventional State Department Diplomatic Security protection is not enough.

Lebanese guards: Dillon ADST oral history; Salem, p. 77. Habib and Dillon had the same security precautions, personnel, and equipment (Crocker 4-25-94). Much of this description of Habib’s security is based on Dillon’s description of his own security.

Kurdi: Dillon ADST oral history; Robert Dillon and Susan Dillon 5-9-94

The less time: Sehulster 7-12-94

Docility: Bider 4-24-93; Hill note on manuscript of this chapter 6-97

Drive time, raped: Sehulster 7-12-94

Habash: “A Sterling Achievement,” *Time,* 8-30-82; “Habib the Peacemaker,” *Newsweek,* 8-30-82, p. 41-42. Dillon (5-9-94) did not believe there were any serious efforts to kill Habib in particular.

Death threats, immune: Draper 5-4-93

Beirut proper: Dillon 5-9-94

Two shells: Robinson memo to S, D, P, S/S, NEA, LWG, S/S-O, 7-5-82, “Draper-Robinson radio-telecon”

Cairo veranda: Atherton 9-19-93

Closed the embassy: Apart from the danger of getting shot or blown up on the street, there was the less likely danger of getting captured within a diplomatic sanctuary. Between 1971 and 1981, forty-three diplomatic facilities of various nationalities had been seized in at least twenty-seven countries; five more takeover attempts were unsuccessful. American embassies were one of the two favorite targets. Of those forty-eight episodes, more than half occurred in 1979 and 1980 (Jenkins, p. v). Note “Greatest danger” below explains why this was not a likely prospect in the case of Yarze. Technically, the State Department considered Dillon’s decision not a closure of the embassy but a move from West Beirut to East Beirut, where his residence was located (Hill note on manuscript of this chapter 6-97).

Suburb: Associated Press story “Habib makes peace in his ancestral land,” in *Clearwater Sun*, 8-21-82

Highway, entire city: Lee 10-2-94; Bavly and Salpeter, p. 103

Entertaining: Smith 6-21-94; Dillon article “Caught in the Crossfire,” *Duke* magazine, May-June 1986, p. 6

Bazillion: Mead 6-5-94

By day, privilege: Dillon 5-9-94

Guest suite: Crocker 4-28-94; Dillon 5-9-94

Snoring, roommate: Dillon 5-9-94. Habib sometimes shared a room with a communicator (Lee 10-2-94). Of the civilians at Yarze, probably the only one with experience in this kind of thing was Draper. As a young FSO in Baghdad during the Iraqi revolution of 1958, he had spent more time than he cared to remember crowded with his colleagues into the besieged chancellery, eating out of cans and getting showers only rarely (Draper ADST oral history).

Gotta send a telegram: Pascoe 6-4-94

Crockers, not try to leave: Pascoe 6-4-94; Crocker 4-28-94. In later years Crocker would serve as ambassador to, among other countries, Iraq (2007-09) and then Afghanistan (2011-12) during the American wars there. He received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in January 2009.

Any belligerent: Barrett 5-9-94. This was also the Marines’ assessment (Smith 6-21-94; Sehulster 6-23-94).

Greatest danger, small caliber: Smith 6-21-94; Crocker 4-25-94; Draper 5-4-93. The residence had the traditional contingent of Marine guards as security to deter intruders, but intruders were not the danger. The residence was in an affluent Maronite neighborhood: The Maronites were delighted to have the American ambassador’s residence there (Dillon ADST oral history), and no Muslim would dare venture into such a hostile neighborhood even in normal times (Draper 5-4-93), much less at a time when the neighborhood was filled with Israelis and when Israeli fire had the Muslims trapped in West Beirut. An artillery shell is like an enormous bullet. When it lands, it explodes and shatters into a thousand small fragments that go ripping through the air at high speed. Those jagged scraps of flying metal can easily kill or maim. Before the invasion, Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Barrett was sitting in his fifth-floor downtown Beirut residence when a truckful of PLO drove by shooting nowhere in particular. A stray bullet hit the ceiling right above him (Mrs. Barrett 5-9-94).

Humor, several effects: Dillon ADST oral history; Dillon 5-9-94; “Radio Report from Amb. Habib 11:55 EDT - Israeli Firing on West Beirut,” 8219017, 7-6-82. Sharon viewed the hill called Yarze (or Yarzah) as a strategic location because the Beirut-Damascus Highway ran on its slopes (Sharon, p. 439), so of course he would position guns there. It is interesting that, while the Israelis have always blamed terrorists for positioning their guns near civilian sites and thus disclaimed responsibility when Israeli fire hits those civilian sites (the Israeli destruction of a UN camp housing civilian refugees in Lebanon in April 1996 being a particularly notable case in point), Sharon in this case was doing very much the same thing as the terrorists that Israelis criticize.

Palestinian fire: Crocker 4-28-94 and 4-25-94

Shrapnel on shack, English: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219693, “Telcon with Habib July 10, 1082 - 1058, p. 3 and 7; punctuation altered for clarity; characteristic profanity added to State Department’s bowdlerized transcript.

Breakfast, urgency: Habib interview with the author. Habib’s favorite souvenir of Beirut would be a nasty-looking four-inch long piece of jagged shrapnel that he kept on a bookshelf in his study.

See the gun: Pascoe 6-4-94

Garage: Lee 10-2-94

Air conditioner, sauna: Bider 4-24-93; Dillon ADST oral history

Acoustics: Bavly and Salpeter, p. 103

Interpret the sounds, quiet night: Dillon ADST oral history

No special windows, face: Dillon 5-9-94; Dillon ADST oral history

Laundry room: Crocker 4-28-94; Sehulster 6-23-94; Lee 10-2-94

Outgoing, incoming: Crocker 4-28-94. At dinner, for example, Habib and his colleagues would hear firing, look at each other, and someone would say, “Outgoing.” The others would nod in agreement and resume eating (Hill note on manuscript of this chapter 6-97).

I sleep well: Habib interview with the author

Description of artillery: Crocker 4-28-94; Pascoe 6-4-94; Draper 5-4-93

MiG shot down: Draper 12-18-94; Sehulster 6-23-94; Smith 6-14-94. The press reported a Syrian MiG getting shot down over Beirut on August 31 and said that was the first downing of a Syrian plane since June 24 (“Israelis Report Shooting Down Syrian Photo Jet,” *The New York Times,* 9-1-82). But the details of that incident do not match the details of the incident Sehulster describes, which he is certain happened between August 6 and 21 (Sehulster 12-7-98). Smith recalls it as between August 21 and 25 (Smith 11-25-96).

Physical grind: Draper 4-13-93

Stamina: Bider 4-24-93

What better way: Habib interview with the author. A colleague later asked him whether he would do it again. “Oh, of course. Christ, it’s fascinating. Who wouldn’t? Why do you think I came back in ’81 and ’82? I knew it might be risky for my health, but it was really worth it. It was worth it to get back in the action again, the things that really count. That’s what we [as FSOs] were supposed to do” (Habib interview with Mulcahy).

Rest, recharge: Dillon 5-9-94

Do the travelling, worried: Draper 12-22-94

Collapsing: Howell 10-11-93

Doctor: Draper 12-22-94 and Grove letter to the author 6-8-97. The same cardiologist treated Begin.

Overexcited: Schiff and Ya’ari, p. 220-21; also Hill note on manuscript of this chapter 6-97

Golf course, walked: Gaucher 5-15-94. A butterfly bomb is a booby-trap bomb that falls out when a cluster bomb opens. Wherever they land, they sit quietly until someone or something nudges them, then they explode. After the war, the Italian ambassador asked his golfing partner, Lt. Col. Gaucher, to get the butterfly bombs cleaned out of the trees at the golf course so they could play in safety. Gaucher brought in bomb disposal experts from the MNF to do it.

Boring: According to a colleague who asked not to be identified by name

Reaction to stress: Bider 4-23-93

Chef: Lee 10-2-94; Pascoe 6-4-94

Lebanese food, eloquent: Sehulster 6-23-94

Every morning: Gaucher 5-15-94

Set a plate, crème caramel: Robert and Susan Dillon 5-9-94. “My god, did he love pistachio nuts!” says Pascoe (6-4-94). “They would disappear. Literally disappear.”

Four desserts: Kreczko 10-6-93. This happened after the war. The king remarked that no one else had ever done that.

Getting fat: Lee 10-2-94; Crocker 4-25-94; Bider 4-24-93. The cherries incident happened after the war. Howell considered it part of his job to keep Habib from eating too much, but he left the mission two weeks into the war.

Fullest: Bider 4-24-93

Coffee, tea: Habib interview with author. Habib was a connoisseur of fine wines, but he barely touched alcohol of any kind on the mission (Grove 6-4-94; Dillon 5-9-94). He would sometimes have a glass of wine on the Yarze veranda in the evenings (Lee 10-2-94). In Jerusalem he would occasionally have one shot of scotch with a lot of water (Grove 6-4-94).

During breakfast: Crocker 4-25-94. Habib loved this typical moment in an FSO’s day, reading “the take,” i.e., the day’s cables (Hill note on manuscript of this chapter 6-97).

Blur: Lee 10-2-94; Pascoe 6-4-94

Palace: Draper 5-4-93

Tacsat: Hill 3-27-93; Hill note on manuscript of this chapter 6-97; and Hill in “50th Anniversary of the Executive Secretariat,” a panel discussion for the Association for Diplomatic Studies’ Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, 6-21-94, p. 13-14. Habib had his support team draft cables after the fact reporting what had happened, but they were more for the historical record than for conducting present business. The operations center in the State Department was a bedroom, about 8 x 10 with a hospital-style bed in it, normally used by FSOs doing twenty-four-hour duty, on the seventh floor, one flight up from Near Eastern Affairs and near the secretary’s office (Hill 7-7-98).

Calls to Hill: Hill 7-19-95; Hill, “50th Anniversary,” p. 13-14; Hopkins, p. 29; Lewis 4-10-94. Habib and Hill usually talked about four times a day. He sometimes talked to Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary for NEA Nicholas Veliotes, NEA staffers Thomas Miller, David Welch, David Mack, and others. The State Department transcripts of these calls generally omit Habib’s characteristic profanity. Hill was filling in for Assistant Secretary Draper while Draper traveled with Habib in the region. Hill had been director of the Office of Israeli and Arab-Israeli Affairs. Before the end of the summer, Hill changed jobs, becoming executive secretary of the department and executive assistant to Secretary Shultz (according to a staff member who asked not to be identified by name).

Swimming pool: Dillon 5-9-94

Silent movie, learned to expect: Grove 6-4-94. Habib’s fellow American diplomats were nearly as tight lipped. “He gave us the word a long time ago,” says one: “Keep your big mouths shut” (“A Cautious Habib works close to home,” *Clearwater Sun,* 8-7-82). One book does say that Habib sometimes gave in-depth backgrounders to American reporters that were not for attribution. “They never let Habib down” (Bavly and Salpeter, p. 105). He had done many such backgrounders in Vietnam and Korea, but denied talking to the press in the Middle East (unrecorded comment to author 12-20-83).

Counterparts: They might leak like rusty buckets themselves, but at least Habib could know that he hadn’t been the one to screw things up. The PLO and the Israelis both leaked whatever morsels—accurate or not—suited their purposes. That would usually send Habib into a steaming rage. In diplomacy, “The greater the distance maintained between participants and journalists, the less likely that individual participants will be tempted to disclose information prematurely, which can reduce flexibility among the negotiators” (Stein/Lewis, p. 19).

A possible origin of Habib’s aversion to the press occurred while he was political counselor in the South Vietnam embassy in 1965. Henry Kissinger was in town as a consultant to assess the political situation for President Johnson. Kissinger made disparaging remarks about the South Vietnamese government during an off-the-record luncheon with reporters. The *Washington Post* reporter arrived late and did not realize that Kissinger’s remarks were off the record, so he published them. The article outraged LBJ and nearly ended Kissinger’s budding career as a consultant to the US government. As one of the people who had briefed Kissinger, Habib’s name got dragged into the flap (Clifford, p. 429-32). The episode may have made a lasting impression on Habib about the unintended consequences of talking to the press. He did talk to the press, but usually off the record. He rarely said anything interesting on the record. Often he would listen to what a reporter was planning to report and give oblique indications of whether or not it was sound. If he liked and trusted a reporter, he might suggest where the reporter should hang out, without saying why; an important development would then happen there, and the reporter would be on the spot. On his post-retirement missions such as the Lebanon crisis, he basically didn’t talk to reporters at all, other than banter and brief non-informative exchanges such as when Reagan would turn the microphone over to him.

Late afternoon: Crocker 4-25-94

Library, pool, book, nap: Crocker 4-28-94; Pascoe 6-4-94; Dillon 5-9-94; Lee 10-2-94

Lucky tie, stay at residence: Gaucher 5-15-94

Restaurants, tension: Lee 10-2-94

Security at restaurants: Bider 4-24-93; Gaucher 5-15-94. Bider was with Habib in Beirut after the war, but the security measures she describes applied during the war as well.

Headquarters: Whereas the US has only one embassy and ambassador in a country, it may have consulates in major cities other than the capital. Israelis considered Jerusalem the capital of Israel, but the US did not. So, while the Israelis had most of their government offices in Jerusalem, the US embassy was thirty miles northwest in Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem had only a US consulate (Lewis ADST oral history; Grove letter to author 6-8-97). Most of Habib’s business was in Jerusalem, so he made the consul general’s residence there his Israel headquarters. Lewis and Tel Aviv embassy staff would travel to Jerusalem to support him (Lewis note to author 1-15-00).

Residence description: Hill 7-17-93 and 3-27-93; Grove ADST oral history

Escape, Muhammad: Grove 6-4-94; Dillon 5-9-94; Hill 7-17-93 and 3-27-93. Mohammad and the other servants were all Palestinians from the nearby village of Batir.

Coming home, nap, take over: Grove 6-4-94

Garden: Susan Habib 3-93; Grove 6-4-94

Dealings, this way: Eagleburger, eulogy at Habib’s memorial service, 6-10-92; Bider 4-23-93, 4-24-93, and 4-26-93

Turned Lebanese, welcomed: Hill 3-27-93. Hill had been on staff at the consulate general in Jerusalem in 1981 during Habib’s mission that led to the July 24, 1981, ceasefire. It may seem odd that Habib felt the tug of his ancestry more at the consul general’s residence in Jerusalem than he did at Yarze. Here’s a possible reason. Though Yarze overlooked the capital of Lebanon, it was a noisy crucible teeming with Americans obsessed with the siege next door. It ill-afforded him the luxury of nostalgia. Nearly all of the Arabs he encountered in Yarze and Beirut were politicians, generals, and other leaders—i.e., ones he could not afford to let down his professional guard with. The Jerusalem consulate, by contrast, was basically an office going about its routine business in a peaceful city. The office and residence were in the same building. The building and grounds were suffused with the quiet ambiance of ancient Arab culture. The Arabs he encountered there were servants with no involvement in his mission.

Mark, slept only: Grove 6-4-94. Habib was the same way with many middle-ranking and junior FSOs. The more he kidded them, the more he liked them (according to an FSO who asked not to be identified by name).

Mind busy: Bider 4-24-93; Grove 6-4-94

Worst thing: This source, one of Habib’s colleagues, asked not to be identified by name

Relaxing, Scrabble: Grove 6-4-94; letter from Martha Hayward to Brandon Grove 5-20-94. This particular Scrabble game happened in February 1983. In Scrabble, each player has up to seven wooden tiles, each of which has a letter on it. The players take turns placing one or more letters at a time on the playing board to form words.

Glass: Grove 6-4-94. The Roman glass was made on the coast of what is now Israel and Lebanon, about 50 miles from the consulate. Today, if you walk on the beach north of Tel Aviv, you can see tiny bits of light green-blue Roman glass, rounded into pebbles by the force of the sea (Hill note on manuscript of this chapter 6-97).

Local, junk, accredited, office, family time: Grove 6-4-94; Bider 4-26-93; Lewis note to author 1-15-00

Junior staff, stand up to him: Grove 6-4-94; Kreczko 10-6-93; Bider 4-23-93

Stellar performance: Grove 6-4-94; Bider 5-23-93; Howell 10-11-93

Devoted: Grove 6-4-94; Howell 10-11-93. Over a decade later, Grove would say, “To this day I hear from people in the State Department who look back with great professional satisfaction and nostalgia to what he taught them” (Grove 6-4-94).

Guiltily: Grove in *Foreign Service Journal,* May 1994

Wanted to conceal: Grove 6-12-94

**Chapter 12: The Marines**

He needed: Mead 6-5-94

205 Handful: As early as July 3, the day Reagan approved American participation in the MNF, Habib asked that French-speaking Marine liaison officers be identified and placed on standby to come meet with him. “But I don’t [want] them to come until I know that we have something. That may be tomorrow, it may be the next day” (Johnston 12-4-96; NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218794, “TelCon Habib and Charles Hill/Adm. Howe, 12:07 p.m., July 3, 1982,” p. 4). Habib specified that he wanted Marine officers who spoke French because French would be the first or second language of most of the participants in these meetings. Though the liaisons had been chosen in early July, one flare-up or another made it pointless for them to come ashore.

*USS Guam:* Smith 6-21-94; Mead 6-5-94. Commodore Richard White and Adm. William Rowden of the Sixth Fleet were also present.

Maronite: The Palestinians hated the Maronites even more than they did the Israelis. A chant heard in the streets of West Beirut during the siege was “Even Sharon, but not Maron”—i.e., the Maronites (Mikdadi, p. 84).

Buffer: Smith 11-25-96. Sharon’s original plan called for the Lebanese Christian forces, the Phalange, to enter West Beirut and kill the PLO once the IDF had the city surrounded. Though Sharon was disappointed that the Phalange had so far basically sat out the war, the PLO feared that the Phalange would strike at the first opportunity. The two had, after all, been regularly killing each other in the civil war that had raged from 1976 until interrupted by Sharon’s invasion.

Sandwich: Mead 6-5-94; Sehulster 6-23-94

Marine responses to Habib: Mead 6-5-94; Smith 6-14-94 and 6-21-94. Disarming the Palestinians had been a goal of Habib, Washington, and Lebanese leaders since the early days of the invasion (Habib cable Beirut 04233, 161325Z Jun 82, par. 1C and 3F; NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8217953, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 1800, June 25, 1982—Late Afternoon Meeting with Sarkis,” 6-25-82, p. 2). In fact, the goal of disarming them was a given even before the idea of an evacuation emerged (Hill 7-9-94). It was always assumed that disarming them would be one of the MNF’s basic jobs.

Attitude, guys from Brooklyn: Mead 6-5-94

Always outnumbered: Draper ADST oral history. *Peacekeepers* is an unfortunate term that inevitably raises platitudinous objections that there is no peace to keep. *Calming forces* would be a much more apt term.

Impossibilities, consent: Smith 6-21-94

Marines chosen: Johnston and Smith were aboard a ship in the Mediterranean; Sehulster and Gaucher were working in Germany awaiting the call to go to the region and didn’t actually go until August 6 (Sehulster letter to the author 1-12-97). After early consultations with Habib ashore, Johnston would need to be on ship to make preparations for the Marines to land, so he would be relieved ashore by Smith.

Matter of days: Hill 7-21-94

August 7: Johnston 12-4-96

General outline: Johnston cable, USMC 2 07 Aug 2030Z, to Cmdr. White and Col. Mead

Textbook: Johnston 12-4-96

Ongoing obstacle: Hill 7-21-94

Ridiculous: Draper 5-4-93

Matter of command, overall commander: Johnston 12-4-96; Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 5

Dirty work, dollies: Johnston 12-4-96. During this first meeting ashore Habib also emphasized how important it was to give the LAF a role suitable to the army of a sovereign country.

Good spirits, close out: Johnston cable USMC 2 07 Aug 2030Z, to Cmdr. White and Col. Mead; Hill 7-21-94

209 Helicopters and Israeli jets: Account compiled from Sehulster 7-12-94 and 11-24-96; Draper 4-25-93; Gaucher 5-15-94; Geske 6-5-94; Johnston 12-4-96; Kerlek 12-8-96; Frank p. 11; and Johnston (CTF Six Zero) cable LIAA00144 to COMSIXTHFLT 111011Z Aug 82. Kerlek was the pilot of the lead Huey; Sehulster, Johnston, and Gaucher were on board; Geske was in charge of the Hueys. Geske says the Marine helicopters that flew Habib typically flew in pairs 100 feet apart. Sehulster says the jets came within 20 or 30 feet; other estimates by people not in the helicopters at the time range up to 200 feet. Even 200 feet is extremely close for a jet to pass by a helicopter. The Pentagon and State Department were anxious to keep the Marine liaisons’ meeting with Habib secret (Howe memo to Eagleburger, “Lebanon Checklist,” 8-5-82, 8223325, p. 1). So the liaisons had been instructed to keep a low profile, making day trips ashore in civilian clothes to meet with Habib and spending nights on ship (Johnston 12-4-96).

Reported the incident: Kerlek 12-8-96

Intention to issue orders: Sehulster 11-24-96. In the words of Johnston’s official cable, the Marines requested authority to scramble an armed fighter escort to “take harassing action” at the first hint of any encore (Johnston [CTF Six Zero] cable LIAA00084, 071835Z Aug 82). This was the Marines’ closest and most dangerous encounter with the IAF, but not their first. Johnston’s report on the incident mentioned without elaboration that “Previous flights to and from Junieh had been intercepted by what were believed to be Israeli aircraft” (cable LIAA00144).

Should a hostile act: Cable LIAA00112 from COMSIXTHFLT 090951Z Aug 92.

Protested, apologized: Shultz, p. 63-64. Israeli officials told an American diplomat in Tel Aviv that the helicopters were buzzed because they had not coordinated their flight with the IDF. They said it was not harassment and was no problem. Begin told Habib that the Israelis were suspicious because the French had said they would be in touch with the IDF and had not been. The Americans rejected such explanations, pointing out that they were not trying to keep the French from talking to the IDF and that the French had nothing to talk about with the IDF yet since they had not yet met with Habib’s MNF planning team (Hill 7-10-94 and 7-21-94). NEA suspected the incidents described here stem from “Sharon’s entirely mistaken suspicion that we were transporting French military personnel as part of a French attempt to enter Beirut before an agreement is reached. We have told the Israelis that this is utter nonsense” (Evening Reading Item “Israelis Harass U.S. Helicopter,” 8-8-82).

Detainment incident: Account compiled primarily from Sehulster 11-24-96; also from Sehulster 7-12-94; Gaucher 5-15-94; Johnston 12-4-96; Frank, p. 11; cable LIAA00102 from COMSIXTHFLT and USCINCEUR to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 081315Z Aug 82; Kerlak 12-8-96; Shultz memorandum for the president, “Status Report on Lebanon,” 8-9-82, 0223742. Johnston’s version is quite different from Sehulster’s and Gaucher’s: He says he never felt captured or threatened, that the Israelis never surrounded the Americans, and that Col. Yahya just insisted on giving them an unwanted escort to Yarze. Johnston considered this just “a little bit of arrogance by the Israelis.” He agrees that the IAF was monitoring their ship and their helicopter flights (Johnston 12-4-96).

Unglued: Sehulster 7-12-94

Phone: Gaucher 5-15-94. The general was Amir Drori (Sharon, p. 503).

Power play, sandbox: Sehulster 7-12-94; Johnston 12-4-96. Washington strongly protested this helicopter incident too. Begin sent his personal apologies (Shultz memo to The President, 8-9-82, 8223742).

Stay ashore: Johnston 12-4-96

As though nothing: Sehulster 11-24-96. He did, however, forbid the Marines to have any direct dealings with the Israelis. They would, of course, have to have some dealings, but those must always be in their capacity as members of Habib’s political/military committee for the multinational force, not as US Marines. The IDF was anxious to have highly visible meetings with the American military, but Habib was determined to avoid any appearance of the Americans being in cahoots with the Israelis in their war (Johnston 12-4-96).

Sharon had repeatedly said he wanted an IDF representative to be a member of the MNF planning group. Habib had repeatedly refused (Hill 7-21-94). As late as August 18, the Israelis were still demanding to know why they were not included as members of the MNF (Johnston 12-4-96). The Israelis were pointedly not invited (Sehulster 7-12-94; Smith 6-21-94), but Habib would send representatives of the committee to brief the IDF every morning on how the plan was evolving. Because of the buzzing and detainment incidents, though, Habib specifically instructed them to drag their feet at every opportunity about giving the IDF any information that might provide better insight into what the MNF was doing (Sehulster 7-12-94; Smith 6-21-94). While these Americans would meet with the Israelis, some of the Lebanese army officers in the meetings served as liaisons with the PLO.

211-12 Habib’s helicopter: Entire story Draper 4-25-93 and 9-19-97. Date and time per Beirut 05272, 101300Z Aug 82 and Beirut 05282, 101515Z Aug 82. Draper says Habib never even reported the incident to Washington, but an official of the Near East Asia bureau recalls having heard about it at the time. Habib confided the story to his University of Idaho classmates at a 1985 reunion, quoting himself telling the Israelis, “Get the hell out of here! That’s for me!” (Easterbrook 2-21-94). The Beirut embassy had sent word to the Tel Aviv embassy to notify the Israelis of Habib’s flight plans in advance (Beirut 05272, 101300Z Aug 82). Schiff and Ya’ari tell an abbreviated version of the story on p. 223-24. In their version, Sharon ordered his troops to Junieh to prevent American helicopters from landing French troops on the beach. IDF jeeps scurried around the tarmac to keep this helicopter from landing. Draper arrived (their version does not place Habib himself at the scene) and screeched “That’s Habib’s helicopter!” The IDF troops were gone a few hours later. Schiff and Ya’ari give August 8 as the date of the incident. The declassified documents give no indication of any Habib trip to Israel between July 28 and August 10.

Surrendering, shelter: Smith 11-25-96, 6-14-94, and 6-21-94

Land mines: Sehulster 6-23-94. The LAF had virtually no mine-clearing capability (Johnston cable, USMC 2, Beirut 5311, 11 Aug). The French did send some of their soldiers out with the LAF to clear land mines and booby traps. After three or four of them got blown up, they backed out (Sehulster 6-23-94). Habib knew quite well from personal experience how dangerous mine clearing was, having been required during his WWII service to probe for mines by poking bayonets in the ground (Draper 9-19-97).

Buffer along Green Line: Sehulster 6-23-94

Signal: Sehulster 11-23-96

Bone of contention: Sehulster 6-23-94. As the guy on the ground who had actually looked at the places Habib had in mind for the Marines to go, Sehulster found himself in the awkward position of having to tell his superiors that Habib’s idea was “far less dangerous” than they thought, while telling Habib that it was more dangerous than *he* thought. Though Sehulster did not support Habib’s idea, his superiors accused him of being too close to the situation and too sympathetic to Habib (Sehulster 6-23-94).

Veto: Sehulster 6-23-94. The decision was made by the US Commander in Chief in Europe, almost certainly with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Sehulster letter to the author 1-12-97).

Let it drop: Mead 11-25-96

Grasp: Smith 6-14-94; Johnston 12-4-96. Both Smith and Johnston talk about some of Habib’s utterly unworkable military ideas, and in the next breath say things like “he had a good sense for what was in the art of the doable from a military standpoint” (Johnston 12-4-96). They apparently reconcile the two themes by Habib’s willingness to listen to their comebacks, learn quickly from their feedback, and revise his ideas accordingly.

Personal level: Sehulster 7-12-94. This contrasts markedly with his treatment of fellow Foreign Service Officers, to whom he rarely expressed appreciation.

Fairly gush: Smith 6-9-94, 6-14-94, and 6-21-94; Mead 6-5-94; Johnston 12-4-96; Sehulster 7-12-94

Kept apprised, Pentagon, freewheeling: Mead 6-5-94

Unprecedented: Shultz 9-16-93

Nobody knew: Mead 11-25-96

Left it to Mead: Mead 1-19-97; Sehulster letter to the author 1-12-97. Sehulster adds, “We, of course, always advised our seniors of such decisions. I do not know of any being overturned.”

Tactical command: Smith 6-14-94 and 6-21-94

Issuing directions, responsible guys: Johnston 12-4-96; NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218794, “TelCon Habib and Charles Hill/Adm. Howe, 12:07 p.m., July 3, 1982,” p. 4

Full authority: Sehulster 6-23-94; Smith 6-14-94

Why can’t you, LAF: Sehulster 6-23-94; Johnston 12-4-96. The Lebanese Armed Forces were capable of little more than getting out of bed in the morning. But, this being their own country, Habib had bent over backwards to involve them. He asked the LAF to come up with a plan for going into West Beirut in advance of the MNF. But the LAF generals were extremely cautious and loathe to commit themselves to anything that might upset the Israelis, the Syrians, or anyone else.

Driven: Smith 6-21-94; Johnston 12-4-96

Stay until they did, mahogany: Smith 6-14-94 and 6-21-94

Sit at the middle: Sehulster 6-23-94

Map on floor: Sehulster 6-23-94 and 11-23-96. This happened August 11 when Habib returned from Israel with Cabinet acceptance in principle of the plan. His helicopter touched down in Junieh at 4:15 p.m., and he started the meeting as soon as he drove back to Yarze.

Three words: Tueni 11-15-95. Draper says, “He did not speak Arabic, but many of the phrases were familiar to him from his childhood, especially the curse words” (Draper ADST oral history). Howell says “As far as I know, he didn’t speak any of the language. He may have known a few words, but I never saw him use the language” (Howell 10-11-93).

Holy Ghost: Mead 6-5-94. The nickname is based on Acts, chapter 2, in the Bible. That chapter recounts the Holy Spirit (or Holy Ghost) filling Jesus’ apostles and suddenly enabling them to speak in languages they did not previously know.

Routinely: Smith 6-21-94 and 6-14-94

Italian: Sehulster 6-23-94; Mead 6-5-94. They were almost certainly mistaken.

Political officer: Crocker 4-25-94. Habib says “Arabic was probably my first language, because my parents did not speak English to one another. I spoke sort of a simple Arabic, colloquial Arabic as a child” (Habib interview with Tueni). Dillon says Habib’s Arabic was better than people give him credit for (Dillon 12-31-97).

Positive impact: Sehulster 6-23-94

Swore beautifully: Mead 6-5-94

Lapsed into French: Smith 6-21-94; Johnston 12-4-96. When Habib had first asked the US military to send liaisons, he specified that he wanted ones fluent in French (Smith 6-21-94).

French volunteered: Sehulster 6-23-94 and 11-23-96; Draper 12-22-93

French do everything, agenda, envy, excuse: Sehulster 11-23-96; Gaucher 5-15-94

Liked Henry: Dillon 11-5-96 and 11-24-96; Sehulster 6-23-94 and 11-23-96

Mistress: Dillon 11-16-96

How many girls: Gaucher 5-15-94

Weird, unthinkable, *fini,* race: Sehulster 6-23-94 and 11-24-96; Gaucher 5-15-94

Dinner party: Sehulster 6-23-94, 6-23-96, and 6-24-96

Worried: Pascoe 6-4-94

Stress: Sehulster 6-23-94; Barrett 5-9-94; Lee 10-2-94; Pascoe 6-4-94

Heart pill, bedroom: Sehulster 6-23-94

Always worried: Mead 6-5-94

**Chapter 13: The Endgame**

Sharon is winning: Habib cable Beirut 05089, 040531Z Aug 82, par. 4-9. Salaam was a former prime minister of Lebanon.

Single Arab country: Habib did briefly explore the idea of moving the PLO to an enclave in northern Lebanon, but the Lebanese government shot down that idea (Draper note on draft of this chapter)

Not now active: Habib cable Beirut 04703, 171445Z Jul 82, par. 4

Two options: Habib cable Beirut 04656, 151445Z Jul 82, par. 3

My horse, then they’ll know: “Transcript of Radio Conversation Between Lawrence Eagleburger, Ambassador Habib, and Charles Hill, July 18, 1444-1516 EDT,” 8220873, p. 5 and 16. The foreign ministers of Syria and Saudi Arabia were due in Washington within days. The visit tied in well with Habib’s decision to travel, since the American gameplan was to impress upon the two foreign ministers that, as Eagleburger put it, “we have done our damnedest and have been more concerned about the lives of the PLO than the Arabs seem to have been and we have not succeeded, and it is now their problem” (p. 14).

New wave: Seale, p. 388, 390; Bavly, p. 107

Learned not to assume: On July 7 he reported that he had heard on good authority that “The Palestinians are ready to give me everything I want. . . . [But] you know me: I’ve been through so many of these things, something’s liable to happen by tomorrow” (transcript “Ambassador Habib and Charlie Hill,” July 7, 1982, 1420).

July 1: On July 1 Habib said, “They should not go to Syria. For one thing, if a Jew gets killed in Europe, the Israelis would bomb the PLO in Damascus. And if they were in Syria they would simply infiltrate back into Lebanon in two weeks” (radio transmission, Habib to Hill 0800 July 1, 1982, 8218541).

Meeting with Assad: Seale, p. 390. See chapter 3, “Playing on Two Ropes,” for the story of the June 11 ceasefire. Assad never wavered from his insistence that Habib misled him in their discussion just before that fateful event. Habib and other American diplomats repeatedly insisted that Assad had read into Habib’s words assurances that Habib did not make.

The sooner: Seale, p. 390

Reiterated: Habib 7-24-92 cable Jidda 5532, quoted in State 206640 TOSEC 110050, 250019Z Jul 82, par. 4-5. Habib did go out of his way to emphasize that a prisoner exchange proposal he was bringing from Begin was not his own and that he was acting “only as a messenger” on that subject (Habib cable Damascus 15216, 231829Z Jul 82, par. 2). Habib also took up with Assad the matter of getting Syrian troops out of West Beirut along with the PLO. Assad replied that, since they were there as (the dominant) part of the Arab Defense Forces sent to Lebanon years earlier by the Arab League, the Lebanese government should talk to the Arab League about it. Habib said that for the time being he just needed them out of Beirut; going to somewhere else in Lebanon would help end the siege of Beirut without compromising their Arab League mandate. He did suggest to Assad a face-saving way to bring them home, though: that “practically speaking they needed to return to Syria for re-equipping” (par. 6B).

Urged the king: Habib 7-24-92 cable Jidda 5532, quoted in State 206640 TOSEC 110050, 250019Z Jul 82, par. 2, 5

Saudis paid, back door: Barrett 5-9-94; Draper 4-13-93. Shultz (7-25-94) says he does not know whether in the end the Saudis paid Syria to take evacuees. In any case, it probably wouldn’t matter whether the Saudis gave any Arab state money directly to take evacuees: The Arabs all understood that, if they did what pleased the Saudis today, the Saudis would be more forthcoming when their brethren needed money for something else tomorrow (Draper 9-19-97).

Accept 5,000: Hill 7-16-94

US recognition: Hill 7-16-94. Draper’s recollection differs. While a number of Arab states clearly insisted on a political bonus for the PLO, Draper recalls that Mubarak himself at most just implied that the US should move toward some kind of recognition. Even then, Draper says, Mubarak would not have accepted the PLO in strength (Draper note on draft of this chapter). Whatever Mubarak’s own feelings about the PLO, he had a constituency to consider. Support for the PLO was strong among the Egyptian public, and Mubarak had been president for less than a year. Winning points for the PLO would enhance his political standing. Moreover, his consistent criticism of the Israeli invasion went a long way toward redeeming Egypt in the eyes of other Arabs in the wake of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 *(Time*, 8-23-82, p. 31).

Gesture: “Transcript of Radio Conversation Between Lawrence Eagleburger, Ambassador Habib, and Charles Hill, July 18, 1444-1516 EDT,” 8220873, p. 7-8. Mubarak had said earlier, “Don’t come to me with the request to take them unless you have something to say to me about the [long-term] peace process.” Habib said that, with Shultz replacing Haig, “there’s a chance to have a peace process again.” He urged the State Department to reinvigorate the stalled peace process. As a gesture toward the broader peace process, Habib no doubt made the same point to Mubarak that Reagan had made a few days earlier to the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Syria, that “the US recognizes that the real issue is not West Beirut or Lebanon but the Palestinian issue. We intend to work hard and creatively to solve it” (“Talking Points for Use with the President,” July 20, 1982, 8221006, p. 4).

Jump the traces: Hill 7-16-94. Habib’s opposition to US recognition of the PLO in this context only seems to contradict his willingness to negotiate the particulars of departure directly with Arafat. His view was that, if Washington chose to recognize the PLO after due deliberation in the normal course of events, fine. But he was unwilling to have the US rushed and blackmailed into granting recognition in the heat of this crisis. In the context of US-PLO contacts in Lebanon on security issues (see chapter 8), he was willing to talk directly with Arafat to bring this immediate crisis to an end. But he was unwilling to have the US manipulated into broad concessions. Shultz, heavily influenced by Habib’s input, told Reagan that “we must take care not to be stampeded into” granting “some political concessions or recognition to the PLO to compensate for their military defeat. . . . We should be careful not to play our Palestinian card over a tactical issue like the West Beirut crisis alone. We should husband such a tool until the opportunity is clear to use it to influence the peace process” (“Talking Points for Use With the President,” July 20, 1982, 8221006, p. 5).

Intact, quid pro quo: Hill 7-16-94. Mubarak didn’t believe Habib that the PLO didn’t want any quid pro quo, because at this point he had not heard that from Arafat. Even after he later did hear it from Arafat, though, Mubarak wouldn’t budge. He agreed only to take members of the PLO’s Ayn Jallut Brigade, which had been trained and equipped in Egypt (Hill 7-16-94; Habib interview with Tueni; Draper note on draft of this chapter).

Habib no doubt also used the argument that the Arabs’ failure to accept PLO evacuees delegitimized the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people. This was a point that Shultz, drawing heavily on Habib’s input, made to the foreign ministers of Syria and Saudi Arabia July 19 (“Talking Points for Use with the President,” July 20, 1982, 8221006, p. 2) and that the State Department conveyed to Reagan (Stoessel memo to the President, 8220115, 7-13-82, “Habib Mission: Letter to King Fahd” page “The President: Talking Points for Use With Foreign Ministers Saud and Khaddam”; “Talking Points for Use With the President,” 7/18/82, 8220840, p. 3).

By August 6 the PLO sent word to Habib that they had told the Egyptians that they did not wish to link their withdrawal from Beirut to their longer-term political claims (Habib cable Beirut 05165, 061510Z Aug 82, par. 5).

Same argument: Hill 7-16-94. Back on July 3, King Hussein had told US ambassador Richard Viets that he would urge Mubarak to accept PLO evacuees only on the condition that the US agree to drop the Camp David Accords and pursue a peace initiative centered on UN Resolution 242. The feeling was that Mubarak would be politically destroyed by taking them unless the US gave him some such political protection (Hill 7-10-94).

Despaired: Draper ADST oral history

Somebody has to, your decision: Habib cable London 16134, 261551Z Jul 82; Habib cable London 16170, 261738Z Jul 82; Djerejian 2-18-97. The “your decision . . .” quote is put in the first person based nearly word for word on Habib’s account in the third person (London 16170, par. 5).

My responsibility: Habib cable London 16170, 261738Z Jul 82, par. 5-6. The king was offering to take Palestinians born in Jordan or who had Jordanian citizenship. He had obviously given this all a good bit of thought in advance. For example, when Habib asked how he would prefer that they travel from Beirut to Jordan, he replied firmly and without hesitation, “By land, direct and unimpeded through Syria.”

Conditions, screen: Habib interview with Tueni; Djerejian 2-18-97; Habib cable London 16170, 261738Z Jul 82, par. 2, 5-7; “265 Palestinians Arrive in Jordan,” *The New York Times* 8-23-82

Elated: Habib cable London 16170, 261738Z Jul 82. A further reason Habib was pleased was that he knew Jordan would put its PLO contingent under military discipline (Hill 7-16-94; Habib interview with Tueni).

Statesmanlike: Habib cable London 16134, 261551Z Jul 82, par. 2

Next target: Habib cable London 16170, 261738Z Jul 82, par. 8. Jordan’s population is mostly Palestinian. After Habib left, the king told the US ambassador to Jordan, Richard Viets, that it was imperative for the US to link a resolution of the Lebanon problem with a comprehensive regional peace initiative (Hill 7-16-94). This would be one of the origins of the September 1 Reagan plan (see chapter 15, “Baking Stones”).

Confident: Hill 7-16-94

Impossible conditions: Hill note on a draft of this chapter. The moderate Lebanese newspaper *An-Nahar* reported that “Habib did not succeed in his tour of the capitals of the Arab states, in spite of the words he heard in these capitals about their readiness to receive the Palestinian fighters, because the conditions which were imposed have undermined the idea from its basis” (reported in Reid cable Beirut 05079, 031100Z Aug 82).

Sarkis: Pakradouni, p. 255-56. A few days later after a similar conversation about a different topic, Sarkis said, “The other day I was mistaken in telling you that you needed two years to understand Lebanon. You need at least another twelve!”

Message to Begin: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib, July 30, 1082, a.m.,” 8222642, “Radio Conversation between Amb. Habib and Peter Dodd (LWG),” p. 1-3. Shultz followed up with a message of his own to Begin emphasizing that the next few days would spell success or failure. He acknowledged that Palestinian “radical diehard elements” were trying to scuttle Habib’s efforts by violating each ceasefire, and he exhorted Begin not to play into their hands by retaliating disproportionately (Letter to Prime Minister Begin from Secretary Shultz, State 213728, 310424Z Jul 82, par. 4).

Hit back: Brown cable Tel Aviv 11591, 301724Z Jul 82, par. 2, 5

Wazzan threatened: Hill 7-16-94

Proximity talks, hit the ceiling, could push: Hill 7-16-94 and 7-21-94; Shultz, p. 52-53. Habib wanted David Kimche on hand to represent Israel.

Habib tried, handshakes, 300 yards: Shultz, p. 52-53; Hill 7-16-94 and 7-21-94; Begin gave his specification of 300 yards to Draper.

50,000: “Fiercest attacks yet strike Beirut,” *The New York Times* article in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-2-82, citing state-run Beirut radio

Pretext, charade: Hill 7-21-94

Phony ceasefire: Hill 7-21-94. Habib said that Sharon’s August 1 operation was intended for the express purpose of taking over the Beirut airport, which was just south of several major Palestinian camps, after the Israelis heard that Habib was thinking of using it for the MNF. And they did. The operation followed close on the heels of a letter from Shultz calling for restraint. “The IDF have grossly violated Shultz’ letter,” Habib said. “It’s a direct rejection. They have taught Shultz a lesson to show him who’s boss.”

Actually entered, Normandy: Hill 7-21-94; Khalidi, p. 96

Route suggested: “Israeli tanks rumble into western Beirut,” *The Washington Post* article in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-4-82; “Israeli armor pushes into west Beirut,” *The New York Times* article in *Clearwater Sun,* 8-4-82; “Israelis push toward guerrilla strongholds,” *St. Petersburg Times* based on *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* wire reports, 8-5-82. *The New York Times* reported them about 500 yards into the port area.

Waiting for Habib: “Again, Begin ignores Reagan,” *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-5-82

Ashamed, overtaken: Hill 7-21-94

Martyrdom: “Israelis push toward guerrilla strongholds,” *St. Petersburg Times* article based on *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* wire stories, 8-5-82

Pursue the plan: Hill 7-21-94. The IDF’s August 4 entry into West Beirut cost it 83 casualties, 19 killed and 64 wounded. This may have given Sharon a taste of what to expect if he did launch an all-out ground assault (“In Lebanon, it’s easier to see the losers than the winners,” *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-12-82). They quickly pulled back out.

I called Sharon: Fisk, p. 316. A woman who was on the ground in West Beirut during this attack wrote “Dresden, Nuremberg and Berlin together can’t compare with what we went through yesterday,” August 4 (Mikdadi, p. 106).

Tacsat, out the window: Account compiled from Habib’s own telling of it in his interviews with Parker, p. 12, and with Tueni, p. 58; Hill’s account in “Philip Habib: A Remembrance” in *Foreign Service Journal,* July 1992, p. 12; Hill note on draft of this chapter; Shultz, p. 58-59; Dillon ADST oral history; Salem, p. 36-37. The “listen carefully” quote is from Salem. I have altered his punctuation for emphasis and have corrected one error. Salem, who was with Habib at the time, has Habib saying, “Tell *Reagan* someone there is lying to him.” But what Habib actually said is “Tell *Begin* someone there is lying to him,” according to Charlie Hill, the person to whom Habib was talking (Hill note to author 1-20-99). Since the names *Reagan* and *Begin* sound alike, and since Salem mistakenly thought Habib was talking to the White House, his error is understandable, but I have corrected it here. After this remarkable exchange, Habib sent State a written account of Sharon’s latest onslaught and added,

Thus the ninth ceasefire before Beirut is broken. There is no question that this is deliberate on the part of the Israelis. We should no longer accept the hypocrisy of statements about the PLO firing first. The amount of devastation being wrought, on top of the immense amount already inflicted on the Beirut area, is so great as to be hard to imagine at a distance.

All this comes on top of the cutoff of essential services and the blockade of West Beirut. No one, from President Sarkis to Prime Minister Wazzan on down believes the United States cannot stop what is going on. Therefore, they associate us with Israeli actions. I have this minute received a telephone call from the Prime Minister pleading with me to do something to stop the bombardment. He still has some faith that I can change things. Why, I do not know—except that these people still believe they can touch the conscience of the United States.

There is no way that Israeli use of American arms in Beirut these days can be characterized as defensive. It is offensive in every meaning of the word—military and moral. . . . The time has come for us to put a stop to it—whatever pressure is necessary. . . .

It is quite possible the Israelis will now bring to a halt their latest escalation, and mouth the false explanation of responding to PLO fire while pledging to restore the ceasefire. They may even try to convince us that it is necessary to aid the negotiating effort. . . . They should be told that if they continue to disregard our views, we will take the drastic action the law allows” (Habib cable Beirut 05089, 040531Z Aug 82, par. 4-9).

It was not unusual for Israelis to argue that their attacks helped Habib’s negotiations by motivating the PLO to talk seriously. One Israeli writer put it this way: “The fierce attacks, particularly those on August 4 and 12, . . . served to persuade the PLO that a full-blown Israeli attack was imminent, which enabled Habib to negotiate an agreement for the PLO’s evacuation” (Rabinovich, p. 143). Indeed, David Kimche had warned Draper a few days earlier that Israel was compelled to step up the military pressure, since there were no alternatives (Draper note on draft of this chapter). Habib rejected that line of thinking.

Sharon ridiculed this episode. “Come by helicopter and see for yourself that we don’t have any artillery near the embassy,” he fumed to Brown. “How does [he] know who is shooting? Do Israeli mortars have a special sound? If one of my officers stuck a phone out the window to report to me like that, I’d fire him in thirty seconds for not going out and checking on his own!” (Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 222; also Fisk, p. 316) Habib thought it was “about as authentic a report as you could make. There was no doubt they [the Israelis] were misleading” (Habib interview with Parker). His colleagues think Sharon’s objection is absurd. The first thing anybody living in a war zone learns, they point out, is how to tell incoming fire from outgoing fire. The only possible source of outgoing fire from the vicinity of Habib’s headquarters was the IDF, who controlled that whole area. No one else but the IDF *had* tanks and artillery up there. Habib and his colleagues could *see* the guns blazing and could see where the shells landed in West Beirut (Hill 6-15-93; Crocker 4-28-94).

This episode was widely reported at the time, often inaccurately portraying Ambassador Dillon as the one who held out the receiver (Dillon ADST oral history). Schiff & Ya’ari’s account (p. 222) reflects that inaccuracy. The confusion may be due to the Israelis relying on a first-person account in a cable Beirut signed by Dillon. In fact, *all* cables are signed by the ambassador, no matter who writes them. Sharon’s denial of having artillery “near the embassy” would be true in the sense that the building (called the chancellery) normally housing the embassy was well inside West Beirut, and he did not have artillery at that location. But that would be irrelevant hairsplitting about terminology, not a candid response to the substance of Habib’s report: Habib was calling from Dillon’s residence in Yarze, which had been the temporary embassy since Dillon closed the chancellery six weeks earlier, and Sharon most certainly had artillery and tanks in the vicinity of Yarze.

This was not the only time Habib held the tacsat out the window for Washington to hear the shooting. What was different this time was that the prime minister was simultaneously denying that the shooting was happening (Hill 7-19-95). This was also not the first time such a thing had happened in a war: In World War Two, “J. Edgar Hoover, in New York City for the weekend, took a telephone call from his Honolulu agent-in-charge, who was seeing Zeros bombing. ‘You can hear the bombs yourself! Listen!’ He held the telephone out his office window while Hoover sat in New York listening” (David Brinkley, *Washington Goes to War).*

Manhunt: Sachar, p. 185

Berlin: Shultz, p. 54

Obsession: Sehulster 7-12-94; also Dillon ADST oral history; Draper 12-18-94; Hill 7-19-95; Sachar, p. 185. Sharon confirmed August 14 that “we have an interest in hitting the headquarters of the terrorists and the commanders of the terrorists” (“Habib brings new peace proposals to Israel,” *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-15-82).

August 6 smart bomb: Mikdadi, p. 107-8; Hill 7-21-94 and 7-12-95; Khalidi, p. 97; “Beirut: Fighting—and talks—go on,” *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-7-82. Reports of the number of stories in the building vary.

Confronted Sharon, I wouldn’t tell: Hill 7-21-94. Hill adds that use of a smart bomb made this particular attack a “deliberate use of professional military force against innocent unarmed civilians.”

Safire: *The New York Times* column in *Clearwater Sun,* 8-7-82

Homestretch: Hill 7-21-94

Elements: Habib cable Beirut 05165, 061510Z Aug 82, par. 4

Surely not reject: Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12017, 071532Z Aug 82

Lewis urgently warned: Hill 7-10-94; Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12017, 071532Z Aug 82, par. 6

Compromise: Habib preferred to have the Americans come in first or simultaneously with the French. But the French wanted to come in first, Weinberger did not want Americans in at the beginning, and the Israelis did not want Americans on the front line. So Habib gave in.

Paranoia: Hill 7-21-94

Convinced: Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12017, 071532Z Aug 82, par. 2-5; Sharon, p. 491-92; Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 7, 11. Begin told the Cabinet August 1 that if the MNF comes in and separates the PLO from the IDF, “the criminals will never leave Beirut” (Sharon, p. 488-89).

Fail-safe: Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 7

MNF’s mandate: Hill 7-21-94. The “mandate will terminate” part was explicit in Habib’s plan, but the “turn around and go home” part was implicit since, if the MNF’s mandate terminated, they certainly were not going to hang around Beirut. But Habib hadn’t spelled that out in so many words. So Begin wanted to add the language “MNF units will leave Beirut” (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 11C). In the end, the wording used was: “In the event that the departure from Lebanon of the PLO personnel referred to above does not take place in accord with the agreed and predetermined schedule, the mandate of the MNF will terminate immediately and all MNF personnel will leave Lebanon forthwith” (“Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation From West Beirut,” *Current Policy* No. 415, August 1982, p. 8, par. 8).

Also implicit in this stipulation was that, once the MNF arrived, it would not be in the PLO’s interest for them to leave: If they left, it would be virtually impossible to ever get them back. The PLO, having squandered their one chance to save their necks, would then be left to the tender mercies of Ariel Sharon (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 11C).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the American commander-in-chief in Europe (USCINCEUR), who would have overall responsibility for the Marines participating in the MNF, on August 12 that “You will withdraw on order if the PLO members (civilian and military) do not withdraw as agreed” (JCS cable for Gen. Rogers 111500Z Aug 82, par. 1). The USCINCEUR specified on August 14 that “any PLO noncooperation with preestablished schedule terminates U.S. involvement” (USMC 2, USCINCEUR 141013Z Aug 82).

No contingent: Shultz letter to Begin, 8-7-82, 92224503, p. 3. In the same letter Shultz added that “There is no doubt Mr. Prime Minister that the PLO, for several weeks during this negotiation, sought every means to delay the talks and to avoid a decision to depart. It is now clear, however, that they have made that decision. Ambassador Habib is at present engaged in most urgent and intensive discussions on the operational details of the time and modalities of departure. The period during which many of us shared an understandable concern that the PLO wished to delay and divert the negotiations now belongs to the past. We are in a new phase. The momentum is with our side. The PLO have crossed the Rubicon and have accepted the necessity of departure; they no longer have the strength, the will, or the support to do otherwise. Indeed, their primary consideration now is for safety—both for the combatants who will depart and for those non-combatants who remain behind. The United States has pledged itself to do all it can to ensure that the PLO has a safe passage out of Beirut; the presence of the multinational force will be an important symbol of that assurance” (p. 2).

229-30 Too far along, plan won’t start, the facts: Hill 7-21-94; Shultz, p. 64. Habib’s allusion to Egypt and Syria referred to their delays in agreeing to receive PLO evacuees. The same IDF firing that Habib referred to also troubled Col. Johnston, who cabled his superiors, “Clear that cooperation of Israelis essential for any plan to work. Heavy bombardment of West Beirut presently underway . . . should suggest how accommodating they now appear” (Johnston cable 5219, 08 1630Z Aug 82). Habib sent a follow-up message to Begin via Lewis making the same points while emphasizing that it was not just the PLO who wanted the French MNF contingent in on D-Day: So did the Lebanese government (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 6-7; Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 7). But Begin was unmoved. And while on the subject, he asked, “Why the French?” The French government, he said, was “bitterly hostile” to the Israeli government and to Jews. Israel should never have consented to French participation in the MNF at all, he said. But he stopped short of now vetoing them altogether (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 5, 11B).

This meeting occurred a few hours after Habib read the *Jerusalem Post* article in which Sharon or his associates had anonymously denounced Habib’s plan as a “fraud” and a “piece of trickery” (“Habib accused of conniving to save bulk of PLO forces,” *Jerusalem Post* 8-8-82). In the meeting with Sharon, Habib said nothing about the article. He stuck to the business at hand (Hill 7-21-94). That article is discussed in chapter 10.

Map, not possible: Lewis 8-11-82 cable Tel Aviv 12220, quoted in State 226747, 130526Z Aug 82, par. 2, 4; Habib cable Beirut 05367, 131337Z Aug 82, par. 2

Not convinced, mathematician: Lewis 8-11-82 cable Tel Aviv 12220, quoted in State 226747, 130526Z Aug 82, par. 4; Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 5-7, 11. The “mathematician” quote is adapted from Lewis’ account.

Wazzan wanted the French: Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 4-7. Wazzan quotes adapted from Habib’s account of what he said. Rather than let the deal unravel over the issue of when the French could enter Beirut, Habib in desperation proposed to Washington a contingency fallback idea: Sending 60-75 unarmed French, Italian, and American civilians in on D-Day as monitors (Habib cable Beirut 05367, 131337Z Aug 82, par. 2-3; NEA Veliotes memo to The Secretary, “Habib Fallback,” August 13, 1982, 8224301).State thought the idea stunk. Too dangerous. Congress would revolt. But, equally stuck, Shultz gamely offered to talk to Weinberger and Reagan about sending in a handful of armed Marines on D-Day instead, a prospect that Begin had already rejected (Secretary cable to Habib, 8-13-82, 82038301221; Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 5, 7).

Israeli press: Grove 6-4-94. Lewis says that by late July Begin “began to realize that Sharon was misleading him and carrying out operations without his approval” (Lewis 4-10-94). The tacsat incident gave him something solid to base that feeling on.

Praised: *Jerusalem Post,* 8-8-82. In the same breath, Begin added that Habib’s prospects for success were not bright and never had been.

Fraud and deception: “Who’s in Charge Here?” *Newsweek,* 8-23-82, p. 19; Evron, p. 148, 159 note 1. The next day Begin criticized “certain Christian circles in Lebanon” for dismissing Habib’s plan as a fraud, “an oblique reference which fooled no one that he was directing his ire at Sharon,” writes Lewis (cable Tel Aviv 12068, 091436Z Aug 82, par. 2-3).

Assumption, clean out: Shultz, p. 65; “Begin turns optimistic about PLO withdrawal,” *The New York Times* article in *Clearwater Sun,* 8-9-82

Leg injury, annoyance, let them take: Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 1-4, 10; Shultz, p. 66. Begin first said, “we’ll discuss it in the Cabinet,” but then went ahead and made the decision himself. The strains between Begin and Sharon were evident to Habib and Draper. When they heard on August 9 that Sharon had invited himself to Washington to try to go over Habib’s head, Draper speculated that Begin might be “setting up Sharon for a giant pratfall” (Hill 7-21-94).

We accept, wrap up: Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 1-4, 11; Shultz, p. 67. Begin ended the meeting by asking Lewis to send word to Habib that, if he accepted Begin’s changes, “he had a deal.” If not, Habib should come to Jerusalem to discuss things in person. As always, Begin had a few quibbles about language: He wanted the words “Palestinian” and “died” replaced throughout with “PLO” and “killed,” and wanted Habib’s term for departure day, “D-Day,” replaced with “E-Day” for *evacuation*. Begin didn’t want the plan to carry any echoes of World War Two’s D-Day, a prelude to VE (Victory in Europe) day. He felt the term D-Day in Habib’s plan implied that a PLO “V” day would follow (par. 4; “Habib brings new peace proposals to Israel,” *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-15-82). More substantively, he still objected to any MNF contingent, especially the French, arriving at the beginning of the evacuation.

Sharon has prepared: Hill 7-21-94

Sabotage: “Sharon campaigning against Habib ideas,” by William Claiborne, *The Washington Post* article syndicated in *Spokesman Review,* 8-9-82

Nose, frightened: Shultz, p. 68; Lewis 4-10-94

Argue Begin: Hill 7-21-94

Pleading: Hill 7-21-94; Shultz, p. 67

Virtually apologized, technical realization: Lewis 8-11-82 cable Tel Aviv 12220, quoted in State 226747, 130526Z Aug 82, par. 1, 5-6. The same day, August 11, the Israeli Cabinet approved the Habib plan in principle (Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 225).

Pressure on Tunisia: Dillon ADST oral history; Draper note on draft of this chapter. The other Arab states also pressured Tunisia, in the spirit of *You take them so we don’t have to.* The destination of the PLO headquarters was a crucial issue. Even the Arabs who were willing to take some fighters were adamant that they would not host a PLO headquarters. Besides all the annoying political activity a headquarters would entail, it would also be likely to draw an Israeli attack someday. Who needed that? (Habib cable to Secstate also for action, 6-28-82, “Meeting with President Sarkis, et al, June 28, 1982,” par. 13; Hill 7-12-95; Radio Transmission, Habib to Hill 0800 July 1, 1982, 8218541). Some people proposed Greece for the headquarters, but Habib rejected that (Draper note on draft of this chapter).

Syria had offered to accept the leaders and headquarters, but the leaders adamantly refused to go to Syria. One reason was their certainty that Assad would put them under strict control. Another was Arafat’s preference to live in a moderate Arab state where he would have better access to Western media. And the US, fearing that Assad would use them to start a new conflict, didn’t want them there (Paganelli cable Damascus 04934, 101438Z Jul 82, par. 19, 29; Dillon letter to author 9-11-98; Draper ADST oral history; Draper 5-4-93; Draper 4-13-93; Hill 7-16-94). Some Arab nations were reportedly afraid that Assad would use the PLO to subvert them (“Agreement on Lebanese peace plan reported near,” *The New York Times* article in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-12-82).

So Habib had to find someplace else for the headquarters. He had met with Lebanese leaders on July 1 and heard of Foreign Minister Butros’ suggestion that Arafat and the other PLO leaders go to Tunis (Radio Transmission, Habib to Hill 0800 July 1, 1982, 8218541; Hill 7-10-94; Draper note on draft of this chapter). That would put their headquarters in the same city as the Arab League headquarters, which would be politically prestigious for them. Tunis would also offer them, as Draper said, “the easy living that they all seem to prefer.” The idea stayed in play for the next several weeks, as did many others, but never really got much serious consideration one way or another. In the end, though, that idea turned out to be the breakthrough in Habib’s quest for destinations (NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218795, 7-4-82, “Recorded Radio Report from Habib [*sic,* actually Draper], July 3, 1982,” p. 3; Hill 7-12-95). The headquarters of the Arab League had been moved from Cairo to Tunis in 1979 after Egypt became an outcast among Arabs for signing a peace treaty with Israel.

Advantage of distance: Gowers, p. 212; Dillon 5-9-94

Arab credentials: Draper 9-19-97

Tunisians gave in: Dillon 5-9-94 and Barrett 5-9-94; Shultz, p. 67-68; Draper note on draft of this chapter. Dillon and Barrett say the Tunisians agreed only to take the headquarters and high command. Tunisia wound up taking 1,000 people (Hill 7-23-98). They did, however, arrange to put the PLO out on an isolated cape well away from the center of Tunis and had them pay their own way (Draper 9-19-97).

Became much easier: Dillon 5-9-94; “Mideast talks down to details,” *Clearwater Sun,* 8-11-82

Yemen, confirmed: “PLO’s evacuation a danger to its hosts,” *Clearwater Sun,* 8-13-82. Assad’s biographer explains that “By 10 August, it was clear to Asad that, whether he liked it or not, the Palestinians would soon be forced out of Beirut. . . . [He then] changed his mind and agreed to give refuge in Syria to the bulk of the Beirut evacuees. No doubt he hoped to regain some control over ‘Arafat’s men who blamed Asad for abandoning them and who now in adversity seemed more independent than ever” (Seale, p. 391). Sudan had offered to take the PLO as early as July 27, but Habib was tepid about the offer. He wanted to keep it as a contingency while continuing to focus his energy on the countries with strong, stable governments that he considered most suitable, primarily Egypt (Hill 7-16-94).

Standing idly by, Saudi pressures: Barrett 5-9-94; “The End Game in Beirut,” *Newsweek,* 8-23-82, p. 20; Herzog, p. 352. Habib would have had an even harder time persuading Arab countries to accept PLO evacuees had he not been able to say that the US was committing ground troops to the effort (Smith 6-14-94).

Deeper level: Draper 4-13-93. Saudi Arabia in particular helped break the deadlock. It was out of the question that the Saudis take any Palestinians themselves—in fact, the Saudis tried to prevent their next-door neighbors the Yemenis from taking any lest they sneak across the border. The Saudis were probably responsible for the Syrians taking as many Palestinians as they did (Barrett and Dillon 5-9-94).

Egypt: “Withdrawal Leaves Many Questions,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82

At Yarze briefing: Johnston 12-4-96

Most awesome: Shultz, p. 71; Mikdadi, p. 121; Schiff & Ya’ari cite unofficial statistics of 300 dead (p. 225). Col. Johnston, one of Habib’s Marine liaisons, cited a report of 180,000 shells but adds, “My God, regardless of the numbers, it was unbelievable, the number of air strikes and the artillery rounds that were fired in on West Beirut” (Johnston 12-4-96). A photographer who spent most of the day at the American University Hospital in West Beirut reported that while “dozens and dozens” of civilian casualties, including many burned by phosphorous bombs, had been brought in, only one PLO fighter, whose leg had been hurt in a car accident, was brought in (“Israel rips Beirut; Reagan outraged,” *Los Angeles Times* article in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-13-82).

Smashing Beirut: “The End Game in Beirut,” *Newsweek,* 8-23-82, p. 17

Bombing Berlin: Johnston 12-4-96. *Blitzkrieg* is Johnston’s word.

Wazzan: Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 5-6; Hill 7-21-94. Tense of Wazzan quote adapted from Habib’s account of what he said. The American government was not doing what was necessary to stop the Israelis, Wazzan said. Maybe Habib was doing his job, but Washington was not. “We had placed our total reliance on the US government to put an end to this crisis,” Wazzan said, “and still we are being bombed. Maybe we should transfer our reliance to the United Nations” (Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 4; quote put in first person from Habib’s account).

Habib had asked the PLO to leave, and they had agreed. He had asked the Arabs to take them in, and they had agreed. He had asked Menachem Begin to accept his plan and to exercise restraint so that negotiations could proceed, and Begin had agreed. But still Sharon sent wave after wave of bombers over Beirut. How could Philip Habib—how could the United States—be taken seriously as good-faith negotiators? And where was Ronald Reagan to back up Habib? “Continuing silence from Washington,” Dillon wrote, “will re-enforce the growing conviction here and elsewhere that we are colluding in this massive blitz carried out after the PLO has already agreed to what we have asked.” Wazzan publicly blamed the US (Dillon cable Beirut 05339, 121439Z Aug 82, par. 3-5; Stoessel cable, State 228797, 142019Z Aug 82, par. 4).

Fire his defense minister: Hill 7-21-94

Progressively destroyed, Mother Teresa: Shultz, p. 70

Recommend: Habib interview with Mulcahy; also Habib interview with Parker; Hopkins, p. 57-58, quoting his 1-3-92 interview with Lewis. Reagan was getting the same message from others too, including NSC adviser Bill Clark and Michael Deaver, who threatened to resign unless Reagan told Begin to stop (Cannon, p. 401).

Appalled, already ordered: Lewis 4-10-94; Shultz, p. 70; Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 226; Lewis quoted in Hopkins, p. 57; Lewis ADST oral history; “Excerpts From Interview With Begin,” *The New York Times,* 8-29-82. Reagan tried twice to reach Begin. The first time, at 10 a.m. Washington time, Begin was in a Cabinet meeting and declined to take the call. Fifteen minutes later the US received word that Begin had ordered the bombing halted. Reagan did not finally get through to Begin until 10:45 a.m. Though at the time the White House played the story as though Begin halted the bombing in response to Reagan’s tough phone call, the Israelis (Hill 7-23-94) and Lewis have always hastened to point out that the order had already been issued by the time Reagan got through. Both may be right. Though Begin declined to take Reagan’s first phone call, he would surely have been notified that Reagan was on the line and would surely have figured out why. Word of Reagan’s first, unsuccessful call may well have helped prompt Begin—who did not want to look as though he had bowed to US pressure—to get the order issued before Reagan could call back.

Schiff & Ya’ari reported that Reagan threatened in this phone call to pull Habib out and discontinue American mediation efforts. The Israeli press did report at the time that Lewis had made such a threat to Begin, but Lewis says he did not. He just said that Washington was furious and that Habib couldn’t do his job if the firing didn’t stop (Hill 7-21-94). Other press reports said the threat was in “private messages” between Washington and the Israelis (e.g., “U.S.-Israel relations mendable,” AP article in *Clearwater Sun,*  8-14-82).

Straw: Lewis quoted in Hopkins, p. 57

Furious: Lewis 4-10-94

Looking as if: Shultz, p. 72, citing the analysis of the US embassy in Tel Aviv

Known nothing, might fire: Shultz, p. 71; Lewis’ 1-3-92 interview with Hopkins, quoted in Hopkins, p. 57; Lewis ADST oral history. Despite the Cabinet’s overwhelming disapproval of what he had already done, Sharon pressed to escalate the fighting even more. Begin reportedly replied, “Let me remind you as I reminded your predecessor Ezer Weizman [who had been fired in a policy dispute with Begin] that you are representing the government when you talk to the army and not the other way around” (“Israel rips Beirut; Reagan outraged,” *Los Angeles Times* article in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-13-82). Sharon later insisted that the bombings of August 12 “were not a personal initiative of Arik Sharon. They were decided and approved by the government” (“Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *The Washington Post,* 8-29-82).

Cabinet: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 226-27; *Time* 8-23-82, p. 29; Evron, p. 149; Lewis 4-10-94. In *Newsweek’*s account of the meeting, Begin told Sharon, “Once and for all I want to make clear who is running this government” (“Who’s in Charge Here?” 8-23-82, p. 18). After the meeting, Sharon said he had been trying to defend the lives of IDF soldiers but that the other Cabinet ministers were competing with each other to claim a share of credit for a negotiated settlement (“Israel rips Beirut; Reagan outraged,” *Los Angeles Times* article in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-13-82).

Hardly anyone: For example, Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 225; Seale, p. 388; Shultz, p. 69; even Gabriel, p. 157-58

Because Arafat: “Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *The Washington Post* 8-29-82. In his memoirs, Sharon says simply “I had done what I believed was necessary to bring about a conclusion to this siege” (Sharon, p. 492-93). What finally broke the impasse, Sharon says, happened on the night of August 12: “Philip Habib finally used the kind of whip he had had available to him for weeks. He issued an ultimatum to the PLO. The cease-fire that had been called at the end of the day would last only forty-eight hours, he told them. What might happen afterward was anybody’s guess. They would have to agree to leave now, without any buffer zones and without the multinational force to protect them. When Habib said this, Arafat knew that the end had come. . . . He would get out, he decided that night” (p. 492).

Habib would dispute Sharon’s account. First, there is no way Habib could have given Arafat any such message about forgoing MNF protection. He was not talking to Arafat directly, and his intermediary to Arafat, Prime Minister Wazzan, declined to even *ask* the PLO about such a thing since *he himself and his own army* insisted that the French come in (Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 7; Hill 7-21-94). Indeed, Habib reported on August 13 that the PLO would clearly “continue to insist that there be a French unit of 350 men present on D-Day.” Though he began brainstorming contingency plans in case Israeli intransigence prevailed, Habib himself most certainly had not given up on having a French MNF contingent on the ground on D-Day (Habib cable Beirut 05367, 131337Z Aug 82, par. 2).

Second, there is no hint in Habib’s communications with the State Department on August 12, 13, or 14 that the PLO had just made any major new decisions. As far as he was concerned, the PLO had already firmly and sincerely decided to leave well before August 12 (for example, Shultz letter to Begin, 8-7-82, 92224503, p. 2).

Third, the only available record of Habib talking at this point about a ceasefire lasting forty-eight hours is his report that Wazzan demanded on August 12 that Israel stop shooting for forty-eight hours so he could finish ironing out the details, or else he would stop working at all (Habib cable Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 2, 8).

Fourth, August 12 would hardly have been the first time Habib might have sent word to the PLO that “what might happen [after a ceasefire] was anybody’s guess.” As *The New York Times* says, “Habib always made plain to the Palestinians that he might not be able to restrain the Israelis next time” (“Being Patient Brings Habib Final Victory,” 8-22-82).

Habib’s only available explanation for the August 12 assault was that Sharon “was determined to prove something” (Habib interview with Parker).

Saguy: Hill 7-21-94. The IDF announced that their relentless attack of August 12 was in retaliation for Palestinian shelling the night before. The PLO had indeed done some shelling that night, Dillon reported—*after* three hours of Israeli air raids.“All of this is an old story” by now, wrote Dillon. Israel may be correct that the PLO consistently shoots first; “we are not in a position to judge. [But] it is clear that Palestinian fire is not destroying Beirut. What the Israelis are doing is” (Dillon cable Beirut 05339, 121439Z Aug 82, par. 3-4).

Satisfied, Shamir: “In Lebanon, it’s easier to see the losers than the winners,” *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-12-82

Finally dropped: Shultz memo to the President, August 16, 1982, “Habib Mission: Close to Final Agreement,” 82038400007, p. 1; Hill 7-10-94; “Israel offers concessions on plan for PLO evacuation,” AP and UPI reports in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-16-82. In announcing the Cabinet’s August 15 decision to allow the French in on the first day, Israeli radio gave as the reason a French promise to withdraw its force if the guerrillas tried to back out and use the French forces as a screen. This was the same promise Habib and Shultz had already made multiple times, but Israel considered this French commitment “more specific than a general commitment in the Habib text, which Israel considered sufficient for Italy and the U.S. but not hard enough to remove distrust here of French sympathy for the PLO” (“Israel offers concessions on plan for PLO evacuation,” AP and UPI reports in *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-16-82; “Cabinet okays Habib schedule for PLO exit,” *The Jerusalem Post,* 8-20-82).

Names, ringers: Lewis 8-11-82 cable Tel Aviv 12220, quoted in State 226747, 130526Z Aug 82, par. 9; Shultz memo to the President, August 16, 1982, “Habib Mission: Close to Final Agreement,” 82038400007, p. 1; Sharon, p. 494-95

Punctilious: Habib letter to PLO “U.S. Requirement for Information,” August 11, 1982, in Yuzo 149-50, par. 4; Schneider cable State 232640, 190049Z Aug 82; Djerejian cable Amman 06953, 191126Z Aug 82. Habib thought Jordan “may be too strict on processing” (Hill 7-21-94).

Too disorganized: Djerejian 2-18-97. Draper also reported that the PLO was also afraid to give lists of names (Hill 7-21-94). The press said they refused (e.g., “Habib brings new peace proposals to Israel,” *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-15-82).

Gave up: Shultz memo to the President, August 16, 1982, “Habib Mission: Close to Final Agreement,” 82038400007, p. 1; Lewis ADST oral history says the Cabinet withdrew Sharon’s demand for lists of names August 14.

Djerejian: Djerejian 2-18-97

Foregone: Shultz, p. 72

Twenty million: Hill 7-23-94, Shultz, p. 73

Announce, premature: NEA Veliotes memo to the Secretary, August 19, 1982, “U.S. Reaction to Approval of Habib Plan,” 8224890, handwritten note at top signed “Nick.” Two days before the Israelis signed off, Shultz was advising Reagan to wait until Habib and Lewis gave the “all clear” (Shultz memo to the President, August 17, 1982, “Habib Mission: Focus on Prisoners,” 8224657).

Only candidate: Habib interview with Parker, p. 10; “More P.L.O. Forces Leave West Beirut Despite a Problem,” *The New York Times,* 8-23-82; “What Next for Arafat and the PLO?” *U.S. News & World Report,* 8-30-82. The election was originally scheduled for August 19, but was postponed to August 23.

Quorum, one government, had it out: “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib August 19, 1982 at 1400 hours,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8-19-82, 8225401, p. 1-3; Hill 7-23-94; Shultz, p. 75-76. The Syrians, Habib said, were “threatening in a most crude way members of the Parliament not to come” (p. 2). Bashir’s faction owned part of the port (Draper 12-22-94). Punctuation altered and italics added for clarity. There is no available record of exactly what Habib actually said to Bashir August 19; parts of this argument are inferred from what Habib told Hill he was *going to say* to Bashir as soon as he finished talking to Hill (“Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib August 19, 1982 at 1400 hours,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8-19-82, 8225401).

Dreamed up: Draper 12-22-94; Hill 7-23-94; “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib August 19, 1982 at 1400 hours,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8-19-82, 8225401, p. 4; Shultz, p. 76). Habib had also arranged pressure on Bashir from the Israelis. Draper emphasizes that the real audience for this show was Bashir’s men, because “he didn’t have complete control of all those nuts. This was designed in part to *get* control.” It was designed also “to make good the US pledge that the Palestinian evacuees would not be attacked that that the stay-behinds and families would be safe,” Draper says. “This was one of Phil’s most clever ploys, in my opinion, but it was also strictly sincere in its overall objective” (Draper note on draft of this chapter).

Now you know: “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib August 19, 1982 at 1400 hours,” NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8-19-82, 8225401, p. 4. Punctuation altered for clarity.

Announced the deal: “Presidential Statement on the Occasion of Agreement on Plan for Resolution of West Beirut Crisis,” 82038600305; Hill 7-23-94; Hill cable State 234464, 201710Z Aug 82, par. 2; “Reagan Orders Marines to Beirut To Oversee Withdrawal by P.L.O.,” *The New York Times,* 8-21-82

Resolution: H. Con. Res. 397; State 234810, 202127Z Aug 82

Nobel: Percy letter in State 235111, 210017Z Aug 82; excerpts in “Habib Is Nominated For Nobel Peace Prize,” *The New York Times,* 8-21-82. Habib was again nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in January 1983 by Chief Justice Warren Burger and by the majority and minority leaders of the US Senate and the minority leader of the House. The dates on those letters say January 1982, but Tom Miller, a protégé of Habib’s who spearheaded the nomination effort and wrote both letters, says the date should be January 1983 (Burger letter January 15, 1982, to Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee; Baker, Byrd, and Michel letter January 26, 1982, to Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee; email to the author from Tom Miller 11-11-01).

One last demand: Cobban in McDermott, p. 214

Bashir’s assurances: Hill 7-21-94

American assurances: For example, Habib’s 8-4-82 letter to the PLO, par. 10 and 13 point 8, in Yuzo, p. 147-48; Habib’s 8-6-82 letter to the PLO, par. 6, in Yuzo, p. 148-49; and Paganelli cable Damascus 04934, 101438Z Jul 82, par. 9

Signed off on rules: Crocker 4-25-94

United States will provide: Excerpt from the final text of Habib’s plan, “Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation from West Beirut,” *Current Policy* No. 415, August 1982, p. 8, par. 4. Here is an excerpt of the letter drafted by Draper and signed by Habib August 19 to make American assurances official:

On the basis of [assurances from the Government of Israel], the United States Government is confident that the Government of Israel will not interfere with the implementation of the plan for the departure from Lebanon of the PLO leadership, offices and combatants in Beirut in a manner which will

(A) assure the safety of such departing personnel;

(B) assure the safety of other persons in the area [i.e., Palestinian civilians]; and

(C) further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.

I would also like to assure you that the United States Government fully recognizes the importance of these assurances from the Government of Israel and that my government will do its utmost to ensure that the assurances are scrupulously observed.

(Habib letter to His Excellency Shafiq Al Wazzan, President of the Council of Ministers, Republic of Lebanon, August 19, 1982; provided by Milton Viorst of *The Washington Post*; printed in Yuzo, p. 154; Draper note on draft of this chapter.) The letter was addressed to Wazzan even though its intended audience was the PLO. A variation on these words was included in the final wording of Habib’s departure plan. In that plan, Habib also reiterated that “the United States will provide its guarantees on the basis of assurances received from the Government of Israel and from the leadership of certain Lebanese groups with which it has been in touch” (US Department of State *Current Policy No. 415,* “Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation from West Beirut,” August 1982, p. 9). Draper (12-22-94) says that “certain Lebanese groups” is a euphemism for the Christians, specifically Bashir Gemayel.

I’m your protection: Barrett 5-9-94

Bashir and Wazzan meetings in library: Dillon ADST oral history; Dillon 10-30-98 and 5-9-94. Dillon hastens to add that he did *not* interpret Bashir’s wry smile to mean *I’ll lie today and butcher them tomorrow.* Though Dillon doesn’t remember the exact date of the phone call, he says it was just before the evacuation began.

This phone call could be interpreted as yet another in Arafat’s long string of evasions and vacillations about whether the PLO would leave. It can also be read as a powerful indictment of the common practice of righteously refusing to talk to one’s adversary. Arafat had conveyed to Habib multiple times over the past seven weeks his willingness to quit Beirut: Habib had taken those offers seriously, Sharon had dismissed each as a lie. Sharon firmly believed that Arafat would make a genuine decision to leave only after Sharon pounded him to within an inch of his life. Sharon believed Arafat finally made that decision only on the night of August 12, after IDF bombing had reached its horrific crescendo (Sharon, p. 492-93). Yet here was Arafat at least a week later—at least a week after the bombs stopped—still indecisive, but nudged over the edge in short order by Habib’s and Wazzan’s arguments.

Though Habib had avoided negotiating over the telephone before, this was not really a negotiation as much as a reiteration of things everyone already knew. And at the eleventh hour and fifty-ninth minute, there was no time for the usual routine of Wazzan shuttling back and forth between Habib and Arafat carrying written messages.

Captured, remains, too late: Shultz memo to the President, August 17, 1982, “Habib Mission: Focus on Prisoners,” 8224657, p. 1; Habib letter to PLO “U.S. Requirement for Information,” August 11, 1982, in Yuzo, p. 149-50; Johnston cable Beirut 5529, 191655Z Aug 82, par. 2A; “PLO, Lebanon make new demands,” *Clearwater Sun,* 8-15-82; “Habib brings new peace proposals to Israel,” *St. Petersburg Times,* 8-15-82. One of the captives was a pilot shot down on the first day of the invasion; the other had been taken from his observation post August 16 (“P.L.O., Set to Pull Out, Frees 2 Israelis,” *The New York Times,* 8-21-82). Some press reports incorrectly said that all nine of the soldiers were killed in 1978. The Israelis were willing to consider trading the 300-or-so Syrian POWs they held for the one pilot Syria held (Shultz, p. 73). Begin originally said he would withhold final acceptance of the Habib plan until the pilot and the remains were returned; on August 15 he went ahead and accepted the plan but said it could not be implemented until they were returned.

US was concerned: Habib 8-18-82 cable Beirut 5490, quoted in State 233655, 192321Z Aug 82. The letter was addressed to Wazzan, but its audience was the PLO. Within a week, Israel started releasing “sizable” numbers of the 7,000 Palestinian and other detainees it had held in southern Lebanon since the invasion began. The Israelis declined to specify a reason for the release, saying the timing of the release was “a pure coincidence” (“Israelis Say Some Seized in Lebanon Are Being Freed,” *The New York Times,* 8-26-82). A State Department official said four months later that the prisoners discussed in Habib’s letter got little attention at the department. He could not cite any specific American intercession on their behalf (“America’s Broken Pledge to the PLO,” *The Washington Post,* 12-19-82).

Bodies on Shabbat: Hill 7-23-94; Draper 4-13-93; Draper note on draft of this chapter; “For 2 Israelis, Ordeal Ends Amid Smiles,” *The New York Times,* 8-21-82. Jewish law prohibits touching the dead on the Sabbath (“P.L.O., Set to Pull Out, Frees 2 Israelis,” *The New York Times,* 8-21-82). The two captives were released around 5:15 p.m.

Breakthrough: Sharon, p. 492-93; *Commentary,* “Lebanon, The Case for the War,” 10-82; Hill 7-12-95; Dillon 5-9-94; Schiff and Ya’ari, p. 224; Seale, p. 391; Bavly & Salpeter, p. 108-9; Cobban in McDermott, p. 214-16. See note “Because Arafat” above for a quote of and remarks about Sharon’s explanation of what finally broke the impasse.

**Chapter 14: Sail Away**

Heavy superstructure: “P.L.O. Starts One-Way Trip Out of West Beirut,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82

French arrive: “P.L.O. Troops Begin Pullout in Beirut; French Enter City,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82; “French Paratroopers Land at Beirut Port—City is Reviving,” *The New York k Times,* 8-21-82; Sehulster 12-10-01; Fisk, p. 336; “P.L.O., Set to Pull Out, Frees 2 Israelis, *The New York Times,* 8-21-82. The plan for the LAF to secure the port prior to the arrival of the French was decided on August 17 (Johnston cable Beirut 5462, 171550Z Aug 82, par. 1A). A few days later, *The New York Times* reported that the Israelis were displeased about “the tardy arrival of the Lebanese the first day—they were said to have overslept” (“Israelis Complain That Guerrillas Are Being Allowed to Violate Pact,” *The New York Times,* 8-24-82).

Tenuous: Johnston 12-4-96

Amphitheater: Johnston cable Beirut 5462, 171550Z Aug 82

Could snipe: According to a source who asked not to be identified by name

Barged, fingers: Habib interview with Tueni

Spiffed up: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 227; “P.L.O. Troops Begin Pullout in Beirut; French Enter City,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82

PLO looks like: Hill 7-23-94. Among the criticisms of the IDF often voiced by American Marines working with Habib is that the IDF soldiers were unkempt (e.g., Johnston 12-4-96; Mead 6-5-94).

As they rode: “P.L.O. Troops Begin Pullout in Beirut; French Enter City,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82

Noise, bullets: “More P.L.O. Forces Leave West Beirut Despite a Problem,” *The New York Times,* 8-23-82; “West Beirut Bids Farewell to P.L.O.,” *The New York Times,* 8-23-82. These casualty figures are just for the first day of the evacuation.

Today 397: Habib cable Beirut 05921, 012000Z Sep 82; “P.L.O., Set to Pull Out, Frees 2 Israelis,” *The New York Times,* 8-21-82; “P.L.O. Troops Begin Pullout in Beirut; French Enter City,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82; Fisk, p. 334

Obstructing: Shultz, p. 78

PLO has lost: “P.L.O. Troops Begin Pullout in Beirut; French Enter City,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82

Gift: “Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *The Washington Post,* 8-29-82

Spokesman: “P.L.O. Troops Begin Pullout in Beirut; French Enter City,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82

Expulsion medal: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 227. Sharon’s first association with yellow was the yellow stars that the Nazis forced Jews to wear.

Pretty good: Draper 5-4-93

Jeeps, no more vehicles: Gaucher 5-15-94; Lewis’ 8-22-82 cable Tel Aviv 12774, quoted in State 237229, 240516Z Aug 82; “More P.L.O. Forces Leave West Beirut Despite a Problem,” *The New York Times,* 8-23-82. Gaucher recalled 10-12 jeeps, Lewis’ cable said 13, and news reports at the time said 20 or 21. Lewis’ cable doesn’t say whether the French found any weapons. Schiff & Ya’ari (p. 228) say that French troops had removed RPGs hidden inside the jeeps. Habib’s call sign corrected per an FSO at Yarze who asked not to be identified by name.

Begin was furious: Shultz, p. 78; Hill 7-23-94

New era: Lewis 8-22-82 cable Tel Aviv 12774, quoted in State 237229, 240516Z Aug 82

Dot and comma, simple solution: Habib cable Beirut 05599, 221055Z Aug 82, par. 2-5; Lewis 8-22-82 cable Tel Aviv 12774, quoted in State 237229, 240516Z Aug 82; Hill 7-23-94. An Israeli official said, “Maybe a jeep is not a weapon. But they’ve also been taking RPG rocket launchers, and perhaps they will try for a Sagger [missile] and then they have a real weapon, perhaps to be followed by a cannon and a tank” (“Israelis Complain That Guerrillas Are Being Allowed to Violate Pact,” *The New York Times,* 8-24-82). He was willing to bar jeeps from future voyages, but was not willing to disrupt momentum by unloading these.

Matter of face: Lewis 8-22-82 cable Tel Aviv 12774, quoted in State 237229, 240516Z Aug 82; Hill 7-23-94

Tell Israel, there’s no way, would be escorting: Shultz, p. 78-79; Hill 7-23-94; Lewis ADST oral history

We thought: Lewis ADST oral history

9 p.m., a year later: Shultz, p. 79; a diplomat who asked not to be identified by name; “Lebanon Assembly Elects a Rightist to the Presidency,” *The New York Times,* 8-24-82; “Israelis Complain That Guerrillas Are Being Allowed to Violate Pact,” *The New York Times,* 8-24-82. Habib’s plan called for all movements to occur during daylight hours. The jeeps continued to collect dust in a warehouse for many years longer.

I want escorts: Johnston 12-4-96; Johnston cable Beirut 5560, 201640Z Aug 82, par. 5; a diplomat who asked not to be identified by name. A French gunboat had escorted the first ship out on August 21 (“P.L.O. Troops Begin Pullout in Beirut; French Enter City,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82). This actually was not the first time the subject had come up. When told August 10 that the US might provide Navy escorts for evacuation ships, Begin responded, “Against whom? Us?” But he did not object (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 6). The American military was alerted to prepare for the *contingency* of escorting ships (USCINCEUR cable to JCS, 141013Z Aug 82, par. B2C2A), but as of August 21 the Secretary of Defense was still saying that it would provide escorts “if asked to do so” (SECDEF cable 210006Z Aug 82, A49).

Eyeball distance, very presence: Johnston 12-17-98. The Israeli gunboats were a couple of miles offshore, but Johnston says, “two miles doesn’t look like much at sea.”

Sharon instructed: Schiff in McDermott & Skjelsbaek, p. 200

I want two: Smith 6-14-94 and 11-25-96; Johnston 12-17-98. Habib quote compiled from Smith’s two tellings of the same episode. As a precaution against the Israelis sinking the evacuation ships, Habib had arranged to have five Greek soldiers aboard each voyage (according to an official involved who asked not to be identified by name). Mead (11-25-96) says that what Habib requested was “precisely the right thing to do” in the situation. The PLO was not the only one thinking about Israeli strikes on evacuees. *The New York Times* quoted an Israeli woman saying, “We should shoot down their planes when they leave Cyprus” (“West Beirut Siege Is Affecting Israelis’ Self-Image,” 8-23-82).

Asked Begin to withdraw, macho: Lewis ADST oral history

Brief statement, almost caused: Lewis ADST oral history

Crew-served: Dillon letter to the author 9-11-98

One individual: “Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation From West Beirut,” *Current Policy* No. 415, August 1982, par. 17, p. 9. Among the many reasons for not letting the PLO take more weaponry was that the ship captains were nervous about having weapons aboard their ships.

Captains: According to a participant who asked not to be identified by name

RPGs, objected: Habib interview with Tueni; Smith 6-14-94. “What the hell do you mean, ‘Not an individual weapon,’” said PLO negotiator Abu Walid. “That’s how they’re armed: A man carries either an automatic rifle or he carries an RPG” (interview with Tueni).

Might consider: Habib cable Beirut 05703, 251845Z Aug 82, par. 4

Authorized twelve: Hill 7-23-94.

*Alkyon* and RPGs: Johnston 12-4-96 and 12-17-98; Hill 7-23-94; Frank, p. 18. Kabuki is a highly stylized ancient Japanese theatrical form. Johnston may have taken someone else aboard with him. Whatever procedures may have been in place before, once the 800 US Marines landed on August 25, no RPGs were allowed on any ship. Each evacuee was checked to make sure he carried no unauthorized weapons. When one PLO fighter on August 25 refused to give up his RPG, Lebanese soldiers simply blocked his access to the ship until he gave it up (Hammel, p. 23-24).

The Israelis complained also that the PLO was not turning its heavy weapons over to the LAF as Habib’s plan required. They were right. The PLO instead did exactly what the Lebanese government had always feared: They gave most of the weapons that they couldn’t sell or carry out to leftist Muslim guerrillas of West Beirut with whom they had previously fought side by side (“New Withdrawal Goes Without a Hitch,” *The New York Times,* 8-26-82; “Israeli Worry: Arms Given to Leftists,” *The New York Times,* 8-31-82; DIA Washington DC//JSI-5A// memo to USCINCEUR VIAHINGEN GE 202204Z Aug 82, par. 2D). The Israelis complained that the PLO had not turned over any heavy weapons to the LAF. Draper reminded them that “the LAF didn’t really want the heavy weapons,” but he and Habib then leaned on Lebanese officials to get moving on it (Habib cable Beirut 5687, 260712Z Aug 82, par. 6; Habib cable Beirut 5703, 260715Z Aug 82, par 6). A convoy of Syrian civilian trucks was due in to pick up the first batch of overland evacuees, and Sharon tried to use the lack of arms surrenders “as an excuse” to keep that convoy out. Habib got Sharon to OK the convoy in exchange for Habib’s promise to work hard on the matter. Habib had the French check the incoming trucks to assuage Israeli concerns that the trucks might be bringing in weapons (Habib cable Beirut 5721, 280925Z Aug 82, par. 4, 6; Habib cable Beirut 05703, 251845Z Aug 82, par. 4, 6).

Trojan horse: Lewis 4-10-94

Scheming to leave: Lewis 8-22-82 cable Tel Aviv 12774, quoted in State 237229, 240516Z Aug 82, par. 5; “Israelis Complain That Guerrillas Are Being Allowed to Violate Pact,” *The New York Times,* 8-24-82. Though the Israelis had withdrawn their demand for identities in mid-August, they resurrected the demand once the evacuation began (Shultz memo to the President, August 16, 1982, “Habib Mission: Close to Final Agreement,” 82038400007, p. 1; Lewis ADST oral history, says the Cabinet withdrew Sharon’s demand for lists of names August 14).

Processing of evacuees, tables: Johnston 12-17-98; Frank, p. 17; Hammel, p. 24

Poor verification, best: Hill 7-23-82; “Israelis Complain That Guerrillas Are Being Allowed to Violate Pact,” *The New York Times,* 8-24-82

Madhouse: Habib interview with Tueni; “P.L.O. Starts One-Way Trip Out of West Beirut,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82; “Israel Pledges to Take Steps For a General Mideast Peace,” *The New York Times,* 8-23-82). Most PLO fighters had a nom de guerre beginning with “Abu,” which is Arabic for “father of” (“To Fend Off Cabin Fever, Long Walks [at the Mall],” *The New York Times,* 10-23-98). Arafat, for instance, was known as Abu Ammar (e.g., Fisk, p. 330).

Definitions: Habib cable Beirut 05921, 012000Z Sep 82. The Israelis claimed that some women and children were going out disguised as men “to confuse the numbers” (“Israelis Complain That Guerrillas Are Being Allowed to Violate Pact,” *The New York Times,* 8-24-82).

Pakistanis: Gaucher 5-15-94; note to author by Dillon 1-25-99; diplomat who asked not to be identified by name; Fisk, p. 295, says the PLO had its share of Third World military trainees.

Legionnaires: Dillon ADST oral history

Elect a president: Mikdadi, p. 74. Examples of Habib’s involvement are discussions he had with Bashir and with Sa’eb Salaam July 30 about the Muslims’ vehement objections to Bashir’s candidacy (Habib cable Beirut 04979, 301430Z Jul 82). Habib had proposed to President Sarkis that he stay on for an extra year, until after things settled down, but Sarkis was too sick and exhausted (Dean 5-12-94). The election was a longstanding concern of Habib’s and everyone else’s. It figured strongly in some of his discussions in 1981. A few days before the invasion began, Habib had dinner in New York with his friend Ghassan Tueni, the Lebanese ambassador to the UN, for the express purpose of picking Tueni’s brain about who the next president of Lebanon might be. “I detected then that he was not as anti-Bashir Gemayel as I thought he would be,” says Tueni, who describes himself as having been “violently against Bashir” (Tueni 11-15-95). Dillon (11-5-96) perceived that, once the evacuation had moved from concept to reality, Habib was even more interested in the election than in the hour-by-hour operations of the evacuation.

If anyone, all of Lebanon: Dillon 11-16-96 and 11-5-96, ADST oral history; Draper 12-22-94. Though, as events turned out, there was no opportunity to really test the authenticity of the changes of heart that Habib and Dillon saw in Bashir, the few indications that there are do tend to support it. Bashir certainly had disappointed the Israelis throughout the siege by refusing to do what they expected of him. And when Begin pressed him in early September to quickly sign a peace treaty with Israel, Bashir refused (e.g., Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 233-36). After the election, Bashir’s statements were conciliatory (“New Withdrawal Goes Without a Hitch,” *The New York Times,* 8-26-82). Habib and Sarkis arranged for him to meet with Sa’ab Salaam and other Muslim leaders and he “more or less made his peace” with them, says Ghassan Tueni (11-15-95). Lewis says that by September 14 Bashir “had begun a healing process to bring all the various factions together and had by this time managed to gather considerable popular support from both the Muslims and the Christians” (Lewis ADST oral history).

Worsen: Habib cable Beirut 04979, 301430Z Jul 82; Mikdadi, p. 74; “Christians Clash With Syrian Units on Lebanese Road,” *The New York Times,* 8-25-82

Anathema: Tueni 11-15-95. One reason suggested for the timing of Sharon’s invasion of Lebanon is that “the deed had to be done before Lebanon’s presidential elections,” i.e., to ensure that Bashir won (Seale, p. 374, 385). Indeed, clearing the way for that election was prominent in Sharon’s first conversation with Habib about it, December 5, 1981 (Brown cable Tel Aviv 18681, 051155 Dec 81).

Thinking that Saudi views would carry weight with Lebanese Muslims, Habib arranged for Bashir to fly secretly to Saudi Arabia to try to enlist their support (or at least quiet their opposition). Habib’s argument was that, while Bashir certainly had been in cahoots with the Israelis lately, he had been in cahoots earlier with the Syrians and was now ready to be his own man (Tueni 11-15-95) This support was important, says one Lebanese official, “because the fact that Phil Habib was behind this carried credibility with those who knew Phil, and particularly Arabs.” The Saudis warned Bashir to keep his distance from the Israelis, but agreed to mute their opposition (Tueni 11-15-95; Fisk, p. 279; Bavly, p. 101; Pakradouni, p. 247). Bashir made this trip to Saudi Arabia at the beginning of July. Bashir and the Syrians had been allies in 1975-76 but then Bashir found it more expedient to ally himself with the Israelis (“Victor in Lebanon Assailed in Syria,” *The New York Times,* 8-24-82).

Delighted: Smith 6-21-94. Seale writes that, after winning, Bashir paid a courtesy call first on outgoing president Sarkis and then on Habib, “who he knew had softened Muslim opposition to him and saved him from total dependence on Israel” (Seale, p. 389).

Celebrated: Smith 6-21-94. One person who was not celebrating was Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. He had always feared that Bashir would have him killed. After the election, Habib arranged for Ryan Crocker to drive Walid through Israeli lines, Bashir’s lines, and Syrian lines to safety. He then slipped out of the country and flew to Paris (Crocker 4-28-94; Tueni 11-15-95).

Unit refused: The Palestinian unit in question, the PLA, considered the LAF too pro-Christian and feared that, if they turned their positions over to the LAF, the LAF would then allow in one of their Christian enemies, the Kataeb (i.e., Phalange) militia (Shultz, p. 80).

Needed more soldiers: Habib cable Beirut 5723, 271246Z Aug 82, par. 7. Habib’s plan originally called for the US Marines and the rest of the MNF to land “approximately” August 26-28. The Israelis wanted to keep them out as long as possible, but Habib decided he needed more bodies by August 25. “Israel will object to our coming in before 50 percent are gone,” Habib said, “but you can’t *get* 50 percent out without the MNF in here” (Hill 7-23-94).

Sehulster driving, tacsat, pushing the button: Sehulster 6-23-94 and 11-24-96; Hill 7-23-94. Habib had been unavailable when Sehulster got back from his tour, so Draper had already reported Sehulster’s observations to Washington before Habib learned of them. Habib thought that Shultz, after seeing the report, would go along with his request (letter from Sehulster to the author 1-12-97). In the end, the French and the LAF deployed along the Green Line.

Can’t just sit, galled: Shultz, p. 80-81; Sehulster 6-23-94; Hill 7-23-94. The Marines on the ground agreed with Habib, says Mead, and shared his embarrassment at being restricted to the port while the French and Italians were out around town (Mead 6-5-94). But it was not their decision to make. Mead said that “I had received only three orders during the whole operation. [They] were to go in, to stay off the Green Line, and to come out!” (Frank, p. 21).

I won’t accept: Hill 7-23-94; Shultz, p. 80-81

Livid, furor: Shultz, p. 81. Sharon finally approved deployment of the French at the checkpoints along the Green Line August 25 (Hill 7-23-94).

Get the president: Hill 7-23-94. Sharon eventually agreed to allow the French to join the LAF along the Green Line (Habib cable Beirut 5723, 271246Z Aug 82, par. 3-4).

Disclose the locations: “Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation From West Beirut,” Current Policy No. 415, August 1982, par. 19, p. 9

Gotta find out, drive a car: Smith 6-14-94 and 6-21-94; Draper 9-19-97. Smith’s only real scare was when he heard an oddly familiar sound approaching from another street and looked up to see a World War Two Russian T34 tank, controlled by one of the city’s militias, clanking around the corner toward him. Only in Beirut.

Waiting to greet marines: Sehulster 7-12-94; an FSO at Yarze who asked not to be identified by name. Sehulster vaguely recalls that that the reason for holding Habib back was the Marines’ need to keep the actual landing simple, and Habib’s security entourage was a complication they could do without. The FSO vaguely recalls that the reason was that the first Marines ashore would be the grunts, and that there wouldn’t be any commander ashore at first to greet Habib.

Habib at port: Sehulster 7-12-94; Mead 11-25-96; Mead 6-5-94

Three tanks, allow to stay: Mead 6-5-94 and 12-6-98; Draper 5-4-93; Johnston 12-4-96 and 12-17-98; Sehulster 12-7-98; Habib interview with Tueni. “Menacing” is Sehulster’s word. Mead, the Marine commander on the ground, says the corporal acted on his own but had Mead’s full support. Quite apart from whatever threat the tanks posed to the ships and evacuees—and recollections vary on whether they posed a threat—Mead felt that their presence around the Marines compromised the neutrality that was the Marines’ only real weapon. “The port was ours,” he says. “They were supposed to have been the hell out of there. Then they were abrasive as normal. So from the first day, we said, ‘Wrong-o. You’re not going to do that to the United States Marines, because here’s what you agreed to. Your word is no good, but with us it better be good.’” Everyone who tells this story has a different recollection of how it ended. The ending written is based mostly on Johnston’s account. Habib had by this time returned to Yarze, so his talks with the Israelis were not in person.

Cabbage: Mead 6-5-94

IDF gagged: Lewis ADST oral history

Incandescent: This diplomat asked not to be identified by name

Hand grenades: Johnston 12-17-98

Instructed the Marines: Frank, p. 17

Johnston-PLO meetings: Johnston 12-17-98. Johnston was later a general.

Showmanship, Fiats: Johnston 12-4-96; Smith 6-14-94; Habib interview with Tueni

His feelings: Draper 5-4-93. A week before the evacuation began, the American military expected about 7,000 combatants to be evacuated (USCINCEUR cable to JCS, 141013Z Aug 82, par. B2). About double that number went out.

Nearly every day: Mead 6-5-94

Fielding problems: Draper 5-4-93

Taxi driver: “Israelis Watching on TV Wonder if It Is All Over,” *The New York Times,* 8-22-82; Draper 4-13-93 and 5-4-93. There are enough differences between Draper’s account and the *Times’* account that they could possibly be describing two separate incidents.

Amal itself captured: Habib cable Beirut 05918, 011630Z Sep 82. Habib encouraged Berri to tell his followers that, with Lebanon now turning a new page in its history, the time for revenge and retribution was over. He sent word to the Israelis to keep sightseers and journalists out of West Beirut. He declined to tell anybody who his source was for the information about the fate of the eighteen men.

Details, brave: Sources who asked not to be identified by name. Many ship owners declined before one in Cyprus agreed to charter his old ships, which one participant describes as “rust buckets,” for a hefty price.

Anxiety: This source asked not to be identified by name.

Over their shoulders: Smith 6-14-94; Draper 5-4-93; and another colleague of Habib’s who asked not to be identified by name. The operation’s better ships were available because late August was toward the end of the Mediterranean cruising season, and the war in Lebanon had cut into their business by scaring off would-be tourists. The Saudis paid for the ships and the other costs of the evacuation.

Two-thirds, mattresses: A colleague of Habib’s who asked not to be identified by name

Workhorse, Sudan: Habib cable Beirut [no number available], 261905Z Aug 82

Standby: Habib cable Beirut 5766, 280817Z Aug 82; an official who asked not to be identified by name

Certified: Habib cable Beirut 5845, 301938Z Aug 82, par. 6

Equipped: Yuzo, p. 159

*Flora,* compromise: Draper 5-4-93; Habib cable Beirut 5721, 280925Z Aug 82, par. 8; Habib cable Beirut 5687, 260712Z Aug 82, par. 6; Habib cable Beirut 05703, 251845Z Aug 82, par. 6; Habib cable Beirut 05922, 012010Z Sep 82, par. 3; Habib 8-23-82 cable Beirut 5647, quoted in State 236898, 232316Z Aug 82; Habib cable Beirut 5877, 021006Z Sep 82

Radiated, whoops: Crocker 4-28-94

Phone Marge: “A quiet Belmont man is the hero in Beirut,” *Peninsula Times Tribune,* 8-28-82; Marjorie Habib 11-18-98

All business: Hill 7-19-95

Looked awful, twenty-two-hour, hides: This source asked not to be identified by name; Hill 7-23-94

Special treatment, Arab solution, re-equip: Hill 7-21-94; Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 1-4, 10; Shultz memo to the President, August 16, 1982, “Habib Mission: Close to Final Agreement,” 82038400007, p. 1; Habib 7-24-92 cable Jidda 5532, quoted in State 206640 TOSEC 110050, 250019Z Jul 82. Officially, the Syrian troops were in Lebanon not as the Syrian army per se, but as the Arab Defense Forces, i.e., the Arab League’s designated military presence in Lebanon.

Burdensome: Habib cable Beirut 5766, 280817Z Aug 82 (par. 5).

Idiot lecture: This FSO asked not to be identified by name; Schiff and Ya’ari, p. 109-160, particularly 137, 159-60

First convoy: The first convoy was supposed to have left a few days earlier, but fighting along that highway forced Habib to put several batches of Syria-bound evacuees on ships instead. This meant that a lot of evacuees were arriving in an entirely different part of the country from where the Syrians had been set up to receive them. Habib worried whether Syria would continue to accept more shiploads. But things had settled down enough by the 27th to start the trucks rolling (“Israelis Say Some Seized in Lebanon Are Being Freed” and “600 Guerrillas in Al Fatah Force Reach Syrian Port,” *The New York Times,* 8-26-82; Habib cable Beirut 5766, 280817Z Aug 82). There were conflicting accounts of who was fighting whom along the route: The Israelis and Phalange each said the other was fighting the Syrians. Sea voyages were simpler and quicker. Doing more sea voyages enabled Habib to finish the evacuation two days ahead of schedule.

Gunner: An observer who asked not to be identified by name; Sehulster letter to author 1-22-99

Thumbing: Transcript “Recorded radio conversation between Mr. Eagleburger and Amb. Habib, July 7/82, 0900 hours” 8218991, p. 5. At the time of this discussion, it was undecided whether the PLO would be leaving by land or by sea. So the discussion was couched in terms of what would happen if the PLO (and, by implication, other evacuees) went out by land.

Kimche: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 9218993, 7-7-82, “Recorded Radio Conversation with Amb. Habib, July 7, 1982, at 1420 hours,” p. 3. At a meeting Habib had with Kimche and Sharon the next day, that assurance was reiterated (Hill 7-10-94).

Became part: “Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation From West Beirut,” *Current Policy No. 415*, August 1982, par. 16, p. 9

Finger, squad car: Hill 7-23-94; Shultz, p. 82; Habib interview with Tueni; “Syrian-Led Force Quits West Beirut” and “First Guerrilla Land Convoy Welcomed Warmly in Syria,” *The New York Times*, 8-28-82. *The* *Times* reports that at least one group of IDF soldiers along the route did move out of sight as the convoy went by, though some took off their uniforms and changed into slacks and sports shirts to stand at the roadside and watch. The Israelis brought militia leader Major Sa’ad Haddad, who had acted as the Israelis’ surrogate in southern Lebanon for six years, up to Beirut to watch on August 30. He stood at Hazmiye Circle giving each group of passing Syrians the finger (Fisk, p. 349; *Time,* 9-6-82, p. 32). The records and memories are unclear on whether the flags were out on just one occasion or two and whether it was during the first convoy and/or second.

Flags, tank battalion, deliberate, absolutely refusing: Hill 7-23-94; Lee 10-2-94; Smith 6-14-94; Sehulster 12-7-98; Seale, p. 389, citing his interview with Habib 9-27-86; Habib interview with Tueni. Sharon’s rationale, Habib inferred, was that he was not going to have his troops hide, and that he wanted his troops to see their enemy in person. Habib’s plan originally called for the IDF to “vacate” the route when the convoys passed, but he reluctantly agreed to change the wording to “clear” the route on condition that the Israelis honor Kimche’s agreement that the IDF be “out of sight” along the road (Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 3). This change was Lewis’ recommendation.

On August 18 Habib’s MNF liaisons met with their IDF liaison officers to go over various particulars, including that the IDF would be “out of sight” (Johnston cable Beirut 5485, 181530Z Aug 82, par. 1). Draper reported on August 26, the day before the first convoy moved, that “we now had an absolute commitment from the Israelis that when the convoys leave Beirut there will be . . . no Israelis in view from the road” (Habib cable Beirut 5712, 261531Z Aug 82, par. 4). An IDF spokesman reiterated the same day, August 26, that the evacuees would not be able to see Israelis along the way. Habib reportedly conveyed to Lebanese leaders the same day Sharon’s further assurances that there would be no Phalangists along the highway (“Overland Pullout of P.L.O. Is Scheduled to Start Today,” *The New York Times,* 8-27-82).

Though the IDF presence along the route clearly violated the spirit of Habib’s understanding with the Israelis, it may have capitalized on a loophole in the letter of the final text of the plan, which talks about *PLO* (not PLA or Syrian) overland convoys: “In those instances when convoys of departing PLO personnel pass through positions of the Israeli Defense Forces, whether in the Beirut area or elsewhere in Lebanon, the Israeli Defense Forces will clear the route for the temporary period in which the convoy is running” (“Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation From West Beirut,” *Current Policy No. 415*, August 1982, par. 16, p. 9).

Confronting commanders, lightened: Smith 6-14-94; Hill 7-23-94. Palestinian and Syrian evacuees did have to drive by some flags and IDF soldiers. Some evacuees made obscene gestures at them, others smiled and waved, some Israelis waved back (Fisk, p. 347).

Galerie Samaan: Gaucher 5-15-94

At this stage: Sehulster 12-7-98

Mossad, Drori: Sehulster 7-12-94 and 12-7-98. A few days earlier, Drori had told Habib and Draper he was concerned that the PLO intended to give the Syrians a lot of its vehicles and heavy equipment to take out and hold for them to reclaim later. Draper reminded Drori of “Sharon’s view that PLO equipment was better out of Beirut by whatever means than to remain behind.” Drori “reluctantly accepted” that answer at the time, Habib wrote (Habib cable Beirut 5687, 260712Z Aug 82, par. 6). Sehulster adds that it’s one thing to sort out a problem like this at the staging area, but once an evacuation actually begins, any interruption is a major *dis*ruption that can easily be the end of it. He doesn’t remember whether any vehicles were ever actually pulled out or not. Habib had never seen any reason to thank people for doing their jobs.

Sent word, stuck with: Hill 7-23-94; Shultz, p. 81; Yuzo, p. 159-60. American defense intelligence said that “Arafat has demonstrated the ability to maintain internal discipline and to move quickly and ruthlessly against those who act against his wishes.” They also believed that, if Arafat were assassinated, the evacuation would probably collapse (DIA Washington DC//JSI-5A// memo to USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE 202204Z Aug 82, par. 2B and 3).

Expulsion going: “The Marines Have Landed,” *Time,* 9-6-82

Responsible, watch over: Hill 7-23-94; Habib interview with Tueni. Arafat’s ship was not the first to travel with Greek troops aboard. They went along on earlier voyages as well (according to an FSO who asked not to be identified by name).

I won’t change, Arafat’s jeeps: Shultz, p. 82; Hill 7-23-94 and 7-19-95

Instructions: Mead 6-5-94

Wazzan, tricolor: Johnston 12-17-98; Habib cable Beirut 05884, 010743Z Sep 82; Fisk, p. 347-48; “P.L.O. Leader Is Mobbed By Well-Wishers at Port,” *The New York Times,* 8-31-82; Randal, p. 271; Salem, p. 62

Habib resented: Gaucher 5-15-94. Henry had made a similarly effusive display of greeting Sharon a week or two earlier (Johnston 12-4-96 and 12-17-98).

Obviously: Habib cable Beirut 05884, 010743Z Sep 82

Checkpoint 54: Johnston 12-17-98; Frank, p. 18; Habib cable Beirut 05884, 010743Z Sep 82; Mead letter to author 1-19-99. Why were so few Marines assigned to such a crucial and potentially volatile task as receiving Arafat? Understated strength was part of the Marines’ whole psychology strategy on this mission: A large force at the gate might have been interpreted as a sign that the Marines were intimidated and might have inspired the crowd to respond aggressively. Besides, the dozen could load their weapons in a flash and had plenty of big sticks close at hand if needed (Sehulster letter to author 1-22-99; Johnston 12-17-98). Mead adds that Checkpoint 54 was by design quite narrow and therefore did not require more than a dozen Marines to staff it.

Lost somewhere, led Arafat’s limo: Fisk, p. 347-48; Johnston 12-17-98; Frank, p. 18; “P.L.O. Leader Is Mobbed By Well-Wishers at Port,” *The New York Times,* 8-31-82. Henry told Johnston that Draper had agreed to their being there. Johnston got Draper on the walkie-talkie, saying he knew nothing about any such agreement and that the excessive number of French forces were creating a problem (Frank, p. 18). A series of empty large steel cargo boxes lined the route that Arafat would travel from Checkpoint 54 to the ship. Though the Marines had no idea who had put those boxes there or why, the boxes had the value of blocking the line of fire that any sniper outside of the port would have. But when Johnston and Mead reconnoitered the route at 4 a.m. in advance of Arafat’s arrival, they discovered that some of the boxes had been removed, opening up a superb line of fire. The Marines immediately closed those gaps (Mead letter to author 1-19-99; Johnston 12-17-98).

Brook no stunts: Johnston 12-17-98

Crosshairs: Gilbert, p. 508. Sharon would later say he regretted not killing Arafat at this moment (“Sharon is Sorry Israel Didn’t Kill Arafat in the 80’s,” *The New York Times,* 2-1-02). Johnston (12-17-98) says, “Had they chosen to pick off Arafat then, it would not have played well with their US allies, if you want to say we were allies in any sense of the word. It would not have been a smart move while Arafat was within our control to have some Israeli knock him off.”

*Mediterranean Sun:* Habib cable Beirut 05895, 011109Z Sep 82

Statistics: Habib cable Beirut 05921, 012000Z Sep 82. Technically, the Syrians were considered Arab Defense Forces.

Half-again more: Draper 5-4-93. Sharon had said only a few days earlier that “the PLO terrorists were ten thousand only, with the Syrians included” (“Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *The Washington Post,* 8-29-82), yet Habib had evacuated a total of 14,738 Palestinian and Syrian fighters (Habib cable Beirut 05921, 012000Z Sep 82). A week before the evacuation began, the American military expected about 7,000 combatants to be evacuated (USCINCEUR cable to JCS, 141013Z Aug 82,par. B2). The Israelis didn’t think he would get more than 12,000 evacuated all told (Draper 5-4-93).

Tens of thousands: Habib interview with the author in *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984

Not my baby: NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8219693, “Telcon with Habib July 10, 1082 - 1058, p. 5; Hill 7-21-94; Rabb cable Rome 20143, 031740Z Sep 82, par. 15. There are conflicting indications in the record and conflicting recollections among Habib’s colleagues about what role, if any, he expected to have after the evacuation was complete. His only firm plans were some naps, some golf, and attending Bashir’s inauguration. Draper would take his place at least for a while. Being retired, he was working for the government on this mission without pay in part because he was just delighted to be active and in part because accepting pay from the State Department might have affected his medical disability pension. The State Department did reimburse him $7,186 in expenses for 1982 (Marjorie Habib 2-27-93; Habib’s 1982 tax papers).

Heading now: Smith 6-21-94. Smith bowdlerized his account, quoting Habib saying “blanking business.”

Came swarming, dinner and dancing: Draper 5-4-93; Pascoe 6-4-94

Walked lighter: Grove 6-4-94

Order of Cedars: Dillon 11-16-96 and 5-9-94; Pakradouni, p. 255; Parker 11-3-96; Habib interview with the author 12-21-83 transcript p. 61. Parker, for one, had received the medal when he ended his term as US ambassador to Lebanon in 1978, and Dillon would receive it when his term ended in 1983. Pakradouni quotes Sarkis’ view of Habib’s plan, but does not specify when Sarkis articulated it.

**Chapter 15: Baking Stones**

Phil pulled off: Shultz 9-16-93

Miracles in the Middle East: Draper 12-22-94

Objections, two weeks early: Draper 5-4-93; Mead 6-5-94; Dillon 11-5-96. The Lebanese wanted them to stay longer; Washington wanted them out sooner. Habib resisted both tugs (Draper 12-2-94; Draper 5-4-93; Mead 6-5-94; Hill 7-23-94). The final plan called for the MNF to depart Beirut “not later than 30 days after arrival” (US Department of State *Current Policy* No. 415,August 1982, “Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuaton from West Beirut,” p. 7). Habib had said in a 1976 speech that, when the American military was necessary in hot spots to reduce tensions, “We should be careful not to increase the chance of war by a premature withdrawal” (*Charleston* [South Carolina] *News & Courier,* 1-31-76).

Hill 7-23-94. There is a suggestion that Habib may have gone with September 10 just to keep the Defense Department from picking an even earlier date. Once resigned to a September 10 pullout, Habib expressed it as a recommendation (Draper cable Beirut 5959, 031735Z Sep 82; Rome 20044, 031041Z Sep 82; Veliotes memo to Eagleburger, September 3, 1982, 85D251 7516), which Draper calls a tactical move (Draper 12-18-94 and 12-22-94). Draper and Lt. Col. Sehulster observed in early September that the city showed promising signs of returning to normal (Beirut 6021, 041217Z Sep 82; Beirut 5989, 031250Z Sep 82), which suggested that maybe September 10 might not be premature after all. Draper adds that he was instructed by Eagleburger to tell the French and Italians that all three contingents of the MNF would be moving out on the seventeenth day. The French ambassador was upset (Draper note on draft of this chapter).

Bomb killed Bashir: Dillon ADST oral history; Schiff and Ya’ari, p. 247; Friedman, p. 157-59. No one knows for sure on whose behalf the assassin acted. Though everyone was suspected—even the Israelis and Bashir’s own people—the strongest evidence points to Syria (Draper 5-4-93; Dillon ADST oral history).

Guns blazing: Draper cable Beirut 06289, 152105Z Sep 82; Draper ADST oral history; Draper 5-4-93 and 12-18-94. The Kahan Commission reports fire coming from Sabra and Shatila as the IDF advanced on them, but apparently most of the shooting that Draper observed was by the IDF. Sharon phoned Begin from near the camps around 10 a.m. and told him there was “no resistance in Beirut.” He and his top aides drafted an announcement that “the entry of the I.D.F. forces was executed without resistance” (Kahan, p. 9).

2,500 terrorists: Tel Aviv 13962, 162033Z Sep 82, par. 7-13, 16; Sharon, p. 500; Lewis ADST oral history; Pintak, p. 78. Israeli intelligence had reported in August that the PLO was planning to leave behind thousands of fighters (Lewis 8-22-82 cable Tel Aviv 12774, quoted in State 237229, 240516Z Aug 82, par. 5; Sharon, p. 494-95; “Israelis Complain That Guerrillas Are Being Allowed to Violate Pact,” *The New York Times,* 8-24-82); it now believed they had in fact done so. Technically, Sabra was a neighborhood, in the center of which was a refugee camp called Shatila (Dillon ADST oral history). But they are both generally referred to as camps. Even the term *camp* is somewhat misleading, since these were not collections of tents but built-up residential neighborhoods.

Tel Aviv 13962, 162033Z Sep 82, par. 7-8 (in par. 13 Eitan raises the number to 5,000; in par. 15 Draper notes that “by Mossad’s own admission there were no significant third echelon PLO leaders left behind, as had been anticipated”); the Americans considered those numbers “highly inflated” (Pintak, p. 78); Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 259; Kahan, p. 7; Sharon, 494. See Fisk, pp. 359-70, particularly 369, on the IDF’s conviction that terrorists were in the camps. Sharon (p. 504, 507) emphasizes that the IDF had instructed the Phalangists that “the mission was only against [the terrorists]. Civilian residents, they were specifically instructed, were not to be harmed.” Khalidi writes that “it requires an assumption of gross incompetence on the part of Israeli military intelligence to believe that the IDF did not know that there were no P.L.O. fighters there. In fact, as is acknowledged by most sources, there were none” (p. 179). Habib said Sharon “had a pretty broad definition of fighting men, including the political cadre” (Khalidi, p. 172). There were reports that another of Israel’s allies, Major Sa’ad Haddad, also participated in the massacre. The Kahan Commission concluded that those reports were false (Kahan, p. 24).

Reneged: This is all discussed in chapter 4, “We Corner Them, You Kill Them.” As applied to this immediate context, see Sharon, p. 501-2, and Kahan, p. 8, 14, 27. It wasn’t that the Phalange blamed the PLO for killing Bashir. There was no more reason to suspect the PLO than any other group. They blamed the Palestinians for ruining Lebanon long before Bashir got killed. His death was just a pretext for doing what they had long been itching to do.

Killings in camps: Schiff & Ya’ari, 258-82; Fisk, p. 357-72; Beirut 06353, 181201Z Sep 82; Draper cable Beirut 06369, 181652Z Sep 82; Kahan, p. 12-23; Friedman, p. 159-66; Seale, p. 392; Randal, p. 15-16; Sharon, p. 500-5

No terrorists: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 262; Kahan, p. 13, quotes slightly different wording; Dillon ADST oral history; also Draper ADST oral history. This is not to say there were no Palestinian fighters at all. There had been gunfire coming from the camps earlier, and Kahan (p. 12) reports some shooting at the Phalangists once they entered. Schiff & Ya’ari (p. 257) cite IDF soldiers on the scene as having “estimated that a few dozen Palestinian fighters were probably involved in the exchanges of fire, and that there may have been up to 200 armed men in the camps.” Kahan, p. 11, says that at the time the Phalangists entered the camps, “there were armed terrorist forces in the camps. We cannot establish the extent of these forces” but believes they were stay-behinds.

Sharon, p. 508, cites Phalangist reports that “they were facing stiff resistance and had suffered casualties” in what Sharon assumed was “a street battle with the PLO.” But the IDF intelligence officer on the scene reported a few hours after the operation began, “The impression is that fighting is not too serious. [The Phalangists] have casualties, as you know—two wounded, one in the leg and one in the hand” (Kahan, p. 13). The Phalange claimed casualties of only two dead and 40 wounded (Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 272). They claimed hundreds of terrorists killed, but the evidence did not back up their claim that those people killed were terrorists in any meaningful sense of the word.

Estimates: Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 282; Dillon ADST oral history; Kahan, p. 21. The IDF estimated 700-800. The PLO estimated 3,500. Dillon’s estimate is 1,500. The Phalangists, anxious to hide evidence, used a bulldozer to dig pits to dump the bodies in and carted other bodies away in trucks (Kahan, p. 21)

Terrace: Fisk, p. 372

Devastated: According to Habib’s friends (“Reagan’s Remarkable Mideast Man,” *San Francisco Chronicle,* 2-22-83)

Signed this paper: Fisk, p. 372. Nonetheless, Habib always maintained that the extent of his commitments had been exaggerated by the PLO (Lewis ADST oral history).

Given assurances, deceived: Habib cable Amman 08129, 281006Z Sep 82, par. 8. Though Habib’s assurances had consisted mostly of reporting the assurances he had received from Begin and Bashir, he had indeed gone further, using the words *US guarantees,* and even going so far as to say *“I* am your protection!” (Barrett 5-9-94). The text of Habib’s letter about guarantees of safety for Palestinian civilians left behind is in the endnotes for chapter 13, “The Endgame.”

The following is part of a working paper that Habib sent to the PLO on August 3, 1982: “Regarding U.S. Government guarantees as regards security for the departing Palestinian forces *along with the security of the camps*. Comment: We [the U.S.] will provide these guarantees” (cited in Davis R. Robinson memo to The Deputy Secretary, “U.S. Responsibilities Concerning the Protection of Civilians in the Beirut Area,” Oct. 18, 1982, attached to memo from NEA Veliotes to The Deputy Secretary, Oct. 22, 1982, 85D251 7517, p. 10; emphasis and bracketed clarification added by author of this memo).

Killer: Seale, p. 392, citing his September 27, 1984, interview with Habib. George Shultz said, “The brutal fact is, we are partially responsible. We took the Israelis and the Lebanese at their word” (Shultz, p. 105).

Sharon felt no such responsibility. Ironically, though he never tired of chiding Philip Habib for naïveté, Sharon would claim naïveté of his own to defend his use of the Phalange. Though Sharon knew that “in past years both Palestinians and Arab Christians had committed far more terrible slaughters on each other,” he claimed “there had not, however, been any real anxiety that [the Phalangists] would act improperly” after the IDF “explicitly told [them] to avoid harming civilians” (Sharon, p. 507-10) The Kahan Commission, the Israeli panel appointed to investigate the massacre, found it “impossible to justify the Minister of Defense’s disregard of the danger of a massacre” (Kahan, p. 32). It dismissed “the routine warnings that I.D.F. commanders issued to the Phalangists” not to harm civilians as “the same kind as were routinely issued to I.D.F. troops” and found those instructions “could not have had any concrete effect” (Kahan, p. 33).

Though his own military intelligence branch regarded the Phalange as “unreliable” (Kahan, p. 7), Sharon claims to have believed that the caliber of men he was sending into the camps could be trusted to follow IDF instructions to “be careful in their identification of the PLO terrorists” as they selected whom to shoot (Sharon, p. 504, 507-8; Kahan, p. 11, 13; also Schiff & Ya’ari, p. 257).

Though Begin believed that “after the assassination of Bashir, their beloved leader, the Phalangists would take revenge on the Muslims” (Kahan, p. 22), Sharon claims “the simple fact was that no one had foreseen the danger” (Sharon, p. 516, 507; Kahan, p. 27, 32). Begin’s preceding sentence was that he had told the Chief of Staff “that we must seize positions precisely to protect the Muslims from the vengeance of the Phalangists.” In his memoirs, Sharon explains his lack of concern on the fact that everyone knew Bashir had not been killed by a Palestinian. Therefore, he reasoned, the Phalange should have no reason to wreak revenge on Palestinians and “no one had batted an eye at the idea of sending in the Phalangists” (p. 507; see also Kahan, p. 22 and 27). But it was not at all certain in the hours and days following the assassination whom the bomber was working for. Indeed, it is still not. Two and a half weeks after the bombing, Habib speculated that the PLO or someone else might have been behind it (Rome 22562, 051748Z Oct 82, par. 7).

Regardless of who thought who had killed Bashir, the Phalange had wanted revenge against Palestinians for various wrongs for years before Bashir was assassinated. Khalidi writes that “the barbarities against the camp population” were what “virtually everyone in Lebanon fully expected if Israel’s Phalangist allies were allowed to have their way. . . . No Israeli official who had had anything to do with the Phalangists could possibly have had any illusions as to what they would do if introduced into a Palestinian refugee camp; moreover, the historical record was full of bloody examples” (p. 176, 178). Fisk quotes an IDF colonel having said earlier “our problem is going to be stopping the Phalange going in to west Beirut and settling old scores” (p. 354). Of the IDF’s instructions to the Phalange to conduct themselves honorably in the camps, Schiff & Ya’ari write (p. 257) that “such repeated warnings would seem to indicate, especially in light of the Phalange’s known record of atrocities, that the senior military men in the field were wary of their intentions from the start.” Other than having authorized the Phalange’s operation and getting confirmation that it had begun, Ariel Sharon is conspicuously absent from accounts of the IDF’s dealings with the Phalange just before and during the massacre. While it was proceding, Sharon kept himself busy far away in Israel (Sharon, p. 504-6).

For various views of Habib’s share of the responsibility, see Randal, p. 275-77; Beinin 10-30-93; “Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World,” Appendix B in Norton, p. 171; Pintak, p. 80.

Send Marines back: Shultz, p. 109; Shultz 7-25-94

Gravitas: Hill 7-19-95; Shultz 7-25-94

Drove home the urgency: Damascus 07136, 022222Z Oct 82, par. 6. He also worried that “the longer the forces are where they are, the greater the chances of an incident which could set back the whole process” (Habib cable Damascus 07144, 031038Z Oct 82, par. 8). Indeed, on the same day he was writing that cable, an ambush killed six Israeli soldiers and wounded 22, prompting Begin to threaten a strong retaliation (Draper cable Jerusalem 03039, 052253Z Oct 82, par. 6).

Informal understandings: Habib interviews with Parker and Mulcahy; cable Rome 22562, 051748Z Oct 82, par. 5; Draper 4-25-93 and 5-4-93; Kreczko 10-6-93; Seale, p. 404. Informal understandings are appropriate in the Middle East, says Veliotes, because they let “you deal with constructive hypocrisy: People deny things but they go ahead and do them” (Veliotes 4-29-93).

Technicalities of transportation: Habib cable Damascus 07155, 031914Z Oct 82, par. 5, 10; Habib/Draper cable Damascus 07153, 031537Z Oct 82, par. 10

Assad’s position, one day after: Habib interviews with Parker and Dusclaud; Habib cable Damascus 07155, 031914Z Oct 82; Habib cable Damascus 07135, 022121Z Oct 82, par. 5; Damascus 07136, 022222Z Oct 82, par. 6; Salem, p. 65-66, 71, 76; Secto 13032, 011822Z Oct 82, par. 6. Habib said that, when he presented to Assad US goals including a Lebanon free of all external forces, Assad “told me that they corresponded exactly with the wishes of Syria and that he didn’t want to maintain armed troops in Lebanon—troops which are not necessary to the defense of his interests” (also Habib cable Damascus 07135, 022121Z Oct 82, par. 4). Shar’a said that massacres could be prevented by forming a national unity government in Lebanon and disarming the militias (Secto 13032, 011822Z Oct 82).

Full justification: Habib interview with Parker; also Habib interview with Mulcahy; Salem, p. 72-73

Political futures: Habib cable Rome 27001, 021716Z Dec 82, par. 4

Second Arab country: Kadashai 6-19-95

Shunning: Salem, p. 50. Lebanese foreign minister Elie Salem writes further that “we could not, on our own, normalize relations with Israel. Lebanon was not Egypt. . . . To us the question of normalizing relations was an existential one; it threatened our national unity, our relations with our Arab brethren, and ultimately our existence” (Salem, p. 50). Also Habib cable Jerusalem 00672, 271554Z Feb 83, par. 15.

Satrapy: Hill 7-9-94. Others used the term *North Bank* to refer to Israel’s designs on Lebanon (e.g., Shultz, p. 200, 219).

Scuttle September 1 plan: Draper 4-25-93

Nicknames: “Who Lost Lebanon?” *Los Angeles Times,* 3-11-84

Description of Amin: Crocker 4-28-94; Dillon ADST oral history. Crocker’s criticism of Amin’s entourage does not apply to his actual top officials, such as foreign minister Elie Salem, upon whom Habib bestowed his ultimate compliment of “professional.”

Habib formulated a plan: Habib cable Rome 27001, 021716Z Dec 82, par. 8; Acting Secretary Dam memo to the President, “Withdrawal of External Forces from Lebanon,” 85D251 7517, 12-8-82; Veliotes memo to Acting Secretary Dam, 12-10-82, “Your Meeting and Luncheon with Foreign Minister Elie Salem of Lebanon, 11:00 a.m., Tuesday, December 14,” section 2. Habib was not the sole author of the plan he had in his pocket. Major contributors included Draper, Ned Walker (special assistant to Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam), and legal adviser Alan Kreczko. Shultz of course signed off on it (Krezcko 10-6-93).

Account of Jerusalem meeting, number one rule, blindsided, amateurs, pigeon: Jerusalem 03815, 162257Z Dec 82; Habib interviews with Mulcahy and Parker; Kreczko 10-6-93; Draper 4-25-93; Parker, p. 259-60, note 11; Salem, p. 41-42; Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984; Habib interview with Donald Stokes, Stanford University News Service, 2-8-79. The deal was a complete surprise to Habib, but less so to Draper. Some months earlier, Amin had told Draper he wanted a representative of his own to talk to the Israelis. “So I said sure, go ahead,” says Draper. “But I didn’t know he’d send some dummy there to talk to the Israelis and let them walk all over him.” While Draper knew that secret talks were going on—he had in fact helped arrange the earliest talks—he did not know they had produced an agreement (Draper 4-25-93; Tueni 11-15-95). Draper, who knew Marun, describes him as “incredibly naïve” about diplomacy and says he would walk alone into meetings “with twenty or thirty Israelis all shouting at him and telling him what to do. The Israelis felt they had an absolute doormat, which they did” (Draper 4-25-93).

Laughing: Draper 4-25-93. Kreczko (10-6-93) adds, “They just loved one-upping Phil.” *The Jerusalem Post* (12-20-82) reported that Sharon’s disclosure of his “framework agreement” set off a “sense of near-jubilation that has pervaded official Jerusalem. . . . In the initial flush of triumph in Sharon’s circles over the framework agreement there was some crowing over the Americans having been ‘taken by surprise.’” Draper suspects that Sharon’s tactic of surprise was payback for the US having surprised Israel with Reagan’s September 1 peace initiative (Draper 4-25-93).

Give Habib a copy: Jerusalem 03815, 162257Z Dec 82, par. 11

Wormed: Habib interview with Parker

Resembled Habib’s plan: Jerusalem 03815, 162257Z Dec 82, par. 12; Habib stressed that the paper was “not bad” (Habib/Draper cable Beirut 09489 171752Z Dec 82, par. 18).

Because of the way: Draper 4-25-93; Paganelli 11-2-96. Shultz often said that, while the US favored peace treaties between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors including Lebanon, a “peace treaty at gunpoint is no peace treaty” (e.g., Secto 13032, 011822Z Oct 82, par. 7). That this agreement had been imposed at gunpoint is indicated by the presence of Israeli troops occupying much of Lebanon and surrounding Beirut and by the fact that the deal had been negotiated not by Israel’s diplomats or foreign minister but by its defense minister.

Forfeited: Parker, p. 185

Habib encounter with Amin: Habib interview with Parker; Parker, p. 185; Habib’s interview with Mulcahy; Krezcko 10-6-93; Habib/Draper cable Beirut 09489 171752Z Dec 82. Amin had told Draper on October 8 that he wanted “everything that Lebanon does to fit within a US-designed package plan” (Draper cable Beirut 07040, 081745Z Oct 82, par. 2A). Draper accompanied Habib into the meeting with Amin “since I had okayed secret talks when Amin approached me. I had to go in with Phil to make sure Amin told the truth” (Draper note on draft of this chapter).

The Israelis leaked word of the paper right after their meeting with Habib. He wrote that “Israeli leaks are causing great difficulties” in Beirut (Habib cable Beirut 09455, 171515Z Dec 82). The paper had in fact been signed by Marun, but not by Amin (Tueni 11-15-95).

Salem’s part in meeting: Salem, p. 41-43. On October 8 Amin confided to Draper that he had two representatives (not including Marun) meeting secretly with the Israelis to discuss the future of Lebanese-Israeli relations. He asked Draper “to be discreet” about those talks since his new foreign minister, Salem, “will know something about that channel but not all” (Draper cable Beirut 07040, 081745Z Oct 82, par. 2B-C).

Changed everything: Habib interview with Parker

Stuck with it: Kreczko 10-6-93

Basis: Habib letter to Reagan, Jerusalem 03839, 182146Z Dec 82. Leaping to the front of the parade, Habib treated Sharon’s secret paper as a major step forward and repeatedly urged Begin to keep up the momentum by getting the formal talks started within a few days and finished within one week (Habib cable Jerusalem 03845, 190953Z Dec 82; Habib cable Jerusalem 03849, 191946Z Dec 82).

Quibbling: Parker, p. 179

Pickles: Parker, p. 185. Draper says pickles were just used as an example for trade generally.

Held his nose: Habib interview with Mulcahy; Habib interview with Parker; Tueni 11-15-95; Paganelli 11-2-96; Kreczko 10-6-93; Draper 5-4-93; Veliotes 4-29-93 and 5-6-93; Weinberger 10-27-93. Of Habib’s colleagues interviewed for this book, nearly all agree that he just went along with the negotiations as a good soldier because it was Shultz’ policy and the only game in town. Shultz (7-25-94) perceived Habib to be fully on board. Charlie Hill’s perception was that Habib did become an enthusiastic believer in this negotiation “because as it emerged, it really was potentially a treaty of peace like the Israel-Egypt treaty. It really would have gotten the Israelis out of Lebanon” (Hill 7-17-93). Ghassan Tueni (11-15-95), the coordinator of the Lebanese negotiating effort who became a close friend of Habib’s, says bluntly, “He was just being a good soldier. He never thought it was going to go through.”

Rarely attended: Parker, p. 185

Feces at airport: Smith 6-14-94; Gaucher 5-15-94; Sehulster 7-12-94; Mead 6-5-94. Beirut resident Jean Said Makdisi (p. 190) describes feces as the IDF’s “trademark . . . a ghastly joke, symbol of an overriding contempt” that they left behind “wherever they had been.” She writes that, when the Israelis left any area in Lebanon, returning residents routinely found feces on furniture and school desks and clothes, in books and bathtubs and washing machines. Petran, p. 19, says the IDF had a practice of leaving heaps of their excrement in Palestinian cultural and other institutions, homes, and offices. Mead and Smith interpreted the piles of feces as just a sign of abysmal basic soldiering: using their own sleeping quarters as a latrine. They say that minimal standards of basic soldiering would dictate having an outdoor latrine within the secured perimeter so soldiers could use it safely. As Smith and Mead read the evidence, though, the Israelis did not patrol their perimeter at night. Instead, they just locked themselves inside. With no extended protection, they didn’t want to expose themselves to danger by going out to use an open-air latrine. So they just did their business inside their quarters. Mead says his patrols later encountered the same conditions often when coming upon quarters elsewhere that IDF soldiers had just left.

Bomblets: Smith 6-14-94. He adds that the IDF had left bomblets scattered into the suburbs of Sabra and Shatila and the refugee areas north of the airport. Another Marine described the US sector of responsibility as “inundated with unexploded ordnance” (cable BLT Two Slant Eight 050900Z Nov 82). The first Marine killed in Beirut died while clearing bomblets at the airport.

Habib encounter with Mead, reconnaissance by fire, next patrol: Mead 6-5-94; Beirut 01077, 281636Z Jan 83, par. 10-11; Frank, p. 44; Long Commission, p. 30. Dillon ADST oral history refers to “the Israeli fondness for clearing the roads with machine guns.” Sehulster (7-12-94) adds, “Yes, there was taunting all the time by [the IDF]. Just arrogance and belligerence.” A Marine commander complained to Gen. Drori about “the danger of locking and loading weapons in confrontation with US Marines, as IDF members had done on at least one occasion” (Beirut 01077, 281636Z Jan 83, par. 11).

Sue Dillon: Sue Dillon, 5-9-94

Slump incident: Sehulster 7-12-94

Pass out incident: Mead 6-5-94. Habib’s cardiologist says (Cheitlin 3-10-01) that what he was experiencing was probably ventricular tachycardia, an episode in which the heart starts beating so fast that it empties. With no more blood coming out, blood pressure drops, and the person faints. Usually the episode soon stops by itself and the person comes to. If the episode continues for long, though, the person dies. Habib never reported this incident to Dr. Cheitlin. Ventricular tachycardia is one kind of arrhythmia. Habib would eventually die from a different kind of arrhythmia.

Virtually a prisoner, grim: Bider 4-24-93

Fame: Bider 4-24-93 and 4-26-93; Kim 9-21-93. Habib usually travelled under the alias P. Harris. For variety, Habib, a mediocre golfer, sometimes travelled under the name Jack Palmer, an ironic combination of Jack Nicklas and Arnold Palmer (State 343274, 100143Z Dec 82; TWA ticket stub in Habib’s home office).

Palace meeting: Salem, p. 75; Draper 5-4-93; Habib testimony, “Review of Adequacy . . . ,” p. 358. Draper recalls hearing that there was a fire at the embassy and that only later did he and Habib learn it had in fact been a bomb. Salem, who was also in the meeting with Habib and Draper, recalls that the first news was in fact of a car bomb.

Most massive car bomb: Long Commission, p. 30; Crocker 4-25-94. Bombs in parked cars were nothing new, and the embassy had precautions in place against parked cars. But kamikaze drivers were a novelty that the embassy was ill-prepared for (Dillon ADST oral history). This was the first violent indication that America was wearing out its welcome in Lebanon and that Habib’s efforts were becoming counterproductive (Long Commission, p. 47; Lewis ADST oral history; Kreczko 5-11-64).

Description of embassy bombing scene: Draper 5-4-93; Dillon ADST oral history; Dillon, “Caught in the Crossfire,” *Duke* magazine, May-June 1986; Pintak, p. 103-04

63 killed: Seale, p. 406

Bloodiest: Wright, p. 16

Hezbollah: Dillon ADST oral history; Draper 5-4-93; Dillon in Dammarell, p. 54-56; Pintak, p. 103-4. An American official who asked not to be identified by name confides that Syrian intelligence had “culpability.”

Visited next day: *The New York Times,* 4-20-83; Draper 5-4-93. Any visit by a VIP to a disaster scene, such as Shultz’ visit to the embassy six days later, complicates matters (Dammarell, p. 65, 120).

First American inside: Crocker 4-28-94; Dillon ADST oral history

Crocker-Habib encounter: Crocker 4-28-94; Dillon letter to the author 5-17-01

Shultz came: Shultz 7-25-94. Neither he nor Al Haig had visited this important region in well over a year. Habib later said that “by the time the negotiations were finished, they weren’t worth the paper they were written on, because they obviously couldn’t be implemented” (Habib interview with Mulcahy). Kreczko (10-6-93) recalls Habib believing at the time that there was no chance of convincing Assad to withdraw under the circumstances. Draper says that in the days before the agreement was signed, “Phil told me privately and repeatedly we should give up (‘scrap’) the draft final version and start all over again” (Draper note to author received 8-11-01).

Side letter, veto: Shultz, p. 221; Veliotes 6-3-01; Kreczko 10-6-93; Salem, p. 92-93; Draper cable Tel Aviv 06574, 151841Z May 83, par. 4. At least as early as April 14 the Israelis had raised the stipulation that the agreement’s provision about Israeli withdrawal should be conditioned upon the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Habib suggested putting it “elsewhere in the package of documents” rather than in the main text (Habib cable Beirut 04097, 141525Z Apr 83, par. 6C). But the Lebanese rejected that condition, on the grounds that they had no control over what the Syrians and PLO did and that Lebanon’s agreement with Israel was an entirely separate matter. “We never considered the agreement to be conditioned on” that stipulation, Salem writes (p. 92-93). Habib had counseled the Lebanese that “Lebanon had to decide its own limits, and could not grant Syria a veto over its negotiating positions” (Habib and Draper cable Beirut 03426, 291214Z Mar 83, par. 11).

Shultz had believed all along that Saudi pressure was the key to getting Syria to withdraw. And he and Habib hoped Assad’s posture was tactical and that he would change his mind. But neither Saudi nor American efforts to influence him were any match for Assad’s implacable opposition (Salem, p. 99).

Die of neglect: The Americans certainly believed that was their purpose in stalling before the formal negotiations began. The Lebanese believed it during the negotiations (Haddad, p. 90; Habib and Draper cable Beirut 03426, 291214Z Mar 83, par. 3). Habib told Amin March 26 he doubted that the Israelis were “delaying the Lebanese negotiations simply to keep [King] Hussein out of the peace process”—a choice of words that leaves a lot unspoken (Beirut 03349, 261832Z Mar 83, par. 11). Ghassan Tueni, the coordinator of Lebanon’s negotiating effort, says, “I don’t think the Israelis wanted the May 17 agreement. They wanted the signature; they didn’t want it applied. They knew all along it couldn’t be implemented” (11-15-95). A hundred days into the negotiations and over seven months after Reagan proposed the September 1 plan, Jordan’s King Hussein, the pivotal figure on whom the whole plan depended, announced that he would not play the role that it envisioned for him (Teicher, p. 225). With his departure from the game, the long-moribund plan was finally dead.

Run out my string: Habib interview with the author, *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1984. In his interview with Dusclaud as well (p. 4) Habib portrayed his offer of resignation as immediate after Assad rejected him. He may not in fact have offered it until some time later.

Successes and failures, speculation: Habib interview with Parker. The US policy objectives he was following had been the same all along:

1. Withdrawal of all foreign forces, period

2. Arrangements to assure the security of Israel’s northern border

3. Restoration of a stable government in Lebanon

4. Extension of Lebanese sovereignty throughout its territory

5. Arrangements to assure the security of all residents in Lebanon, including the Palestinians.

**Chapter 16: Denouement**

Pessimists: Quoted in Arias, p. 74

Civil war worse: Crocker 4-25-94

Unilateral withdrawal: Veliotes 5-6-93; Shultz, p. 221-23; Veliotes 5-6-93

Marines at airport: With the IDF withdrawal from the Shouf, the Marines’ reason for being at the airport no longer applied. The airport was just *west* of Sidon Road, a major highway. Lt. Col. Charlie Smith, who scouted out potential locations for the Marines in mid-August before they came back, had wanted the higher ground on a ridge overlooking that highway to the *east.* But the IDF insisted on continuing to use the highway to supply its troops in the Beirut area. Draper did not want Marines perched above the highway, because the Lebanese Muslims would object that they were protecting the IDF convoys. So Draper told Smith the Marines would have to set up at the airport instead (Smith 6-14-94 and 6-21-94; Draper 5-4-93; Frank, p. 24-26). Frank, p. 25-26, incorrectly identifies Habib as the one who told Smith that (Smith 6-21-94).

Training LAF: Habib cable London 05972, 192138Z Mar 83, par. 9

Partisan prop, McFarlane, participants: Cannon, p. 418-22; Long, p. 31-32, 40-42, 46, 60; “Who Lost Lebanon?” *Los Angeles Times,* 3-11-84. Smith (6-14-94) says that the main value the Lebanese factions saw in the MNF II was protection from the Israelis. Once the IDF had pulled out of the Beirut area, the local factions had no further use for the MNF.

To a limited extent, the Marines had become targets early in 1983. But as Habib put it in mid-April, “the Lebanese knew very well that we would not engage in a combat role in Lebanon” (Habib cable Beirut 04022, 132000Z Apr 83, par. 15). That changed during McFarlane’s time. “Up until [July] there was no basic problem,” Habib later said. “. . . But the circumstances changed so that the nature of the security threat changes” (Habib testimony, “Review of Adequacy . . . ,” p. 357).

Habib, Draper, and Dillon are scathing in their denunciations of McFarlane’s approach to the mission. He declined to even be briefed by Habib because he did not want to be “contaminated” by Habib’s thinking (Draper 5-4-93; Dillon in Dillon/Barrett 5-9-94). McFarlane’s decision to call in American strikes at Suq-al-Gharb was “a disastrous mistake,” decided by “a real imbecile” (Draper 5-4-93). Dillon describes McFarlane and his staff as self-important, secretive, and ignorant “NSC sons of bitches” who “believed they had a duty to somehow restore the use of military force as an American policy option. . . . McFarlane and company were constantly coming up with schemes that would have required naval gun-fire or forays from ships anchored off the coast. [The military] mainly resisted these ideas. . . . The Marine officers on the ground, although aggressive young men the way Marines must be, were really fairly apprehensive about American involvement which would have forced them to take up arms on one side or another. Therefore the Marine officers were in increasing opposition to Bud McFarlane and his team” (Dillon ADST oral history; Dillon 5-9-94). McFarlane in his memoirs is equally critical of Habib’s work.

Truck bombs: Long, p. 32-33; Frank, p. 94. The IDF’s partial withdrawal concentrated Israeli troops in southern Lebanon, whose population is predominantly Shi’a Muslim. This move radicalized the Shi’a there. The spiritual heart of the Shi’a sect of Islam is Iran. The truck bomber was an Iranian (“Making Sense of the Middle East,” *The Stanford Magazine,* Spring 1986, p. 28-31; Veliotes 6-5-93; Draper 5-4-93).

Anger at McFarlane, my watch: Bider 4-26-93; Dusclaud 4-19-95; Habib interview with Parker, p. 25. Technically, it didn’t happen on McFarlane’s watch either. Six days before the bombing, Reagan appointed him head of the National Security Agency.

Thoroughly planned: Sachar, p. 173; and one of Habib’s colleagues who asked not to be identified by name

Also the most: Khalidi, p. 148; Jansen, p. 13; Habib interview with Dusclaud, p. 3. The 1948-49 war would be considered longer if the number of truce days were added to the number of combat days (Khalidi, p. 148). In the immediate aftermath of the siege, Sharon and Begin pronounced the effort a great victory and an unqualified success. (“Sharon: ‘I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted,’” *The Washington Post,* 8-29-82; Sachar, p. 192; Lewis OH8/11; Jansen, p. 91). But that coat of paint didn’t last long. Sharon later publicly blamed Habib, Veliotes, Draper, and Lewis as the architects of the defeat in Lebanon (Lewis OH 10/81).

Most colossal blunders: Draper OH2. In “The Commando,” *The New Yorker,* 4-17-00, Connie Bruck writes that the invasion was “made for all the wrong reasons, and a quagmire from which they cannot escape. [Sharon’s] aim was, among other things, to drive the P.L.O. out of Lebanon, neutralize Syria, and (with the P.L.O. routed) force the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to forgo their struggle for independence and accept Israeli rule. On every count, it failed.”

This tragedy: “The Commando,” *The New Yorker,* 4-17-00

Worst of all possible: Uri Milstein, “The height of Ariel Sharon’s folly,” *Haaretz*, June 4, 2012

Israel’s Vietnam: For example, “The Commando,” *The New Yorker,* 4-17-00

PLO’s career: One could argue that this ceased to be the case in the second *intifada,* which began in October 2000, but other anti-Israel players were much more prominent in that violence. The name PLO was rarely heard anymore.

Alternatives: Marjorie Habib on multiple occasions

Hezbollah: Shimon Shapira, “The Origins of Hizballah,” *The Jerusalem Quarterly,* no. 46, spring 1988, p. 121-23; Yaacobi 2-14-95; “Courage Under Fire,” *Time,* 6-5-00; Uri Milstein, “The height of Ariel Sharon’s folly,” *Haaretz*, June 4, 2012; “Hezbollah Areas in Beirut Are Hit,” *The New York Times*,” May 27, 2013. Hezbollah’s longer-range goal was to establish in Lebanon an Islamic movement loyal to Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini that would overthrow the Lebanese government and replace it with an Islamic regime on the Iranian model (Shapira, p. 122).

Average of 25: CBS Evening News, 1-1-99. Twenty-one died in southern Lebanon in 1998 (“Israel Mourns More War Dead in Lebanon,” *The New York Times,* 2-24-99).

Mini-invasion: “Israeli Aircraft Strike Guerrillas in Beirut Suburbs,” *The New York Times,* 4-12-96; “Ending the Pain,” *Time,* 5-6-96; “Beirut Staggers As Israel’s Raids Enter Sixth Day,” *The New York Times,* 4-17-96. This was not Israel’s first serious attack in Lebanon (“Israeli Jets, in Answer to Attacks, Bomb Guerrilla Bases in Lebanon,” 7-26-93).

Replaced: Yaacobi 2-14-95. It might be more accurate to say that the war in Lebanon replaced one terrorist threat with two, since Hamas also rose to fill part of the void left by the weakening of the PLO. But Hamas’ rise was not directly attributable to the war in Lebanon.

Political factor, idea: Yaacobi 2-14-95

Puppet state: “Israel Mourns More War Dead in Lebanon,” *The* *New York Times,* 2-24-99. This defense minister was Moshe Arens, who had been Israel’s ambassador to the US during the siege.

Epitaph: Ze’ev Manowitz, writing in *Ha’aretz* in early August 1982, quoted in Sachar, p. 194-95; see also “After a General Tells of Killing P.O.W.’s in 1956, Israelis Argue Over Ethics of War,” *The New York Times,* 8-21-95

Security zone: “Courage Under Fire,” *Time,* 6-5-00; “Israel Quitting Lebanon After 22 Years,” *The New York Times,* 5-24-00 (the 22 years counts back to Israel’s 1978 invasion, Operation Litani); “Barak Declares End to ‘Tragedy’ as Last Troops Leave Lebanon,” *The New York Times,* 5-24-00; “The Commando,” *The New Yorker,* 4-17-00. The 1,550 figure is *Time’*s; *The New York Times’* “Barak Declares…” article says more than 900 since 1978.

Estimates: Jansen, p. 38; Dillon OH2; Seale, p. 388; Mikdadi, p. 137, 140. An independent Lebanese newspaper, *An Nahar,* published by Habib’s friend Ghassan Tueni, determined that there were 17,825 dead and 30,103 wounded, not counting Israelis (“Lebanese Paper Puts Toll at 17,825 Killed,” *The New York Times,* 9-2-82).

Killed more than 650: This number is mentioned in an Israeli judge’s ruling quoted in “Begin knew Sharon deceived him,” *Ha’aretz,* 11-5-97; another article, “Court rules in libel case: Sharon misled Begin,” *The Jerusalem Post,* 11-5-97, says over 600. The IDF earlier said they had 368 dead and 2,902 wounded (Gabriel, p. 235); Fisk (p. 298) and Schiff & Ya’ari (p. 301) both say over 500 Israelis died.

Begin: Kadishai 6-19-95; “Mr. Begin’s Legacy,” by Anthony Lewis, *The New York Times,* 9-1-83; “Israel Loses Its Nerve,” by Joseph Kraft, *The Washington Post,* 9-1-83. Begin’s friend and longtime aide Yehiel Kadishai points out that Begin had said some years earlier that he would retire from politics at age seventy, and that he turned seventy twelve days before announcing his resignation, which took effect September 15.

Kahan Commission report: Kahan, p. 32, 33, 49. Sharon chalked up his dismissal to being a scapegoat for “what Christian Arabs had done to Moslem Arabs” (Sharon, p. 519, 521-24).

Sharon deceived Begin: “Begin knew Sharon deceived him,” *Ha’aretz,* 11-5-97; “Court rules in libel case: Sharon misled Begin,” *The Jerusalem Post,* 11-5-97

Temple Mount, *Intifada:* “Sharon Touches a Nerve, and Jerusalem Explodes,” *The New York Times,* 9-29-00; “Cease-Fire Doesn’t Quell Holy Land Violence,” Associated press, 10-1-00; “As Arabs and Israelis Fight On, Albright Seeks Talks” and “At Arms Again, Suddenly,” *The New York Times,*  10-3-00; “The Great Unraveling: End of Oslo Era, With a Bang,” *The New York Times,* 10-26-00; “Arafat’s Gift,” *The New Yorker,*  1-29-01, p. 54; National Public Radio’s “Morning Edition,” 10-6-01

Sharon’s path to prime minister: “Sharon Easily Ousts Barak to Become Israel’s Premier; Calls for a Reconciliation,” *The New York Times,* 2-7-01; “As Israelis Vote, Dreams of Peace Seem to Be Fading,” *The New York Times,* 2-6-01; “Out of exile Once Again, Sharon is Focus of Israel,” *The New York Times,* 1-24-01; “Desert Hawk,” *Vanity Fair,* January 2002

Arrest, liquidate: “Playing Into Sharon’s Hands,” *The New York Times,* 1-25-02; “Sharon is Sorry Israel Didn’t Kill Arafat in the 80’s,” *The New York Times,* 2-1-02

Carson: “The Tonight Show,” March 13, 1986, per a note in one of Habib’s scrapbooks

December 1983 journalist: Habib interview with the author 12-21-83

Depressed: Cheitlin 3-26-93

Shifting gears: Shultz 7-25-94; Shultz, p. 627. His wife Marjorie was very protective of him. Whenever the phone would ring, she would race him for it so that, if someone was calling to ask him to make a trip somewhere, she could say, “He’s not here.” Phil grumbled to a friend that he had to get more phones around the house, including one in the bathroom, so he could get it before Marge did (Dusclaud 4-19-95; Dusclaud interview with Yves LeGouar 8-95). Whenever he would go to Washington, he would have her drive him to the San Francisco airport. He would never take a cab, she says, “because that would cost the taxpayers money! One time I couldn’t get out of a bridge game to take him. He was furious at me for making him take a taxi!” (Marjorie Habib 3-26-94).

Heroes: Bush letter to the author 7-1-93; also Bush note to Marjorie Habib 5-27-92

Seldom ask: Habib letter to Wyn Hall, 8-14-89

Manila, Marcos: Shultz, p. 608-42.

Central America mission: Shultz, p. 950-69; Arias 6-24-95 and 10-1-95; Shultz 7-25-94

Discarded, moped: Cheitlin 3-26-93

Redeeming: Habib letter to Wyn Hall, 8-14-89

Heart: Cheitlin 3-26-93 and 3-10-01

Itchy feet: Habib letter to Walter Orebaugh, 5-18-92

Drove, suspected: Dusclaud interview with Yves LeGouar 8-95, translated by Alice Eddé; Dusclaud 4-19-95

Habib’s death: Dusclaud interview with Yves LeGouar 8-95; Cheitlin 3-26-93 and 3-10-01. Some press reports inaccurately said he had died after visiting several wine cellars in Burgundy. In fact, he died just before his winetasting would have begun.

Military cemetery: Marjorie Habib 5-18-97 and 8-19-01

Some lifetimes: “Personalities,” *The Washington Post,* 3-1-80

**Appendix: Basis for Mistrust**

June 6-8: Bavly, p. 165

June 13: Habib cable from Jerusalem 01903 of June 13, 1982, repeated in State 163551, 142321Z Jun 82, par. 25; *Sunday Times* of London, 6-20-82; cited in Jansen, p. 35-36. “It is utterly appalling,” the paper wrote, “that the Israeli victors should obstruct these humanitarian non-political operations.” On July 6 Israel’s ally the Phalange helped maintain the blockade of West Beirut by turning back a Red Cross convoy at the port (Stoessel cable State 186129 TOSEC 100100, 060031Z Jul 82, par. 3).

June 14-July 5: Discussed in chapter 4, “We Corner Them, You Kill Them”

June 15: Lewis 6-15-82 cable quoted in Haig cable 051526, 170048Z Jun 82, par. 3-4; Paganelli cable from Damascus 04216, 151108Z Jun 82 [6-15-82]

July 5: “Radio Communication between C. Hill - Habib, 7/6/82, 0715” 8218995, 7-6-82, p. 1 and 5

July 30: Hill 7-16-94

Aug 1: Hill 7-21-94

Aug 2: NEA Veliotes memo to The Secretary, 8-2-82, 8223177; Hill 7-21-94

Intermediary pass: Habib cable from Beirut 05338, 121420Z Aug 82, par. 7; Habib cable from Beirut 5321, quoted in State 226706, 130147Z Aug 82, par. 1-3; Hill 7-21-94